




Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
From Beirut to Belfast 






Czar Alexei Sepe 
 





An Honors Senior Thesis submitted to The Honors Program of the 









FROM BEIRUT TO BELFAST: 


















































Dedicated to my aunt, Mary Jane Mercado, who lost her life to COVID-19, and to all healthcare 




Table of Contents 
 
 
Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................. iv 
 
Preface and Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... v 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: Power-Sharing Through the Rearview Window? ..................................................... 1 
 
Chapter 2 
Sites of Social Interaction and Cohesion Strategies: A Theory of Ethnic Tensions after Power-
Sharing Agreements ...................................................................................................................... 15 
 
Chapter 3 
Lebanon: A Nation Faces a Tough Reality ................................................................................... 49 
 
Chapter 4 
Northern Ireland: A Fight for Peace ............................................................................................ 93 
 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion: Is Power-Sharing Worth It? ................................................................................... 133 
 





Table of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Three Main Institutional Designs for Power-Sharing ................................................... 20 
 
Figure 2. A Typology of Sites of Social Interactions (SSIs) in Divided Societies ....................... 31 
 
Figure 3. A Typology of Cohesion Strategies in Divided Societies ............................................. 35 
 
Figure 4. Relationship Between Theoretical Frameworks and Ethnic Tension in Post-Conflict 
Societies ........................................................................................................................................ 41 
 
Figure 5. How Power-Sharing affects Ethnic Tensions in Post-Conflict Societies ...................... 45 
 
Figure 6. Political and Military Actors during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989) .................. 57 
 
Figure 7. Sites of Social Interaction (SSIs) and Cohesion Strategies in the Taif Accords ........... 59 
 
Figure 8. Lebanon Predicted Outcomes ........................................................................................ 65 
 
Figure 9. Implementation of Taif Accords 10 Years After Adoption ........................................... 71 
 
Figure 10. Ethnographic Map of Beirut ........................................................................................ 85 
 
Figure 11. Lebanon Case Study Findings ..................................................................................... 91 
 
Figure 12. Political and Military Actors in the Troubles (1968-1998) ....................................... 104 
 
Figure 13. Sites of Social Interaction (SSIs) and Cohesion Strategies in the GFA .................... 108 
 
Figure 14. Northern Ireland Predicted Outcomes ....................................................................... 113 
 
Figure 15. Implementation of GFA 10 Years After Adoption .................................................... 118 
 
Figure 16. Northern Ireland Political Attitudes, 2013-2019 ....................................................... 129 
 
Figure 17. Northern Ireland Case Study Findings ...................................................................... 131 
 
Figure 18. Summary of Case Study Findings ............................................................................. 133 
  
 v 
Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
I was sitting on my AerLingus flight from Dublin to Newark, reminiscing—as any college 
student who studies abroad does—of the memories I’ve made during my semester in Ireland. 
Scrolling through my Facebook timeline, I reflected on the weekend excursions, the nightly 
outings, and the new friends I made. I can safely say I enjoyed the good craic.  
 
One photo stuck out to me.  
 
In October 2019, I visited Northern Ireland for a couple of days. I had only learned tidbits of the 
political turbulence that roiled that part of the island, like the notorious IRA or Bloody Sunday 
(which was just a U2 song to me then). I recalled encountering a protest in front of Belfast City 
Hall. The protestors kindly informed me that they were upset because the city hall stopped flying 
the Union Jack in 2012. Frankly, the demonstration felt more like the monthly meeting at your 
local Elks Lodge: about 10 people, all pretty old, holding up their little flags and signs as they 
talk about the ‘good ol’ days.’ But the flags they were waving were extremely provocative if you 
knew what they meant. It was the regimental colors of the 1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment—
the British soldiers who perpetrated the Bloody Sunday massacre. In a ludicrous photo, I stand in 
front of the protestors: thumbs-up, smiling obliviously. Just like your stereotypical tourist. 
 
The summer beforehand, I was in Beirut, and the parallels were uncanny. Thanks to the Aggad 
Fellowship, I studied beginner Arabic at the Lebanese American University. Sectarianism felt so 
blatant in Lebanon. Meandering throughout the cluttered streets, I saw political posters 
everywhere, depicting politicians with their eye-to-eye grins—but there wasn’t even an election 
going on. Walking through an alleyway from the grocery store to my apartment, I saw a group of 
older men, about 5 of them, towards the end of the street. They sat around in a circle with their 
plastic chairs, sipping their coffee and smoking their hookahs. Next to them was the sky-blue 
flag of the Future Movement, a Sunni political party. As I passed them, they all perked up, 
mumbling to each other—serving as sentinels for their neighborhood. Visibly shaken, I scurry 
off, avoiding their menacing glares. Safe to say, I did not take a picture with them.  
 
For me, this symbolic parallel commenced my rabbit-hole exploration of the similarities between 
Lebanon and Northern Ireland. Both countries have confessional governments. Both experienced 
internal political strife; both were bloody and fratricidal. Both countries were known as notorious 
havens for terrorism. However, I felt one intuitive difference: Lebanon felt like a nation in 
disarray, unable to cope with its civil war past (I was there three months before the October 
Revolution), while Northern Ireland felt lively and hopeful for their future. In one place, I can 
jokingly take a picture with the Loyalist partisans—in the other, I felt like I was going to get into 
some serious trouble with a Sunni gang. Why? 
 
My thesis is an attempt to answer the questions I raised during my time abroad. It also gave me a 
good excuse to look back on my own ‘good ol’ days’ in Europe and the Middle East, especially 
since foreign travel won’t be occurring in the near future. Most importantly, though, it serves to 
showcase how I’ve developed as a writer and researcher, both in history and political science. 
Though cliché, I really do believe this work is a culmination of my undergraduate academic 




Inspiration for the title came from Thomas Friedman’s award-winning memoir, From Beirut to 
Jerusalem (1989). In the off-chance you ever stumble upon this thesis, Mr. Friedman, I must say 
thank you.  
 
I was lucky enough to make many friends in Dublin and Beirut. To my Irish friends: thank you 
for sharing your candid thoughts with me. I would like to particularly thank Séan Quinn at 
Trinity College, Dublin, for recommending that I visit Belfast. Alongside great hummus and 
plenty of sun, I must thank my Lebanese friends for giving me valuable insight: Joe Monem, 
John Haibi, Raed Khairallah and Firas Farah. Special thanks go to LAU’s SINARC program and 
my Arabic teachers: Laure Obeid and Sara Ammar. Also, I must thank Ghia from the Université 
Saint Joseph for our Global Conversations discussion, as she shed light on her country’s 
situation. My heart goes out to Lebanon—for its suffering, but resilient people.  
 
I must thank my thesis advisor, Professor Peter Krause, and the department thesis supervisor, 
Professor Jennie Purnell. Working with Prof. Krause on his research team sophomore year 
exposed me to research methods and political violence literature—but most importantly, he 
fostered my keen interest in this field. So during the end of my junior year, I felt it was a no-
brainer to ask him to advise me. Prof. Krause has been very patient with me throughout the 
writing process. And I have learned many lessons, from overcoming methodological roadblocks 
to making some of the most stunning scholarly figures you’ve ever seen. I hope you enjoy 
reading all of this, Professor. Many thanks also go to Prof. Purnell, who was flexible as I decided 
to push on writing this work, in a time when I had personally felt overwhelmed during the 
pandemic. My thanks also go to librarian Julia Hughes, who guided me through primary source 
databases and procured books I requested that supplemented my research. 
 
I would like to thank the Boston College community for their support, pushing me to do bigger 
and better things, and fostering my intellectual and social life. I must thank my mentors: 
Professor Kathleen Bailey, Professor Oliver Rafferty, S.J., Professor Robert Savage, and 
Monetta Edwards, Director of the Winston Center for Leadership and Ethics. They always had 
their door open to me whenever I needed advice, pushing me in various directions and providing 
me with immense opportunities. My Perspectives teacher, Professor Antonia Atanassova, 
deserves my thanks as well. She gave me the confidence and encouragement to publish an essay 
in an undergraduate journal freshman year, fostering my academic curiosity in Stokes Hall. My 
thanks go out to my friends at BC, especially my roommates: the ‘Sleepover,’ ‘Rubi’ D41 and 
D42, and the ‘Kirkwood Manor’ boys. May Route 66 live on. Special thanks go to Thomas 
Shade, whose mastery of tables guided my work. 
 
Lastly, I must thank my friends and family in Parsippany, New Jersey. To my mom, dad, and 
lola: I know I gave you all a heart attack when I said I was going to Beirut. Nevertheless, thank 
you for your tireless support for everything I do—and above all, for your unbounded love.  
 
C. A. Sepe  




Introduction: Power-Sharing Through the Rearview Window? 
 
“My friends and my road-fellows, pity the nation that is full of beliefs and empty of religion.  
Pity the nation that wears a cloth it does not weave, eats bread it does not harvest, and drinks a 
wine that flows not from its own winepress…” 
“Pity the nation whose sages are dumb with years and whose strong men are yet in the cradle.  
Pity the nation divided into fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation.”  
 
– Kahlil Gibran, The Garden of the Prophet1 
 
“History says, Don’t hope / On the side of the grave,’ / But then, once in a lifetime / The longed 
for tidal wave / Of justice can rise up / And hope and history rhyme.” 
“So hope for a great sea-change / On the far side of revenge. / Believe that a further shore / Is 
reachable from here. / Believe in miracles. / And cures and healing wells.” 
 




  If you have the chance to go to Beirut, don’t take an Uber—take a service (pronounced 
“ser-vees”). These decades-old sedans meander throughout the city, clogging up the congested 
main arteries built over ancient Roman roads, honking and heckling their way to make a living. 
Standard fare is usually LL2,000—a little over $1 USD—for almost anywhere in the greater 
Beirut area, but as custom, you’ll have to negotiate with your taxi driver.3 There is one caveat 
though: as Nayla Assaf writes, drivers like Abu George “would not settle for less than LL7,000 
to take his customer from Gemaizeh to Caracas, a distance that could be covered in 15 minutes 
 
1 “The Garden Of The Prophet by Kahlil Gibran,” accessed February 24, 2021, 
http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks05/0500581h.html. 
2 “The Cure of Troy,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, accessed March 24, 2021, https://www.post-
gazette.com/news/insight/2021/02/21/The-cure-of-Troy/stories/202102210026. 
3 This was the case when I visited Lebanon in June and July 2019. Since the financial collapse in the autumn of that 
year, the country has hit hyperinflation. For decades, the Lebanese pound was pegged at “roughly 1,500 to the 
dollar,” however, “dollars were being sold on the black market for up to L£9,5000.” In real terms, the “average 
prices for food and non-alcoholic beverages rose 402 per cent” in one year alone. See Chloe Cornish, “Currency 
Crisis Leaves Lebanese Cupboards Bare,” Financial Times, February 21, 2021, 
https://www.ft.com/content/69e1e040-d8d7-494e-9a90-6f02f68f0bf7. 
 2 
providing there [was] no other traffic.”4 On the other hand, a trip from Gemaizeh to Hazmiyeh, 
which is a further distance, only costs the standard LL2,000.5 Abu George is not being absurd or 
nonsensical—it’s the norm.  
In reality, this is a recurring pattern among many service drivers. It is a subtle remnant of 
Lebanon’s civil war, which separated East and West Beirut between Christians and Muslims, 
respectively. Driving from Gemaizeh to Caracas involves crossing the dividing line—the 
notorious ‘Green Line’—but not Gemaizeh to Hazmiyeh, neighborhoods that both lie in East 
Beirut. Assaf puts it eloquently: “Although the barricades, the checkpoints and the militiamen 
once positioned on either side of the three demarcation lines disappeared…after the 1975-1990 
civil war ended, in most taxi drivers’ minds, they are still there.”6 The ghost of the Green Line 
lingers, and the mental barriers emanate throughout everyday life in Beirut.  
Speaking to another service driver, Richard Hall interviews Gabriel Saad about 
conversation etiquette: “politics is off the table, [Saad] adds—it’s too divisive. But bemoaning 
the state of the country is the great unifier.”7 Lebanon is approaching thirty years since the end of 
its civil war, but even after all that time, the war’s zeitgeist stubbornly persists. The services 
themselves, a system created when the civil war decimated the country’s public transportation, 
have survived sectarian strife, foreign occupation, and Islamist terrorism. It does help that the 
Lebanese state has been incapable of rebuilding the public transport system since the 1989 Taif 
Accords that ushered in peace. What unifies the Lebanese people, ironically, is Saad’s 
 
4 “Green Line Lives on in Minds of Beirut’s Taxi Drivers,” The Daily Star Newspaper - Lebanon, October 13, 2003, 
https://www.dailystar.com.lb//News/Lebanon-News/2003/Oct-13/40396-green-line-lives-on-in-minds-of-beiruts-
taxi-drivers.ashx. 
5 Ibid. Assaf’s report, written in 2003, says the standard service fare was LL1,000. From personal experience, the 
fare has since increased to LL2,000 (as of July 2019). 
6 Ibid. 
7 “Uber Has Met Its Match with Lebanon’s Old-School Carpool Taxis,” The World from PRX, accessed February 
26, 2021, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-11-03/city-s-cheap-old-school-carpool-service-puts-uber-test. 
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sentiments, embodied in the common expression: hukoomi zift. Translated literally to “the 
government is asphalt,” the word zift ( تفز ) is an insult in Arabic, so a better translation would go 
along the lines of “the government is shit.”8  
Unfortunately, Lebanon is in an abysmal state. Since anti-government protests rocked 
Beirut in October 2019, a banking and political crisis precipitated, devaluating the Lebanese 
pound and ruining the savings of many people—all on top of the Coronavirus pandemic. A year 
later, government ineptitude culminated in the August 2020 Beirut port explosion, when “nearly 
3,000 tons of ammonium nitrate detonated, killed 211 people and injured more than 6,000.”9 An 
influx of global sympathy and solidarity after the blast projected Lebanon’s plight on the world 
stage. Nonetheless, international aid is being conditioned on wholesale government reforms, but 
negotiations over power-sharing Cabinet positions are at a deadlock (as of March 2021). Because 
of these cascading crises, the World Bank asserts that Lebanon is faced with “an arduous and 
prolonged depression.”10 Hala Saghbini’s Tweet captures the national mood: “The dollar is equal 
to 10,000 pounds. People are hungry, prices are flying and there is no electricity. We want a 
government immediately. Enough humiliation of the people.”11 Although this spiral of tragedy is 
enveloping the country, you can count on one thing: the service will live on, zigzagging Beirut—
its taxi drivers providing an integral lifeline for the nation. 
 
8 See “How Do You Translate ‘Zeft’?," ArabLit & ArabLit Quarterly, accessed February 27, 2021, 
https://arablit.org/2016/08/26/how-do-you-translate-zeft/. This article provides a lively discussion on the meanings 
and connotations of the word zift. A debate about how to effectively convey the meaning of the word into English 
ensued after the prominent Arab commentator Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi asked for a translation on his Facebook 
page. 






 Meanwhile, in a different part of the world, taking a taxi becomes a history lesson—and 
yes, even a tourist attraction. These are the Black Taxis of Belfast. Taxi drivers operate tours 
through East and West Belfast for mesmerized foreigners—many of whom are spending a 
weekend around Northern Ireland’s luscious countryside and natural landmarks, like the Giants’ 
Causeway. The drivers are not only your tour guides, but in keeping with the island’s poetic 
tradition, they transform into wise Irish bards who recount harrowing tales of violence, hatred, 
and sectarian revenge. Driving you past one of the over sixty “peace walls,” they point to the 
murals that adorn the barriers dividing Catholic and Protestant communities.12 The artwork 
illustrates a troubled past, but also a hopeful future. As one mural says, “there’s more in 
common…than what divides us.”13 I took one of these tours in the fall of 2019. When I asked if 
Guinness (which is a pub staple in the Republic of Ireland) is ubiquitous among the Northern 
Irish regardless of sectarian affiliation, David, our driver, first hesitated—then responded: “Does 
a bear shit in the woods?” 
 The tourism sector has played a key role in the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland, 
providing new economic opportunities for its people. The Troubles, an ethnic-religious conflict 
that ravaged the region for over thirty years, was thrust into global consciousness when the BBC 
broadcasted brutal images of innocent protestors being gunned down in the street by the British 
army—an event known as Bloody Sunday.14 Today, streams of tourists gawk at working-class 
 
12 “The Peace Walls of Belfast: Do They Still Help Keep the Peace?” CBC, August 29, 2019, 
https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/the-peace-walls-of-belfast-do-they-still-help-keep-the-peace-1.5262640. 
13 Hugh Biggar, “The Murals on Belfast’s ‘Peace Walls’ Offer an Illustrated History of the Troubles,” Washington 
Post, accessed March 4, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/the-murals-on-belfasts-peace-walls-
offer-an-illustrated-history-of-the-troubles/2018/08/15/4c993480-9cca-11e8-8d5e-c6c594024954_story.html. 
14 See Robert J. Savage, The BBC’s “Irish Troubles”: Television, Conflict and Northern Ireland (Manchester: 
University Press, 2015), 93-5. Savage writes how the iconic footage of Father Edward Daly carrying a gunned-down 
youth was a diplomatic fiasco for the British. For example, after those images were transmitted across the Atlantic, 
the British embassy in Washington frantically went into damage control—especially in light of the outcry from 
prominent Irish-American members of Congress, like Senator Ted Kennedy. 
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Belfast neighborhoods most affected by the political violence: places like the Falls Road and the 
Short Strand. This “dark tourism,” or the “desire to visit places worldwide which are linked to 
atrocities and tragedies,” has been a worldwide trend in recent years—and the Northern Irish 
have cashed in on it.15 In 2001, only three years after the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement 
(commonly known as the Good Friday Agreement), “the six counties that comprise the province 
drew 1.2 million visitors…and a solid percentage of them are drawn to the place by a fascination 
with the Northern Ireland of the headlines.”16 By 2019, the province drew a whopping 5.3 
million visitors and about £1 billion into the local economy.17 It seems that Northern Ireland has 
overcome its divisions, and can even share its historical pains to the world as an avenue for 
economic growth. 
 But of course, it’s not that simple. For its part, Northern Ireland has maintained peace—
albeit a tense, frigid one. The 2016 Brexit referendum renewed concerns for ethnic violence in 
the province. The main problem for Northern Ireland was the imposition of hard border checks 
between north and south on the island—thereby violating the peace agreement—if the UK were 
to withdraw from the EU Common Market. Republicans capitalized on majority discontent over 
the Brexit result and reinvigorated calls for a border poll with the goal of Irish unification.18 Yet, 
in 2017, Sinn Féin exited power-sharing, and the country was left without a regional 
government. After a three-year hiatus from Stormont, Sinn Féin (SF) and the Democratic 
 
15 “‘Dark Tourism’ Booms at Northern Ireland’s Troubles Museums,” BBC News, accessed March 4, 2021, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-46046674. 
16 Tom Mudd, “In Belfast, Cabs Offer Tours Showing Scenes of Conflict,” Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2002, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1022159743471097240. 
17 “Tourism | Department for the Economy,” May 17, 2015, https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/topics/tourism; “The 
Tourist Economy in Northern Ireland,” accessed March 4, 2021, https://www.nibusinessinfo.co.uk/content/tourist-
economy-northern-ireland. 
18 Gerry Moriarty, “Shared Island: Northern Ireland Is Still a Society on a Sectarian Edge,” The Irish Times, 
accessed February 22, 2021, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/shared-island-northern-ireland-is-
still-a-society-on-a-sectarian-edge-1.4344699. 
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Unionist Party (DUP) entered into power-sharing in January 2020, enacting a compromise deal 
that revised institutional procedures and finally acknowledged the Irish language (alongside the 
Ulster-Scots language)—just before the Coronavirus pandemic.19 Nonetheless, trouble looms on 
the horizon. In March 2021, a council of loyalist paramilitary groups renounced the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) because of the Northern Ireland protocol in the UK-EU trade deal.20 Political 
tensions are rising, and ethnic animosities are re-awakening, but as the debate rages on, the Black 
Taxis idly stand by in Belfast city center amidst worldwide travel bans—waiting for their 
longed-for tourists.  
 This tale of two taxis magnifies broader, deep-rooted questions about war, peace, and 
reconciliation—in parts of the world where sectarian division has been a way of life. Lebanon 
and Northern Ireland are examples of what scholars have termed as “deeply divided societies”: 
“post-war countries with salient vertical (identity-based) cleavages that are perceived to threaten 
stability and peace,” according to Rima Majed.21 In the wake post-World War II decolonization 
and the era of national liberation movements, questions about nationhood and identity challenged 
theorists and practitioners alike. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, renewed attention to ethnic 
violence captured political scientists and the general public. As the world watched in horror the 
atrocities at Srebrenica and Rwanda—seemingly ‘tribe-like,’ ‘primordial,’ and hate-fueled 
genocides and massacres—fierce debates over the United States’ “responsibility to protect” 
 
19 “Stormont Talks: Main NI Parties Agree Power-Sharing Deal,” BBC News, January 10, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-51068774. 
20 “Brexit: Loyalist Paramilitary Groups Renounce Good Friday Agreement,” The Guardian, March 4, 2021, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/mar/04/brexit-northern-ireland-loyalist-armies-renounce-good-friday-
agreement. 
21 Rima Majed, “What’s So Deep About Deeply Divided Societies? Rethinking Sectarianism in the Middle East,” 
American University of Beirut, accessed February 27, 2021, 
http://www.aub.edu.lb:80/nyo/Briefings/Pages/sectarianismfulltextsummary.aspx. 
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(R2P) engulfed Washington.22 Conflict resolution theories endeavored to find political and 
institutional solutions to deep-rooted conflict in these societies. This is where the concept of 
‘power-sharing’ comes in.  
 Power-sharing institutions—or consociationalism—are, as Caroline Hartzell and 
Matthew Hoddie define, “rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by 
groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, 
among collectivities competing for power.”23 These specific arrangements, comprised of special 
constitutions, electoral processes, and safeguards were seen by many as a political path towards 
peace in divided societies. From apartheid South Africa to the minuscule island of Bougainville, 
political leaders devised power-sharing frameworks that account for opposing ethnic 
communities. Indeed, the constitutional make-ups of Lebanon and Northern Ireland are viewed 
as consociationalism par excellence. Both countries were involved in violent political conflicts 
between ethnic-religious communities and ended their hostilities via power-sharing. Both polities 
have maintained power-sharing institutions since the end of the twentieth century. However, how 
has power-sharing played out in these two countries, and many other divided societies, after 
peace is achieved? I had a hunch that there must be some relationship between Lebanon’s 
absolute failure as a state and Northern Ireland’s relative success. Why is this the case? 
 My thesis picks up the conversation on this topic. Recent literature has explored power-
sharing in practice, and the successes and challenges states have faced when implementing this 
form of constitution. How have power-sharing institutions affected divided societies? What 
effects have they had on ethnic identities? Why do some arrangements succeed, while others 
 
22 See Charles Homans, “Responsibility to Protect: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, accessed 
March 29, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/responsibility-to-protect-a-short-history/. 
23 Caroline A Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “Power Sharing and the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil War,” 
International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 641–53, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz023, 643.  
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fail? A lively debate about the answers to these questions has kept the fields of conflict 
resolution and ethnic violence interesting and engaging. As I studied these subjects, I was 
intrigued by a particular facet in this debate; namely, questions about the relationship between 
power-sharing arrangements and ethnic tensions. Thus, I decided to ask, “To what extent do 
power-sharing institutions affect ethnic tensions in divided societies?” In the following chapters, 
I attempt to find some answers.  
1.2: Thesis Outline 
 
To what extent do power-sharing arrangements increase or decrease ethnic tensions? 
How can we conceptualize a way to analyze power-sharing that better reflects its potential 
effects on ethnic animosities? Why do power-sharing agreements succeed or fail? This thesis sets 
to explore these questions through a theoretical framework that will help analyze post-conflict 
societies. Using Lebanon and Northern Ireland as comparative case studies, I test my theoretical 
framework to see if it can provide a potential explanation of the relationship between power-
sharing and ethnic tensions (if there is any). I provide key insights for academics and 
practitioners on power-sharing institutions, weighing their merits and limitations through my 
conceptual lens.  
 In Chapter 2, I lay a foundation to understand power-sharing agreements in relation to 
ethnic tensions in post-conflict societies. To better conceptualize the research question, I separate 
it into two main parts: political institutions and ethnic identity. I provide a literature review of 
conflict resolution theories, zeroing in on consociational theories of democracy. Then, I engage 
in theories of ethnicity and identity formation, using scholarly works from historians, 
anthropologists, and social scientists to answer this fundamental question: “what is ethnicity?” 
To sum up, I find that ethnic identity is not primordial nor static. Rather it is developed and 
 9 
constantly reconfigured in relation to others, creating an in-group/out-group dynamic via an 
actual or perceived common blood lineage. Ethnicity is not inherently political, but in ethnically 
divided countries, it becomes the main political cleavage.  
 With these concepts identified, defined, and operationalized, I present my theory of 
power-sharing and ethnic tensions. I use Pierre Nora’s lieux de mémoire scheme of historical 
memory to craft a theory of sites of social interaction (SSIs for short). Three sites of social 
interaction are (1) sites of contestation, where interactions are a zero-sum game, resulting in 
winners and losers; (2) sites of coexistence, where interactions are underpinned by a notion of 
tolerance or a ‘stay-in-your-own-lane’ mentality; and (3) sites of collaboration, where 
interactions are of mutual benefit, and separate identities share the space. In addition, I outline 
three main strategies of social cohesion in power-sharing institutions to supplement my analysis 
of ethnic tensions, namely: (1) assimilation, in which a new national identity is constructed or a 
hegemonic ethnic identity is imposed on all other ethnic groups; (2) differentiation, in which 
ethnic identities are tolerated in society and a pluralistic outlook takes root; and (3) segregation, 
in which ethnic groups are separated, causing a bifurcation of national identity. These predictions 
inform my final hypothesis: SSIs and cohesion strategies that increase tensions will cause power-
sharing failure in the long run, and vice versa—SSIs and cohesion strategies that decrease 
tensions will lead to power-sharing success.  
 In theory, certain sites of social interaction and cohesion strategies will increase or 
decrease ethnic tensions. Sites of contestation are more likely to increase tensions, while sites of 
collaboration may decrease tensions. A strategy of assimilation is conducive to an increase in 
ethnic antagonisms, while segregation is conducive to a corresponding decrease. Both sites of 
coexistence and a differentiation strategy may either increase or decrease ethnic tensions, 
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depending on case-specific factors. All these logics are spelled out in Chapter 2, giving us ample 
material to test in our two case studies: Lebanon and Northern Ireland. The research design 
consists of a structured, focused comparison combined with smaller within-case studies. I 
provide historical context and process trace the practice of power-sharing in both polities, to 
inform my textual analysis of the Taif Accords and the Belfast Agreement. I premise my 
empirical chapters on the congruence method to see whether or not my hypotheses stand up to 
scrutiny in the Lebanon and Northern Ireland cases by conducting within-case analyses of 
particular aspects of society. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 engage in each case’s power-sharing arrangements, their 
implementation, and specific areas of post-conflict society within the SSI and cohesion strategy 
framework. In the third chapter, I explore the case of Lebanon. I trace Lebanon’s history of 
power-sharing, noting how consociation has been an integral institution for the country, to keep 
the mosaic of ethnic and religious communities in harmony. Ethnic tensions rose drastically in 
the aftermath of Lebanese independence and the Palestinian national movement, which brought 
about the Lebanese civil war in 1975. About fifteen years later in 1989, ethnic-religious 
paramilitary groups were ready—with the looming shadow of Syria—to enter into peace 
negotiations, culminating in the Taif Accords.  
I then study the power-sharing structures in Taif, placing its provisions in the theory of 
sites of social interaction and cohesion strategies. The settlement was clearly designed to placate 
multiple ethnic-group actors, which resulted in divergent SSIs and cohesion strategies throughout 
the document. I conclude that in its general outlook, the Taif Accords envisioned a site of 
coexistence and pursued assimilation and differentiation strategies. In engaging with two specific 
spheres in Taif—Lebanese education and economic segregation/displacement—I determine the 
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extent to which the treaty was implemented, and if these sites and strategies were manifested as 
envisioned in the settlement. Due to many factors, such as Syrian interference, the power-sharing 
agreement was only somewhat implemented. This is expressed in both cases of Lebanese 
education and economic/war displacement, as these post-war spheres became sites of 
contestation through political corruption, clientelism, the meddling of the religious lobby, and 
the neoliberal economic program that catered to the wealthy, rather than the majority of 
Lebanese society. I gauge ethnic sentiments, concluding that there has been a substantial increase 
in sectarian animosities since 1989. Lebanon is indicative of the pitfalls of the SSIs and cohesion 
strategies outlined on paper and their implementation in society. Due to these discrepancies, 
sectarian animosities are exasperated. Therefore, I find that my hypotheses correspond to 
Lebanon’s post-war regime—and its failure. 
The fourth chapter analyzes Northern Ireland. Unlike Lebanon, Northern Ireland does not 
have a legacy of power-sharing. The formation of Northern Ireland ensured a Protestant-majority 
regime. For its first forty years, Protestants held a solid grip over the country. However, Irish, 
Catholic nationalists, mobilized along ethnic-religious lines, overwhelmed the Protestant, 
unionist Stormont government in the wake of the civil rights protests, in the late 1960s. By 1972, 
paramilitary groups engaged in political violence, commencing a period known as the Troubles. 
After failed attempts at resolving the political issues that fomented the violence in the region—
from the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement to the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement—the United 
Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Irish parties reached the 1998 Belfast 
Agreement (Good Friday Agreement). I analyze this power-sharing agreement, which contains a 
multidimensional approach and focuses not only on political institutions but cultural and socio-
economic issues too.  
 12 
I discern an overarching SSIs of coexistence and collaboration, as well as a strategy of 
differentiation, in the Northern Irish power-sharing agreement. The parity of esteem, a normative 
concept that called for the equality of group status throughout society, undergirded the GFA—
thereby instilling sites of coexistence and collaboration through differentiation. Similar to the 
Lebanese case, I conduct an in-depth study, using our established theories, of two provisions 
included in the GFA: anti-discrimination and employment equality, and decommissioning. On 
balance, the anti-discrimination and equality efforts were successfully implemented, resulting in 
sites of coexistence and collaboration in the workforce and creating differentiation. The 
decommissioning issue transitioned between SSIs during the scope of my investigation: 
envisioned as a collaborative SSI, it quickly became a site of contestation, until the IRA fully 
dumped arms. So, in this case, the result was a site of coexistence through an assimilation 
strategy. My analysis of polling data proves that ethnic tensions have slightly decreased since 
1998. Thus, I find congruence in my hypothesis for the Northern Irish case study—proving that 
SSIs, cohesion strategies, and ethnic tensions all have an important causal link to the success or 
failure of a power-sharing regime after peace is achieved.  
In Chapter 5, I present my overall conclusions, provide implications, ask new questions, 
and present my final remarks about this thesis. There is a clear causal link between power-
sharing arrangements and ethnic tensions in divided societies, through the mechanisms of SSIs 
and cohesion strategies. Power-sharing outcomes are dependent on ethnic tensions. If tensions 
increase, due to SSIs and cohesion strategies that correspond to an increase in animosities, the 
power-sharing regime will fail. Conversely, power-sharing succeeds when tensions decrease, 
because of SSIs and cohesion strategies that suited to decrease tensions. Lebanon and Northern 
Ireland encode power-sharing institutions with different sites of social interaction, as a reflection 
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of a society’s composition, and different cohesion strategies, as a reflection of power-sharing 
design. Implementation, I conclude, provides us with the missing link in our knowledge of 
power-sharing and ethnic tensions. My theory of society, institutional design, and ethnic identity 
expresses these mechanisms and logics, to explain why power-sharing does, or does not, work. 
1.3: Power-Sharing Through the Rearview Window? 
 
 In our tale of two taxis, we see Abu George and David navigate the ghosts of a post-war 
environment in different ways. While the Beiruti service driver hikes up your fare for crossing 
the invisible sectarian dividing line because of the risks, the Belfast cab driver (who identifies as 
a Protestant) had no qualms showing us a mural of Bobby Sands in the republican Falls Road 
neighborhood. Lebanon and Northern Ireland, once notorious for political violence and 
terrorism, have achieved peace. But what kind of peace? Is peace avoiding neighborhoods of 
differing sectarian affiliation? Is peace commercializing ethnic tensions and an unsettled past? It 
is clear that power-sharing has a tangible, real effect on the lives of everyday people in these 
societies. Whether it is Taif or Good Friday, Beirut or Belfast, the grand institutions and hopes 
that power-sharing once held have given way to practical, sobering realities. This is a unique 
moment in time, because there is enough distance to try to study the effects of power-sharing 
with a degree of objectivity, yet it is close enough that many people hold deeply-felt passions 
about this phenomenon on the ground. The year 2020 alone has revealed how political crises 
force us to revisit old questions about identity and power.  
Could we view power-sharing arrangements through the rearview window—of a 1980s 
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 What is the causal relationship between power-sharing arrangements and ethnic tensions 
in divided societies? How do institutions—designed to settle political violence—shape political 
behavior, and thus shape ethnic identity and antagonisms? Specifically, to what extent do power-
sharing agreements increase or decrease ethnic tensions in post-conflicted societies? This chapter 
lays the conceptual framework to tackle these research questions, adding to ethnic conflict and 
political violence literature. In short, the dual schemas of sites of social interaction (SSIs) and 
cohesion strategies explain how power-sharing affects ethnic tensions. Depending on specific 
SSIs and cohesion strategies, tensions may either increase or decrease. Taken as a whole, I 
establish a causal link between society (SSIs), institutional designs (cohesion strategies), ethnic 
tensions and the overall success or failure of a power-sharing regime. These theories contribute 
to the extensive body of literature in the sphere of ethnic conflict and conflict resolution, as 
evident in my literature review below. 
2.2: Literature Review 
 
As a political concept, power-sharing finds its roots in the seventeenth century, when 
German statesman Althusius coined the term “consociational” to “denote a polity consisting of 
an association of several societies.”24 The modern study of consociationalism, or sharing power 
among rival social and identity groups, is mostly attributed to Arend Lijphart’s foundational 
 
24 Rudy B. Andeweg, “Consociationalism,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 
(Second Edition), ed. James D. Wright (Oxford: Elsevier, 2015), 692–94, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-
097086-8.93025-3, 692. 
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investigation of the Netherlands’ political system in the 1960s.25 He situates “consociational 
democracy” in a typology of democratic systems.26 It is no coincidence, however, that this 
concept gained traction during a global era of decolonization and wars of national liberation.27 
These conflicts, throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, made this subject especially 
relevant for social scientists and policymakers. Further interest grew in the 1990s—after the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the resulting ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe—with the subfield 
integrating empirical innovations, like Ted Robert Gurr’s Minorities at Risk Project.28 With new 
social science methods and a fresh batch of relevant cases, consociational studies flourished.  
Alongside the expansion of ethnic conflict studies was a parallel growth in conflict 
resolution studies. Here, many scholars turned their attention back to power-sharing theories of 
government by offering theoretical rebukes of Lijphart’s and his contemporaries’ schemas. 
Donald Horowitz counters Lijphart’s consociational concepts of “inclusion, representation, and 
power sharing” with centripetalism, in which electoral institutions incentivize cross-ethnic 
parties, “encouraging moderation.”29 Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild, on the other hand, 
present “power dividing,” in which institutions mirroring American political institutions—“civil 
 
25 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Consociationalism,” in A Dictionary of Politics in the Middle East (Oxford University 
Press, 2018), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191835278.001.0001/acref-
9780191835278-e-85. 
26 Arend Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems,” Comparative Political Studies 1, no. 1 (1969 1968): 3–44, 
17-22. 
27 See Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?,” World Politics 24, no. 3 (1972): 319–55, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2009753, and his engagement with Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: 
An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, first published in 1953, 322-8. 
28 Ted Robert Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 
Presidential Address,” International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994): 347–77, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600737, 
349. 
29 See Matthijs Bogaards, “Consociationalism and Centripetalism: Friends or Foes?,” Swiss Political Science Review 
25, no. 4 (2019): 519–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12371, 519. Bogaards provides a comprehensive overview of 
the two main opposing schools of consociational democracy in divided societies.  
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liberties, multiple majorities, and checks and balances”—are emphasized.30 This re-invigorated 
interest from academics and politicians in settling ethnic conflicts through power-sharing 
institutions has carried over into the twenty-first century. 
To this end, scholars have identified a clear avenue for further investigation; that is, why 
power-sharing arrangements succeed or fail.31 Principles espoused by earlier theorists have been 
explicitly integrated into peace settlements. For instance, proponents of power-sharing were 
instrumental in Iraq’s new constitutional set-up after the 2003 war.32 In the academic realm, 
Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie employ statistical analysis to study civil war conflict 
settlements and their outcomes from the 1970s to 1990s, finding durable peace in 87.5% of their 
cases.33 Paulina Pospieszna and Gerald Schneider investigate how “war outcomes and the 
institutional legacy of conflict-affected countries” shape power-sharing institutions and political 
decision-making in divided societies.34 Stephen Rosiny and Emer Groarke revive old debates 
about power-sharing’s merits and limits around the ongoing Syrian civil war.35 However, the 
burgeoning political science literature pertaining to ethnic conflict still lacks answers to 
fundamental questions and assumptions about power-sharing arrangements.  
 
30 Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, “Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies,” in Philip G. Roeder and 
Donald S. Rothchild, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005), 15. 
31 Stefan Wolff, “Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Center,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
International Studies, March 1, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.65, 19. 
32 See David L Phillips, “Power-Sharing in Iraq,” Council on Foreign Relations, CRS No. 6, April, 2005, and 
Michael R. Gordon and Anthony Shadid, “U.S. Urges Iraqis to Try New Plan to Share Power,” The New York 
Times, September 10, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/world/middleeast/10policy.html. 
33 Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-
Sharing Arrangements,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 (May 1, 2003): 303–20, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343303040003004, 313.  
34 Paulina Pospieszna and Gerald Schneider, “The Illusion of ‘Peace Through Power-Sharing’: Constitutional 
Choice in the Shadow of Civil War,” Civil Wars 15, no. sup1 (December 4, 2013): 44–70, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2013.850877, 47. 
35 See Stephan Rosiny, “Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon’s Taif Experience,” Middle East Policy 20, 
no. 3 (2013): 41–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12031; and Emer Groarke, “‘Mission Impossible’: Exploring the 
Viability of Power-Sharing as a Conflict-Resolution Tool in Syria,” International Journal of Conflict Management 
27, no. 1 (2016): 2–24, http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJCMA-12-2014-0090. 
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Nils-Christian Bormann et al. identify two specifically understudied areas in power-
sharing theories: “[understanding] the causal chain from institutions to peace or conflict 
outcomes through behavior” and “the possibility that different kinds of power-sharing 
institutions may have different effects on civil peace.”36 Bormann and his colleagues conduct a 
large-N statistical analysis to test their hypotheses, finding that “de jure power-sharing 
institutions affect the likelihood of ethnic conflicts by influencing civil war through power-
sharing practices [emphasis added].”37 My research fleshes out Bormann et al.’s avenues for 
additional study and contributes to the overall subfield. There needs to be a comprehensive 
theory that accounts not only for the causal chain between power-sharing institutions and 
behaviors, but also how they influence ethnic animosities in post-conflict societies. Moreover, 
qualitative methods can better reveal specific factors that affect (and not affect) this causal chain. 
Instead of the statistical large-N approaches of Hartzell and Hoddie and Bormann et al., I plan to 
investigate this phenomenon through the comparative case study method, including within-case 
analysis and process-tracing, which is discussed later in this chapter. Only after teasing out these 
smaller questions do I plan to answer the big-picture question: Do power-sharing institutions 
work? But before I provide my theoretical framework, the next two sections define and 
operationalize seemingly amorphous terms like ‘ethnicity’ and ‘tensions.’ 
2.3: Defining Power-Sharing Agreements and Ethnic Tensions 
 
 What are power-sharing agreements? What are ethnic tensions? While these questions 
seem relatively straightforward, these terms are up for debate because there is no consensus on 
their usages. Power-sharing is situated in the broader realm of consociationalism, which is 
 
36 Nils-Christian Bormann et al., “Power Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace,” American Journal of Political 
Science 63, no. 1 (2019): 84–100, 86. 
37 Ibid., 96. 
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concerned with regime type. John McGarry notes how consociation can be democratic or 
authoritarian.38 There are a multitude of regime-type configurations, with much of the scholarly 
debate focused on which is the best institutional make-up for consociational democracy. Three 
main institutional frameworks emerge: power-sharing consociationalism, centripetalism, and 
power-dividing.39 I adapt Stefan Wolff’s categorizations to provide a simplified overview of 
each institutional design’s recommendation, state construction, and status of rights and identities. 
This thesis will focus on power-sharing consociationalism, although these institutional 
frameworks are often combined in practice by nation-states.   
 
38 John McGarry, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 1.  
39 See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1977); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and 
Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace. 
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Power-sharing agreements are settlements in which opposing factions, oftentimes in 
ethnic conflicts, agree to a formal set of political institutions that distributes power amongst each 
community. I will use power-sharing “agreements,” “arrangements,” and “institutions” to 
describe the same concept. Nevertheless, the contested nuance between each term should be 
acknowledged. For example, McGarry and his colleague Matt O’Leary emphasize the 
importance of an “…agreement on transitional issues that go beyond such [power-sharing] 
institutions” as part of their theory of liberal consociationalism.41 The umbrella term 
“arrangements” can encompass a formalized treaty or agreement, or series of agreements and 
 
40 Adapted from Wolff, “Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Center.” 
41 McGarry, The Northern Ireland Conflict, 325. 
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treaties which include the formation of power-sharing institutions. “Agreements” may imply a 
formal ratification process, which may not occur in all power-sharing regimes when informal 
pacts or precedents may take hold. As for “institutions,” power-sharing must necessarily include 
some sort of constitutional prescription, in addition to state goals and issues of mutual concern 
that may not be embodied in de jure institutions. While Bosnia and Herzegovina formalized the 
Cabinet’s distribution by ethnicity in their constitution, Lebanon’s National Pact was originally 
an unwritten precedent that governed which religious group holds which office. These terms are 
interchangeable unless I note a clear differentiation.  
Of course, power-sharing agreements is premised on the fact that there must be more than 
one political faction to share power with. The study of power-sharing in ethnic conflict assumes 
that political cleavages are formed in a polity through ethnicity. There are plenty of power-
sharing arrangements without ethnicity as the defining cleavage in politics—one can look to the 
US Senate’s February 2021 power-sharing agreement between Democrats and Republicans.42 In 
this sense, power-sharing is a political tool: a means to achieve an end. This thesis explores the 
means-end link through the lens of ethnic conflict. In my study, political actors may represent 
their ethnic group as a whole or an ideological faction within an ethnic group. Power-sharing 
arrangements are reached between warring ethnic groups, often with the guarantee of an external 
state actor. Formal institutions within a power-sharing agreement include executive, legislative, 
and judiciary branches, as well as the mechanisms for the electoral process. With these 
considerations, power-sharing agreements may call for a new constitution, but it is not a 
necessary condition in all such agreements. Above all else, power-sharing aims to settle a violent 
 
42 Jack Brewster, “Senate Reaches Power-Sharing Agreement And Democrats Take Over Committees,” Forbes, 
accessed March 25, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackbrewster/2021/02/03/senate-reaches-power-sharing-
agreement-and-democrats-take-over-committees/. 
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ethnic conflict, and the hope for these agreements is that peace is achieved and stability is 
secured for a country and its people. 
To better define ethnic tension, which often requires power-sharing, I will parcel out the 
words ‘ethnic’ and ‘tension.’ The idea of ethnicity is studied by scholars in multiple disciplines 
because of its salience and resonance in everyday life. In the United States, the 2020 Census 
differentiates race and ethnicity when it pertains to an individual’s “Hispanic origin.”43 Though 
this instance shows the practical uses of terms like “race” and “ethnicity” in a bureaucratic 
context, academics have defined ethnicity in different ways, depending on their focus.44 In this 
examination, ethnicity is defined as a unit of social organization in which self-defined groups 
derive their commonality through a sense of common ancestry or lineage. This workable 
definition is in line with Anthony D. Smith’s socialization theories, in which ethnicity is one 
manifestation of “the need for identification with a community in order to achieve individual 
identity and self-respect, is in part a function of socialization experiences in the historic culture-
community.”45 Section 2.4 will take a closer look at ethnicity, to underpin the conceptual logics 
of my framework of power-sharing and ethnic tensions. 
Tension, used in conjunction with ethnicity, is described as antagonism, animosity or 
hatred between ethnic groups that manifests itself along a spectrum—in its extreme form as 
incidents of violence or in lesser degrees through prejudicial viewpoints and opinions of the out-
group. I will use “tension” and “antagonism” interchangeably throughout this work. Ethnic 
tension is not ethnic conflict per se, but ethnic tension may precipitate incidents of violence and 
 
43 US Census Bureau, “2020 Census Questions: Hispanic Origin,” 2020Census.gov, accessed November 10, 2020, 
https://2020census.gov/en/about-questions/hispanic-origin.html. 
44 See Clifford Geertz, “What Is a Country If It Is Not a Nation?,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 4, no. 2 
(1997): 235–47. 
45 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, UK : New York, NY, USA: BBlackwell, 1987), 14.  
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vice versa: violent conflict can de-escalate to a situation where there is peace, but tensions are 
still salient between formerly warring factions. Ethnic indifference, in which people may feel 
impartial or uninterested in a contest between ethnic identities, is not the same as ethnic tension. 
Implied is the fact that two or more ethnic groups must be present in the same contested territory. 
Although there are hierarchies and cleavages within an ethnic group (social class, region, gender, 
etc.), in my working definition, I focus on ethnic tensions between other ethnic groups. Also, 
tension assumes that the feelings are reciprocated by both groups. To reiterate, ethnic tension is 
animosity, antagonism and/or hatred between identity groups, primarily derived from a 
generalizable ethnic characteristic.  
2.4: Understanding Ethnicity, Nationality, and the Nation-State 
 
 What is ethnic conflict? What is the difference between ethnicity and nationality, or 
between state and nation? Fundamental to the key questions I pose is precisely defining these 
terms. “Nationality” is often conflated with “ethnicity,” and while both ideas are heavily 
intertwined, each term must be separated from one another. Words like “state” and “nation” are 
used interchangeably in popular discourse, be it by journalists, politicians, and even the most 
astute scholars in academia.46 As Walker Connor points out, “the most fundamental error 
involved in scholarly approaches to nationalism has been a tendency to equate nationalism with a 
feeling of loyalty to the state rather than with loyalty to the nation.”47 Ironically, this 
 
46 See Clifford Geertz, “What Is a Country If It Is Not a Nation?,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 4, no. 2 
(1997): 235–47, for a sociological account of the varying usages of each term; “Nations and States,” accessed 
January 8, 2021, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/172-general/30345-nations-and-
states.html. This webpage gives an account of the popular understanding of the differences between ‘nation’ and 
‘state’; See “Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” The White 
House, accessed January 8, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-
session-united-nations-general-assembly/. Former president Trump describes the international delegation as 
“countries,” “nations,” and “nation-states” in one speech. 
47 Walker Connor, “Terminological Chaos (‘A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a ...’),” in 
Ethnonationalism, The Quest for Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994), 89–117, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv39x5s6.8, 91.  
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terminological obfuscation involves some of the most important terms in political science, not 
only in the academic realm but in the public sphere—especially when “…nation-ness is the most 
universally legitimate value in the political life of our time,” as Benedict Anderson argues.48 
Before I embark on a theory of ethnicity, the first three terms I define and differentiate are 
‘state,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘nation-state.’ 
 First, a state is the set of political institutions, collectively called “government,” that is 
sovereign over people in a self-contained unit of territory. For my purposes, the Weberian 
definition of a state as an organization with the monopoly on legitimate violence should be 
recognized, but it is not the primary way I use this term.49 The emphasis in this definition is that 
the state is contained within a territory, limited either by natural geographical demarcations or 
human-made borders. Central to this conceptualization is that the state is an entity that has 
ultimate power in decision-making in the polity, internally and externally. However, this does 
not necessarily mean this power is viewed as legitimate by all people in a state, which is partly 
the reason why internal conflict (like ethnic conflict) occurs. The state is manifested through 
government, a set of political institutions that control the levers of power in a society—and 
enforces its power through force or the threat of force. In international relations, states interact 
with other states, and has been the primary unit of analysis in this discipline. Mexico is a state, 
insofar as it has a government that exercises the final say and wields ultimate control over the 
levers of power (courts, police, immigration, monetary policy, education, etc.) within a 
delineated geographical unit.  
 
48 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed. 
(London; New York: Verso, 2006), 3. 
49 Andreas Anter, “The Modern State and Its Monopoly on Violence,” The Oxford Handbook of Max Weber, March 
5, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190679545.013.13. 
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 Second, a nation is a self-defining, self-conscious group that derives its cohesion through 
a sense of common bond—real or perceived—as well as a sense of attachment to a physical 
space. People “sense” a nation precisely because the nation, as a unit, is self-perceived and 
intuitive.50 It is not self-evident because “…the essence of a nation is intangible.”51 For example, 
in its common usage, many use the term in conjunction with a more tangible element of society, 
like “cultural nationalism” or “linguistic nationalism.”52 The nation is therefore rooted in feeling 
and intuition, as seen in the literature involving evolutionary psychology and group identities, 
like J. Philippe Rushton’s “Genetic Similarity Theory.”53 This fluidity, combined with Ernest 
Gellner’s observation that “having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has 
now come to appear as such,” makes it difficult to pinpoint the nation as a political 
phenomenon.54 Nevertheless, the nation manifests itself in very real ways and has influenced the 
course of modern politics.  
 What makes the nation self-conscious is its self-defining nature, as the group and its 
individual members must be aware of their commonality to define what their nation is. This 
sentiment of belonging reinforces the very notion of a nation, which in turn, reinforces the self-
defining capacity of group members to see themselves as forming a nation. Of course, one can 
counter that this is a characteristic of general identity formation, in individuals and groups. What 
differentiates a concept of nation, however, is how it perceives commonality with its group 
members. Many scholars associate “nation-ness” with “…a psychological dimension 
 
50 Andreas Wimmer, Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004), 24.  
51 Connor, “Terminological Chaos,” 92.  
52 Ibid., 106. 
53 J. Philippe Rushton, “Ethnic Nationalism, Evolutionary Psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory,” Nations and 
Nationalism 11, no. 4 (2005): 489–507, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2005.00216.x. 
54 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
6. 
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approximately that of the extended family, that is, a feeling of common blood lineage.”55 People 
form groupings around the basic family unit, then further extrapolate this sense of commonality 
by forming kinship groups that derive an intermediate common ancestry. Ultimately, these 
kinship bonds form an even greater bond that derives commonality through some perceived 
sense of shared ancestry, in the form of a nation. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is forged 
through a commonality of ideas and shared values, or “the integration of citizens of by way of 
public discussion according to democratic procedures and the rule of law” according to Donald 
Ipperciel.56 In essence, the nation is in a constant process of self-defining, and this aspect of the 
nation has immense consequences on the role it plays in ethnic conflict.  
 A nation-state melds the tangible state and the intrinsically intangible nation, and 
nationalism is the ideological vehicle to achieve this. Simply put, the goal of national movements 
is to create their own nation-state. Nationalism is “…a theory of political legitimacy, which 
requires that ethnic boundaries should not cross political ones.”57 To clarify, nationalism 
involves a nation’s self-defined territorial boundaries—a common homeland, or territory of 
origin. The nation, though intangible, lays claim to territory, by virtue of a common people being 
rooted in it. Eric Hobsbawm comments on the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, in 
which “rulers…rediscovered the importance of ‘irrational’ elements in the maintenance of the 
social fabric…” in the formation of nation-states.58 The nation-state is elusive because there are 
 
55 Connor, “Terminological Chaos,” 94.  
56 Donald Ipperciel, “Constitutional Democracy and Civic Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 13, no. 3 (2007): 
395–416, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2007.00293.x, 399-400; Cf: Yael Tamir, “Not So Civic: Is There a 
Difference Between Ethnic and Civic Nationalism?,” Annual Review of Political Science 22, no. 1 (2019): 419–34, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-022018-024059. Tamir argues that in practice, the lines of ethnic and civic 
nationalism blur, so that no truly distinct civic nationalism can arise. 
57 Gellner, 1.  
58 Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” in The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge and 
New York, 1983), 263–307, 268. 
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no pure “nation-states.” Many may consider Germany as a nation-state with a German national 
identity, yet the concept of a state for a so-called Germanic people arose during the wave of 
nineteenth-century European nationalist movements. Beforehand, this land was a collection of 
principalities under a broader confederation, be it the Holy Roman Empire or Napoleon’s 
Confederation of the Rhine. Nation-states can seem like arbitrary concoctions, and only through 
the evolution—or re-definition—of one’s nation can a nation-state be consolidated and claim 
legitimacy.  
 Ethnicity is related to nationality in the sense that ethnicity is also an identity which 
derives its manifestation through the self-defining, self-conscious grouping of people. A 
distinction though is that ethnicity derives its origins through a perceived blood relation. US 
citizens form the American nation, founded on civic nationalism. But except for those 
indigenous to the North American continent (Native Americans or First Nations), most cannot 
claim to be an ethnic American. Donald Horowitz asserts that ethnicity is ascriptive in nature, 
meaning that an ethnic grouping arises from qualities that are perceived to be beyond a person’s 
control, “whether the indicium of group identity is color, appearance, language, religion, some 
other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof.”59 The simple intuition that 
underlies ethnicity is that it is assumed to be immutable—that one is born into a certain ethnic 
group. As a way of sorting people into groups, conceptualizing ethnicity relies on culture and 
appearance, often reinforcing each other in its affirmation of distinctness in relation to others. 
Even religion, which until the Enlightenment was believed to be an inherited aspect of one’s 
identity, still holds immense power in defining ethnic identity through the cultural practices and 
institutions that accompany religious practice—rather the actual belief in God. That is why in 
 
59 Horowitz, 17-8. 
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this study, though other scholars may make distinctions in ethnicity like “ethno-linguistic” or 
“ethno-religious,” these are, in fact, ethnicities that revolve around a particular, prominent 
distinguishable cultural attribute.  
 In turn, ethnic conflict is the contestation of different ethnic groups over territory. It is a 
fight over “real estate.”60 Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff aptly describe this phenomenon: “…at 
least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes and potential settlements along 
an existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide…”61 Ethnic conflicts are fights to assert 
hegemony over a disputed ethnic territory. A minority ethnic group may wish to gain hegemonic 
control while the majority ethnic group wishes to keep it. These expressions of power are sought 
to legitimize the societal standings of ethnic groups, as they seek either “to retain a measure of 
political power it [an ethnic group] already possesses, or it strives to acquire the amount of 
power that it deems necessary in order to preserve its identity as a distinct ethnic group.”62 
Certain groups resort to violent means when they perceive that the threat is so great to their 
community’s preservation that nonviolent means cannot be pursued. A minority group may feel 
threatened by the majority ethnic group through a sense of injustice, discrimination, and/or 
relative deprivation. Intense mobilization, rooted in this insecurity, can result in what Barry 
Posen identifies as an ethnic security dilemma: “one group is likely to assume that another 
group’s sense of identity, and the cohesion it produces, is a danger.”63 What distinguishes ethnic 
conflict from other forms of fighting is the total salience of ethnicity: “the permeative character 
 
60 See James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139583824, 3. Gelvin describes the Israel-Palestine conflict as “a dispute 
over real estate” and I find this quote applicable to most, if not all ethnic conflict.  
61 Karl Cordell, Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Responses (Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2009), 
83. 
62 Ibid., 84. 
63 Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1 (March 1, 1993): 27–47, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442672, 31; Daniel Byman, Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic 
Conflicts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 14-6. 
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of ethnic affiliations, by infusing so many sectors of social life, imparts a pervasive quality to 
ethnic conflict and raises sharply the stakes of ethnic politics.”64 Therefore, ethnic conflict is the 
battle over the legitimacy of an ethnic community to be sovereign over a disputed territory, and 
arises in divided societies when the threat of “ethnic elimination” is so great that only violent 
means will assure self-preservation and self-assertion.  
2.5: A Theoretical Framework for Ethnic Tensions after Power-Sharing Agreements 
 
As explored previously, the role of history and ancestry is integral to forming, 
consolidating, and crystallizing ethnic identities. Ethnic conflict takes the leap of faith, thrusting 
notions of ethnicity and nationality—these self-defining identities—into contestation. Peace 
settlements that involve power-sharing between ethnic groups politicizes ethnicity in formal 
institutions, but ideally ends ethnic violence as well. In this vein, an understanding of the 
conditions in which power-sharing may increase or decrease ethnic tensions in post-conflict 
societies can begin with a concept rooted in the study of historical memory: lieux de mémoire, 
roughly translated to “sites of memory.” This historical schema will aid this exploration of post-
conflict societies, if extrapolated to create a political science lens.65  
Pierre Nora identifies and theorizes about a phenomenon that occurs after the advent of 
nineteenth-century nationalism. He calls it “sites of memory”: “a play of memory and history, an 
interaction of two factors that result in their reciprocal overdetermination.”66 What concerns us in 
developing this theoretical framework is Nora’s concept applied generally; that is, of sites or 
spheres where opposing forces are at play. These so-called lieux, taken literally or figuratively, 
 
64 Horowitz, 7-8. 
65 I must thank Professor Guy Beiner for exposing me to Pierre Nora’s writings, when I took his course on historical 
commemoration in Ireland in the spring of 2020. 
66 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations, no. 26 (1989): 7–24, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2928520, 19. 
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are liminal places where divergent phenomena are forced to converge. Opposing concepts 
intermingle and interplay—either creating dissonance, tension, and antagonism or consonance, 
resolution, and even harmony—but nonetheless comprising one entity. This ontology is useful 
when adapted for the study political conflict and ethnic identity. Another characteristic of Nora’s 
lieux de mémoire is the physical manifestation of this interplay between history and collective 
memory—in his case, through commemorative sites like cemeteries, monuments, and festivals.67 
The notion of “sites” that manifest themselves in real life is applicable for my analysis. These 
sites could be thought of as emanating throughout segments of society. It can be the various 
economic industries within a country; culture, humanities and the arts; education and sport; civil 
society groups and political institutions, and so on. Hence, the two fundamental characteristics in 
lieux de mémoire—a place of convergence of opposed entities and their manifestation in society, 
actual or perceived—put into perspective the way that opposing ethnic groups interact with one 
another in the same polity after peace is realized by means of power-sharing arrangements. 




67 Ibid., 12. 
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Figure 2. A Typology of Sites of Social Interactions (SSIs) in Divided Societies 
 

























































































Taking into account the idea of sites of social interaction (or SSI for short), I devise a 
typological framework. Figure 2 shows three types of SSIs in post-conflict societies: sites of 
contestation, sites of coexistence, and sites of collaboration. In effect, these three categories 
encompass all facets of a country—be it the state, economy, or society. What differentiates this 
framework from other ways of categorizing a society is the way it places emphasis on examining 
the social fabric after prolonged violent conflict. Contestation most resembles the nature of 
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society during civil war, while collaboration is expected in a society shared by ethnic groups. 
Coexistence is an in-between state, where ethnicity is salient but difference is tolerated. The 
benefit of conceptualizing post-conflict society as these types of sites, in a similar vein to Nora’s 
illustration, is that it implies crossover potential in specific areas. Tension can only arise when 
opposing groups converge, whether in a larger territory or a local community. When viewing 
facets of political, social, and economic institutions through SSIs, one can determine the extent 
to which there is convergence or divergence within each site, and subsequently, measure the 
antagonism that may play out in a site. After all, ethnic identity needs a place to manifest itself, 
lay claim to group worth, and contrast or compare in relation to another group—and sites of 
contestation, coexistence, and collaboration are where these identities and any animosities play 
out in divided societies. 
First, a site of contestation is a place where ethnic groups are expected to challenge and 
fight each other or defend from one another. They often involve substantial or essential issues to 
each group. In a site of contestation, there must be a winner and a loser—and thus, a zero-sum 
game may take hold.68 For example, electoral systems are sites of contestation, where groups 
fight to win votes and secure the most advantage in government. Power-sharing agreements with 
strong corporatist elements are sure to create sites of contestation, not only in elections but in the 
state institutions themselves. The government, in a sense, is a site of contestation, but power-
sharing institutions have mechanisms designed to moderate the winners and shelter the losers.69 
In practice, sites of contestation are places where identities may clash to the point of gridlock. 
Belgium’s parliamentary politics is a good example of site of contestation: political parties 
 
68 Lijphart, Democracy, 27. 
69 For Lijphart’s “consociational democracy,” moderation is achieved via instruments of “mutual veto” and 
“segmental autonomy” while for Horowitz, power-sharing it is achieved through incentivizing cross-cutting 
coalitions in the electoral system. 
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divided on ethnic and linguistic lines continue to fail to form coalition governments in the recent 
decade, when “the big winners in the election could hardly be farther apart.”70 Overall, sites of 
contestation are characterized by a “winner-loser” playing field and is most common in politics 
in societies reeling from civil strife.  
Second, a site of coexistence is a place where ethnic groups mix and show a level of 
tolerance—but nothing more. Ethnic identity is not a main concern. Rather, these sites tend to 
foster a “stay in your own lane” mentality. Opportunities for these sites may occur in the 
economy, if goods and services are rendered regardless of ethnic identification. In societies 
where ethnicity is the point of conflict, sites of coexistence can involve roads and public 
transportation, or other public spaces. Anders Stefansson’s study of ethnic intermingling in 
mixed villages in Bosnia after their civil war concluded:  
“some level of inter-ethnic co-existence and tolerance had developed in particular 
between the returnees and displaced Serbs who had moved into these neighborhoods, 
among other things based on economic interdependence, an emerging sense of solidarity, 
and a pragmatic need to avoid conflict in everyday life.”71  
 
Arguments about sites of coexistence arise from its effectiveness; whether or not this form of 
“negative peace” is a constructive bridge towards greater trust-building or “merely hides the 
unresolved conflicts” in divided societies.72 Pragmatic concerns like getting a job or leasing 
space for a business may override ethnic partisanship. These sites may shift depending on 
cultural contexts, but the primary indicator for a site of coexistence is an expectation for 
intermixing and tolerance. 
 
70 Suzanne Daley, “No Bridging Language Divide; Tensions Run Higher than Ever between Belgium’s Two 
Halves,” National Post (Toronto), 2010. 
71 Anders H. Stefansson, “Coffee after Cleansing?: Co-Existence, Co-Operation, and Communication in Post-
Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Focaal 2010, no. 57 (2010): 62–76, https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2010.570105, 7. 
72 Ibid., 11. 
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Third, a site of collaboration is a place where ethnic groups are expected to intermingle, 
working together on common ground issues for mutual benefit. These sites are shared spaces, 
integrating intentional cross-community efforts and resulting in mutually beneficial outcomes for 
all ethnic groups involved. Power-sharing arrangements may have provisions for sites of 
collaboration. For instance, efforts to foster reconciliation, dialogue, and cross-cultural 
exchanges promote understanding of opposing ethnic groups. South Africa’s “Truth and 
Reconciliation” commission was premised on the fact that restorative justice could be achieved 
by having victims and perpetrators of ethnic violence attest to the tragedies of apartheid, as a 
process of healing.73 Sites of collaboration can arise organically or constructed by political 
agreement. Civic groups and NGOs in many countries view education as a way to bridge 
community animosities, especially at the primary and secondary school level. The Kami Bangsa 
Indonesia project, for example, seeks to foster “engaged citizenship” and “tolerance” among 
students in “six Indonesia provinces widely regarded as conflict areas, post-conflict areas, or 
areas of concern.74 In these sites, there are elements of mutual benefit concerned with ethnic 
communities, but overall, sites of collaboration are meant to be shared spaces in which a sense of 
community can be forged from the aftermath of war. 
Power-sharing arrangements pursue strategies, to reach an overarching objective: creating 
a functionally cohesive, stable polity after internal, interethnic conflict. Of course, other 
objectives, like distributing the spoils of war, are pursued by the opposing parties. But in the end, 
power-sharing agreements are the means to an end: reconstituting a country. Adopting a strategic 
level approach to power-sharing institutions enhances the previous discussion on social 
 
73 See Timothy Sisk and Christoph Stefes, “Power Sharing as an Interim Step in Peace Building: Lessons from 
South Africa” in Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace. 
74 “External Evaluation - Indonesia,” Center for Civic Education, accessed January 8, 2021, 
https://www.civiced.org/civitas/program/research-and-evaluation/indonesia. 
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interaction, revealing a clearer picture of the casual relationship between power-sharing and 
ethnic tensions. Strategy accounts for particular power-sharing institutional designs, and how 
specific designs may affect ethnic tensions. I use this dual-pronged approach, in tackling this 
question, to amplify my theory’s explanatory power. The three types of cohesion strategies are: 
assimilation, differentiation, and segregation. Figure 3 summarizes each strategy and its 
characteristics. 
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Assimilation is a strategy intended to absorb the ‘other’ into the dominant identity or a 
new, national identity. Two outcomes are possible: either a dominant ethnic group integrates 
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minority groups into their own, making the dominant ethnic identity the hegemonic national 
identity, or a new, overarching national identity is constructed and all other ethnicities are 
subsumed under this newly-formed identity ‘umbrella.’ Avidit Archarya et al. explore 
assimilation in ethnically divided societies through a “sons-of-the-soil” model, in which a 
national elite is faced with a set of choices: “(i) whether or not to exert effort toward population 
control, and (ii) whether or not to exert effort in assimilating the population of the other group.”75 
These choices are made both during negotiations for power-sharing and after a settlement is 
reached through the implementation process.  
As a rule of thumb, the bigger the difference among ethnic groups, the harder it is to 
pursue a successful assimilation strategy. In post-Franco Spain, an assimilation policy that 
imposed the Spanish language in education and administrative positions had “low cost” barriers 
for Catalonians because Castilian and Catalan languages are structurally similar.76 However, 
assimilation can be a very costly endeavor. Many decry such moves as ‘cultural genocide.’ A 
recent example is the ongoing efforts of the Chinese government to assimilate the Uighur 
minority in Xinjiang province through ‘re-education camps’ and mass-surveillance. This is 
evidence, as many claim, that “China is committing crimes against humanity in its treatment of 
the Uighurs.”77 China’s forced assimilation policy is one end of the extreme but is not a unique 
phenomenon. Assimilation, be it under the dominant ethnic culture or a new national culture (e.g. 
“South African” after apartheid) are seen in divided societies after violent conflict. Through 
 
75 Avidit Acharya, David D. Laitin, and Anna Zhang, “‘Sons of the Soil’: A Model of Assimilation and Population 
Control,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 30, no. 2 (2018): 184–223, https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629817737858, 
186. 
76 Ibid., 196-7.  
77 Kate Cronin-Furman, “China Has Chosen Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang—For Now,” Foreign Policy, accessed 
January 10, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/19/china-has-chosen-cultural-genocide-in-xinjiang-for-now/. 
 37 
successful assimilation, cohesion is achieved at the state level—either voluntarily or forcibly. 
Unsuccessful assimilation, however, may result in the re-emergence of conflict. 
 Differentiation, or a strategy in which ethnic diversity is accepted, is rooted in a 
pluralistic notion of society. The term “differentiation” is used, instead of “diversity,” because it 
encompasses the relational nature of ethnicity in divided societies. Rather than something valued 
in its own right, as diversity has come to signify in present-day parlance, differentiation has a 
more neutral connotation.78 This concept is embedded in the idea of power-sharing, as “even if 
political mobilization is organized on ethnic lines, civil politics can be maintained if ethnic elites 
adhere to a power-sharing bargain that equitably protects all groups.”79 Two outcomes of 
differentiation strategy develop: cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. Cultural pluralism, a 
principle in which “cultural differences would be acknowledged and respected” so that it “enrich 
a vital democracy,” contrasts from multiculturalism, a principle that emphasizes cultural 
differences and espouses cultural relativism.80 Lloyd Wong’s sociological paradigm corresponds 
to the outcomes of differentiation I propose—cultural pluralism parallels “interactive pluralism” 
while multiculturalism parallels “fragmented pluralism” in society.81  
Differentiation is a strategy that many post-conflict societies adhere to, especially if they 
have democratic power-sharing institutions. For instance, Abdul Rahman Embong examines 
Malaysian society’s transition to a differentiated middle class: “unlike the pre-1970s period, 
 
78 See “How Diversity Makes Us Smarter,” Greater Good, accessed March 26, 2021, 
https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/how_diversity_makes_us_smarter. Corporate America is a prime 
example of a societal push for greater diversity. I wanted to use the term ‘differentiation’ instead so that the political 
baggage that may come with the rhetoric of diversity is avoided.  
79 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 4 
(1996): 136–75, 6. 
80 Richard J. Bernstein, “Cultural Pluralism,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 41, no. 4–5 (May 1, 2015): 347–56, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453714564855, 350; Lloyd Wong, “Multiculturalism and Ethnic Pluralism in 
Sociology,” in Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada: Theories, Policies and Debates, ed. Shibao Guo and Lloyd 
Wong (Rotterdam: SensePublishers, 2015), 69–90, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6300-208-0_5, 71-3. 
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when the new middle class in Malaysia was overwhelmingly Chinese, the contemporary new 
Malaysian middle class is multiethnic in composition, with the new Malay middle class 
constituting a major component.”82 Tolerance is emphasized in a strategy of differentiation, so 
that members of oppositional ethnic groups may interact with each other in spheres where 
ethnicity is not as salient, like in trade or commerce. While cultural pluralism prefers respect for 
differences, multiculturalism takes one step further, emphasizing differences (and to detractors, 
exasperating them). In this vein, cultural pluralism and multiculturalism are the same side of the 
coin but differ in the extent to which differentiation is desired in society. 
 The third outcome of divided societies is segregation, either self-imposed by groups or 
rendered through government policies and international treaties. In ethnic conflict, segregation 
via migration occurs in mixed ethnicity neighborhoods. This tendency towards homogeneity 
during ethnic violence is because “attacks are more likely to occur in areas where there are small 
but significant minorities.”83 Nils Wiedmann and Idean Salehyan’s study of the steady self-
segregation of Sunni and Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad during the 2003 Iraq War convincingly 
proves this phenomenon.84 Living areas are gradually homogenized because as people became 
easy targets of ethnic violence in mixed areas, they move to find safety amongst their own ethnic 
group. This is proven to reduce ethnic violence in the long run—and scholars like Chaim 
Kaufmann propose this type of “ethnic separation” as a solution to ethnic civil wars.85  
The dilemma after peace is achieved, however, is whether or not communities should 
stay segregated. In this case, a strategy of segregation may be pursued through power-sharing 
 
82 Abdul Rahman Embong, “The Culture and Practice of Pluralism in Postcolonial Malaysia,” in Robert W. Hefner, 
ed., The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (University 
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Baghdad,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 52–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12059, 60. 
84 See Weidmann and Salehyan. 
85 Kaufmann, “Possible,” 7.  
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agreements—explicitly or implicitly—to maintain peace. In its hardest form of segregation, 
opposing ethnic groups only come into contact with each other in sites of contestation. This 
results in a bifurcation of national identity, allowing room for minority national sentiments to be 
expressed in political institutions. Ethnicities geographically isolated in a territory may benefit 
from a strategy of segregation, allowing for autonomous political institutions from the 
centralized government. Marshaley J. Baquiano analyzes the psychological positioning between 
the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an insurgency group 
fighting for an independent state in southern Philippines. Due to the isolation of the minority 
ethnic-religious Muslims relative to the rest of the country, the insurgency group lays claim to 
the “Bangsamoro people” and “state.”86 Both parties pursued a segregation strategy, allowing the 
ethnic Moros to have autonomous political institutions in the Philippines. In this case, separating 
the ethnic minority from national politics has helped achieve peace.  
2.6: Do Power-Sharing Agreements Increase or Decrease Ethnic Tensions? 
 
 Power-sharing agreements reflect the will of elite combatants in ethnic conflict to resort 
to the negotiating table when there seems to be no incentive to prolonged violence in the short-
term or when an external actor with overwhelming force intervenes, either in favor of one side or 
as a ‘neutral’ arbitrator. During negotiations, elites propose power structures that benefit their 
ethnic communities. Political institutions, governance, and the electoral process are essential 
spheres for negotiation. Compared to other forms of conflict settlement, power-sharing “refers to 
a practice of conflict settlement that has a form of self-government regime at heart, but whose 
overall institutional design includes a range of further mechanisms for the accommodation of 
 
86 See Marshaley J. Baquiano, “Intergroup Positioning in Peace Negotiations: The Bangsamoro Peace Talks in the 
Philippines,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 25, no. 3 (August 2019): 234–45, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000360. 
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ethnic diversity in divided societies.”87 Most power-sharing agreements favor corporatist 
structures, in which power is segmented into main interest groups—that being the main ethnic 
communities in conflict. This differs from a pluralistic political structure, which accounts for 
different interests and beliefs on the individual level. External powers often act as guarantors for 
power-sharing agreement and help in the maintenance of peace in the short term.88 The 
corporatist, elite-centric agreements achieve peace in the short run, but “…create incentives for 
ethnic leaders to escalate both the stakes and the means of conflict.”89 This means that political 
elites are incentivized to keep ethnic divisions salient. But do these divisions influence ethnic 
tensions in the long run, after peace is achieved? 
 In short, power-sharing institutions do influence ethnic tensions, and depending on 
certain conditions, may increase or decrease tensions in post-conflict societies in the long run. 
The normative effect of these institutions should not be underestimated. Constructivist arguments 
may gain credibility as power-sharing regimes play out decades after their settlement. A key 
differentiator of these agreements are those concerning solely the state’s political institutions and 
those that account for cross-community social interaction outside the realm of politics. Even if 
cross-community provisions are outlined in original settlements, the recent histories of divided 
societies after conflict should attest as to whether or not these efforts were implemented. Under 
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 Using the sites of social interactions laid out in Figure 2 coupled with the cohesion 
strategies of divided societies after power-sharing agreements laid out in Figure 3, I generate 
three causal hypotheses about the relationship between power-sharing and ethnic tensions. First, 
in post-conflict societies, sites of contestation increase ethnic tensions, while sites of 
collaboration decrease ethnic tensions. Sites of coexistence may either increase or decrease 
animosities, depending on case-specific factors (H1). Second, in power-sharing arrangements, a 
cohesion strategy of assimilation will increase ethnic tensions, while a cohesion strategy of 
segregation will decrease ethnic tensions. A cohesion strategy of differentiation will either 
increase or decrease ethnic tensions, contingent on the sites of contestation, coexistence, and 
collaboration contained in a power-sharing agreement (H2). Power-sharing agreements that 
institutionalize and implement SSIs and cohesion strategies that, on balance, increases ethnic 
tensions will fail, while power-sharing agreements that institutionalize and implement SSIs and 
cohesion strategies conducive to a decrease in ethnic tensions will succeed (H3). Figure 4 
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outlines each theory’s relationship with ethnic tensions in a divided society with power-sharing 
institutions. 
 
H1: In post-conflict societies, sites of contestation increase ethnic tensions, while sites of 
collaboration decrease ethnic tensions. Sites of coexistence may either increase or decrease 
tensions, depending on case-specific factors. 
 
 
 Hypothetically, at its most extreme, society in the midst of civil war is altogether a site of 
contestation. In this scenario, war is a zero-sum game involving the self-preservation of ethnic 
collectivities. Many power-sharing agreements are struck in the context of a peace settlement, 
because warring factions desire to guarantee their political position in a reconstituted state. 
Whereas sites of contestation are spheres in which ethnic tensions are high because groups view 
these places as a zero-sum game, sites of collaboration have low ethnic tension because these 
areas are viewed as a shared space. Sites of coexistence fall in between, where tensions might be 
salient, but tolerance of others is expected. Tensions may remain in sites of coexistence but are 
not salient to the extent of sites of contestation. 
 
H2: In power-sharing arrangements, a cohesion strategy of assimilation will increase ethnic 
tensions, while a cohesion strategy of segregation will decrease ethnic tensions. A cohesion 
strategy of differentiation will either increase or decrease ethnic tensions, depending on the sites 
of contestation, coexistence, and collaboration contained in a power-sharing agreement. 
 
 
I also argue in Figure 4 that power-sharing that pursues an assimilation strategy increase 
ethnic tensions, while policies of segregation decrease tensions. Oftentimes, assimilation will 
increase ethnic tensions but if a hegemonic culture (either of one ethnic group or a new culture) 
is forced upon other groups successfully, this tension may be buried and overcome by 
government. A failed policy of assimilation will exacerbate ethnic tensions to the point of 
renewed conflict. On the other hand, the segregation of ethnic groups will decrease ethnic 
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tensions in the long run due to the homogeneity. This, hypothetically, would eliminate ethnic 
tensions between different groups altogether because they do not come into contact with each 
other. This view is in line with Kaufmann’s solution to ethnic conflict, as he claims, “separation 
may help reduce inter-ethnic antagonism; once real security threats are reduced, the plausibility 
of hypernationalist appeals may eventually decline.”90 But in diverse, mixed societies this goal 
incurs heavy costs in the short run. These two extreme goals that certain power-sharing 
agreements have also carry extreme outcomes in regard to increasing or decreasing ethnic 
animosities. 
 Moreover, I propose that a power-sharing strategy of differentiation may increase or 
decrease tension, depending on the extent to which there are sites of contestation, coexistence, 
and/or collaboration in a divided society. Differentiation may result in less tension because sites 
of coexistence and collaboration are created, either ‘top-down’ from government policies and 
power-sharing agreements or ‘bottom-up’ from a potential cross-community civil society. But 
this is very hard to do. One route that Hugo Miall proposes is “conflict transformation,” which 
calls for “a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, the interests, the 
discourses, and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of 
violent conflict.”91 Such transformation would be needed to successfully implement a policy of 
ethnic pluralism that decreases ethnic tensions. Certain conditions, in contrast, may cause 
animosity to increase in a strategy of differentiation—and sites of social interaction are key to 
determining whether tensions increase or decrease. Accordingly, a policy of differentiation may 
be a mixed bag for ethnic relations in a divided society. 
 
 
90 Kaufmann, “Possible,” 11. 
91 Hugo Miall, “Transforming Ethnic Conflict: Theories and Practices” in Wimmer, Facing Ethnic Conflicts, 162. 
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H3: Power-sharing agreements that institutionalize and implement SSIs and cohesion strategies 
that on balance increases ethnic tensions will fail, while power-sharing agreements that 
institutionalize and implement SSIs and cohesion strategies conducive to a decrease in ethnic 
tensions will succeed. 
 
 
 Granted that power-sharing arrangements incorporate sites of social interaction and 
cohesion strategies in their frameworks, both typologies and their causal links to ethnic tensions 
can predict the success or failure of a power-sharing regime in the long run. The main 
determinant for power-sharing success or failure is a regime’s stability, both politically and 
socially. Power-sharing arrangements that provide for stable governance in the long run—
including a functioning bureaucracy, free and fair elections, and the rule of law—are successful. 
Failed power-sharing regimes are characterized by state dysfunction, and in its most extreme, 
power-sharing collapse or civil war. I posit that increased ethnic tensions in a polity increases the 
likelihood for power-sharing failure. Likewise, I expect decreased ethnic tensions increases the 
chances for success. Ethnic tensions, if unchecked, spiral into incidents of violence and renewed 
ethnic grievances—the precursor for conflict. That is why higher increases necessarily increases 
the likelihood of regime failure. Conversely, if tensions are checked and decreased, this 
decreases the likelihood of failure. In short, there is an inverse relationship between ethnic 
tensions and power-sharing outcomes. Hypothesis 3 incorporates both causal frameworks in an 
attempt to answer fundamental questions about the desirability of power-sharing institutions as a 
conflict resolution mechanism, especially in the long run. This links power-sharing 
arrangements’ effects on ethnic tensions in society to the viability of a power-sharing state.  
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Figure 5. How Power-Sharing affects Ethnic Tensions in Post-Conflict Societies 
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Figure 5 demonstrates the causal chains that unite all three hypotheses, to form a 
comprehensive theory of how power-sharing agreements affect ethnic tensions in post-conflict 
societies. Inherent in these arguments is the assumption that ethnic conflict is not purely rational 
nor irrational—rather, it is a mix of power and identity. The claims I provide lean towards a 
constructivist view of group identity and ultimately, the normative aspect of power-sharing 
institutions. Though certain scholars like Michael Hechter view that “ethnonationalism can be 
collectively irrational, for it is often associated with undesirable social outcomes like economic 
decline and civil war,” others like Barry Posen argue that ethnic conflict result from security 










dilemmas among mobilized armed communities in a state of “internal anarchy.92 Power-sharing 
agreements thus can provide political and ‘rational’ solutions to violent conflicts, but may not 
address core issues of identity and nationalism. What I conclude, through a theoretical 
framework of ethnic tensions and power-sharing arrangements after peace is achieved, closely 
aligns to Rothchild and Roeder’s conclusions: “The very same institutions that provide an 
attractive basis to end a conflict in an ethnically divided country are likely to hinder the 
consolidation of peace and democracy over the longer term.”93 By studying ethnic tensions and 
their correspondence to types of power-sharing agreements, one can test if power-sharing is an 
adequate vehicle for long-term peace or just a short-term stopgap to curb violent ethnic conflict.   
2.7: Research Method and Design 
 
 As discussed earlier, this thesis will rely on the comparative case study method rather 
than large or small-N statistical analysis. I will study Lebanon and Northern Ireland, two 
countries that experienced civil war among rival ethnic-religious groups. Both cases resolved 
ethnic conflict via power-sharing arrangements: 1989 Taif Accords for Lebanon and 1998 
Belfast Agreement for Northern Ireland. It has been over thirty years since the Taif Accords and 
over twenty years since the Good Friday Agreement, so there has been ample time since power-
sharing was struck in both nations to assess their impact. The main variation between Lebanon 
and Northern Ireland is Lebanon’s relative state failure and Northern Ireland’s state success. 
Both cases involve power-sharing, however Lebanon’s power-sharing institutions have utterly 
collapsed while Northern Ireland’s institutions have mostly held in place. With this in mind, I 
 
92 Michael Hechter, “Containing Ethnonationalist Violence,” in Wimmer, 284-5; See Chaim Kaufmann, “Rational 
Choice and Progress in the Study of Ethnic Conflict: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 178–207, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410591002554, 199. 
93 Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, “Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies,” in Roeder and 
Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, 6. 
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design a “structured, focused comparison,” using “controlled comparison” as described by 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s case method.94  
 Each case will involve a textual analysis of the power-sharing treaties and smaller studies 
on certain facets provisioned in each agreement. First, I will conduct a brief historical 
background of the ethnic conflict in each society. Then, I will analyze the legal text of the two 
power-sharing agreements—the Taif and Good Friday agreements—and conclude with the 
extent to which these plans were implemented and/or altered over the course of their ratification 
to the present-day. To better understand the sites of social interactions and cohesion strategy 
theories, I will select key provisions in the documents and determine which site and strategy is 
purported to be achieved. Using statistical data, studies, and public opinion via polling and news 
outlets, I determine if these sites of social interaction and cohesion strategies correspond to the 
extent of ethnic tension in the country, as I predict. In summary, this theoretical framework will 
be tested through two case studies to see if power-sharing does increase or decrease ethnic 
tension and if the factors addressed above contribute to such changes.  
2.8: Conclusion 
 
 Milton J. Esman notes that “human behavior is conditioned decisively by opportunities 
and constraints provided by the institutions that people encounter.”95 This chapter builds a 
theoretical argument that power-sharing agreements have the potential to both increase or 
decrease ethnic tensions in divided societies after peace, depending on an agreement’s cohesion 
strategy and provisions for sites of social interaction. Incorporating the rich body of research on 
ethnic conflict, I conceptualize abstract notions of ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity,’ and clearly defined 
 
94See Chapters 3 and 8 in Alexander L. George, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). 
95 Milton J. Esman, “Ethnic Pluralism: Strategies for Conflict Management,” in Wimmer, Facing Ethnic Conflicts, 
203. 
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what power-sharing agreements and ethnic tensions are. Then, I present two analytical 
frameworks to help us in this investigation: sites of social interaction, necessary for animosity to 
arise in a divided society and cohesion strategies, central to the goal of power-sharing 
institutions. I devised this two-pronged approach to better examine causality between societal 
behaviors, institutional designs, and ethnic tensions. Together, this approach yields the 
conclusion that sites of contestation increase ethnic tensions, sites of collaboration decrease 
tensions, and sites of coexistence may increase or decrease tensions contingent on specific case 
factors. The cohesion strategy of assimilation will increase ethnic animosities while segregation 
will decrease them—differentiation, in the middle-ground, can either increase or decrease 
tension depending on the extent to which sites of social interaction are cultivated by power-
sharing.  
Sites of social interaction and cohesion strategies give a comprehensive view of the group 
behavior and institutional mechanisms in post-conflict societies. Granted that both schemas hold 
up to my subsequent empirical studies, I predict that ethnic tensions is one determining factor in 
power-sharing regime outcomes, in the long run. My last hypothesis posits that in the long-term 
perspective, an overall increase in a society’s ethnic tensions will cause power-sharing failure, 
while a decrease will cause power-sharing success. Like my other theories, power-sharing may 
result in limited success or failure if, on the balance, ethnic tensions have only slightly increased 
or decreased. In conclusion, power-sharing agreements have a normative impact on divided 
societies and studying the ethnic tensions (or lack thereof) after their implementation can reveal 
new ways to determine if power-sharing succeeds or fails in varying post-conflict societies 
around the world. 
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Chapter 3 
Lebanon: A Nation Faces a Tough Reality 
 
“It is a Syrian solution in an Arab dress beneath an international umbrella.”  
 
– Adel Malek, political analyst, on the Taif Accords, 1989.96 
 
“I think Beirut now is not the same as it was before I became prime minister. Now, everybody 
admits that Beirut now, and Lebanon in general, and Beirut in particular, is coming back to 
being the jewel of the Middle East.”  
 
– Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, in an interview with reporter Charlie Rose, 1998.97 
 
“Our response to this decision is that whoever declares or starts a war, be it brother or father, 
then it is our fight to defend ourselves and our existence.”  
 





The Preamble of the Lebanese Constitution states: “The abolition of political 
confessionalism shall be a basic national goal and shall be achieved according to a staged 
plan.”99 Three decades later, this “staged plan” does not exist for a country roughly the size of 
Connecticut—even after a fifteen-year civil war claimed 150,000 lives, 300,000 casualties, and 
over 1 million émigrés.100 As of March 2021, the Lebanese political system is in limbo after the 
resignation en masse of prime minister Hassan Diab’s government in August 2020, because, as 
The Daily Star puts it, “political factions waste time over sectarian considerations in Cabinet 
 
96 Youssef M. Ibrahim, “LEBANESE FACTIONS AGREE ON CHARTER TO RESOLVE STRIFE,” The New 
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formation.”101 Some analysts argue that Lebanon is a failed state, considering these staggering 
numbers in 2020: 75% of its people live in poverty, the country’s public debt is 175% of its 
GDP, and there are 1.7 million refugees, making Lebanon the state with the highest per capita 
refugee population in the world.102 However, most do agree on what has caused the country’s 
recent social and economic spiral—political corruption, wrought by “[Lebanon’s] dysfunctional 
sectarian political system.”103 Why have Lebanon’s political institutions stagnated, thirty years 
later? The answer may lie in power-sharing and ethnic tensions after the dust settled from the 
civil war. 
 This chapter explores Lebanon’s power-sharing constitution to determine the extent to 
which ethnic tensions have increased or decreased since the 1989 Taif Accords. I trace a history 
of power-sharing in the region, dating back to the Ottoman era. This legacy culminated in the 
creation of Grand Liban during the French Mandate, institutionalizing a consociational society. 
Due to various socio-economic developments, however, the political arrangement that favored 
Maronite Catholics was unsustainable, which led to the Lebanese civil war in 1975. I proceed to 
identify the cohesion strategies and sites of social interaction in Taif. In its totality, I extrapolate 
underlying SSIs of coexistence and cohesion strategies of assimilation and differentiation. 
Although the power-sharing agreement contained contradictory strategic goals, it does envision a 
broad, national identity based on the common denominator between the religious sects: the Arab 
identity. 
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Then, I assess Lebanese society, and how it has adapted to a post-conflict reality through 
its sites of contestation, coexistence, and collaboration. In education, a site of collaboration, 
pursuing assimilation through a national Arab identity, is envisioned in Taif. In the economic 
reconstruction and displacement policies of the new government, sites of coexistence and 
collaboration were conceived. Unfortunately, a history of both cases demonstrates that these 
provisions in the Taif Accords were barely implemented. Education and the economy became 
sites of contestation, which led to a corresponding increase in ethnic tensions. This conclusion is 
upheld through my study of ethnic tensions since peace was achieved in Lebanon. Lastly, I 
conclude with my findings of the role that Taif played in cultivating—or failing to cultivate—
sites of social interaction conducive to decreasing ethnic tensions. There is a causal link between 
cohesion strategies and sites of social interaction and a rise in ethnic tension in Lebanon. This 
unique theoretical perspective on Lebanon’s power-sharing institutions provides one of many 
causal factors that contributed to the country’s current dilapidated state—a far cry from the 
“extraordinary opportunity” embodied in the Taif Accords.104 
3.2: An Enduring History of Power-Sharing in Lebanon 
 
 The people of the area known as Lebanon have coexisted in a mosaic of different 
religious sects for centuries prior to the creation of the modern nation-state in the 1920s. This 
milieu of communities trace their origins to the period of Islamic rule in the Levant, from around 
600-1000 C.E. As William Harris notes, varying Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim 
communities dotted the Levant during this era, but “the peculiarity of Mount Lebanon was the 
longer-term endurance of a collection of rural sectarian heartlands.”105 After a mélange of rulers 
 
104 Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Hails Lebanon Accord and Urges Support,” The New York Times, October 24, 1989, 
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and invaders (from the Frankish crusaders to the Mamluks), control of Mount Lebanon and its 
port cities, by the sixteenth century, fell into Ottoman hands. Throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, two ascendant ethnic-religious communities emerged in the mountain 
region: the Druze, who are an offshoot of the Isma’ili Shia sect, and the Maronite Catholics, a 
Christian sect with an Eastern Catholic religious tradition. Tensions between the two sects 
culminated in widespread sectarian violence in 1860. These attacks, in effect, “brought another 
European military intervention and a negotiated new order” within the Ottoman empire.106 
Consequently, an autonomous province of Mount Lebanon was created (the mutasarrifiya) with 
an imperial, non-indigenous governor and a multi-denominational advisory council—a 
development that marked, as Ussama Makisidi writes, when “Mount Lebanon was communally 
reinvented,” so that “a public and political sectarian identity replaced a nonsectarian politics of 
notability.”107 The seeds of Lebanon’s power-sharing were planted well before the French 
creation of Grand Liban. 
 The French carved out Greater Lebanon in 1920 from their League of Nations mandate to 
establish a Christian-majority country. The French justified its suzerainty over this land by 
asserting a special relationship with the Maronite Catholic people. Thus, the imperial power 
wished to maintain its traditional ties “especially to the Christians of Lebanon,” as “it projected a 
considerable cultural influence [on] the area.”108 However, in drawing up the borders, French 
administrators were presented with a challenge. As Charles Winslow sums up: “Lebanon needed 
to be large enough to be economically viable but small enough to make political sense.”109 To 
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solve the dilemma, Mount Lebanon’s traditional boundaries were expanded to include many port 
cities on the Mediterranean, as well as regions to the hinterlands south and east of the mountain 
range—integrating the ancestral Maronite Catholic and Druze lands with Shia and Sunni Muslim 
population centers. Lebanon hence became a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state under colonial 
rule. This inherent friction between the creation of a Western-facing Christian state in the 
Levant, on the one hand, and the economic considerations of including land with a 
predominantly Muslim populace who did not identify with the country’s cultural-political 
underpinnings on the other would be the fundamental dilemma for Lebanon’s national identity. 
With French blessings, a constitution was adopted in 1926 and provided the political 
foundations for the modern-day Lebanese state. The text outlined liberal principles, such as the 
section on “Individual Rights and Freedoms” that guaranteed the “right against arbitrary arrest or 
detention,” “religious freedom in all its manifestations,” and “freedom of education.”110 Also 
institutionalized was confessional politics, stipulated in Article 95: “religious communities shall 
be equitably represented in public employment and in the formation of the Cabinet without 
causing harm to the interests of the State.”111 As Issam Saliba writes, “the deputies have become 
more the representatives of the religious communities whose seats they occupy rather than 
representatives of the whole nation or even the geographic districts that elected them.”112 Thus, 
the Lebanese state during French control formalized the principle of power-sharing via the 
mechanisms written in its constitution, and in the subsequent decades through legislation, 
constitutional amendments, and unwritten precedents. 
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 The Second World War proved to be a critical juncture for Lebanon, leading to the 
country’s independence in 1946. During the war, Lebanese politicians sought formal 
independence from French rule through the British, who mediated an agreement between rival 
ethnic-religious factions to forge a power-sharing government. This was the basis for the 1943 
National Pact. British General Edward Spears reached a compromise between the two leading 
religious sects: the Maronite Catholics, led by Bechara al-Khoury and representing the 
Christians, and the Sunni Muslims, led by Riad al-Solh and representing the Muslims. Using a 
1932 census that showed a slight Christian majority in Lebanon, the two parties agreed to a ratio 
of six Christian to five Muslim parliamentary seats, solidifying Maronite control of the 
government. Negotiators agreed to further power-sharing stipulations: a Maronite Catholic 
would be the country’s president, a Sunni Muslim the prime minister, a Shia Muslim the speaker 
of parliament, and a Greek Orthodox Christian the deputy speaker. This unwritten precedent 
would guide the infant nation’s politics.  
The ‘National Pact’ was born. With al-Khoury as president and al-Solh as prime minister, 
the governing duo emphasized Lebanon’s “Arab face” and a “similar theme of ‘no East, no 
West,’ while advocating for a ‘special relationship’ with the Arab world.”113 Dilip Hiro notes 
that this political arrangement realigned Lebanese politics from a “Maronite-Druze partnership” 
to “a Maronite-Sunni alliance,” so that “within a generation, modern Lebanon had crystallized as 
an entity built on the foundation of a confederation of sixteen proto-national communities.”114 
With Lebanese independence achieved in 1946, the constitution and the 1943 National Pact 
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enshrined a power-sharing regime for the nation that abided by principles of representative 
proportionality, which favored Maronite Catholics at the time. 
 Nevertheless, the 1932 census did not adequately reflect the changing demographic 
realities in Lebanon. By the mid-twentieth century, the Sunni Muslim population was growing at 
a faster rate than their Christian compatriots. Rania Maktabi’s re-examination of the 1932 census 
concludes that “the apparent Christian majority in Lebanon was a heavily politicized majority 
based on the questionable exclusion of considerable numbers of residents on Lebanese territories 
and the debatable inclusion of significant numbers of emigrants.”115 In essence, the informal pact 
that crystallized Christian pre-eminence in the Lebanese government clashed with the rising 
demographic strength and economic aspirations of Muslims in the 1950s. Lebanon’s 
consociational democracy could not withstand internal pressure from the economic and political 
deprivation of certain ethnic-religious groups, as well as external pressure from the rise of the 
pan-Arabism and Palestinian resistance movements. Although Marie-Joëlle Zahar identifies the 
historical factors before Lebanese independence as an example of “one of the most enduring 
power-sharing experiments,” the changing political landscape after independence shook this 
fundamental element of the polity to its core—and precipitated a civil war in the 1970s.116 
3.3: ‘No Victor, No Vanquished’: Civil War and the Road to Peace 
 
 New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman, in his award-winning memoir From Beirut 
to Jerusalem, wrote this of his time spent in the Lebanese capital in 1982: “I don’t know if Beirut 
is a perfect Hobbesian state of nature, but it is probably the closest thing to it that exists in the 
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world today.”117 For his American audience, Beirut represented the ‘primordial’ nature of the 
conflicts in the Middle East, where fighters brutally massacred refugees in the name of religion. 
But for all the reductionist accounts of the Lebanese civil war reproduced in the print media at 
the time, there were also stories of the complex, multi-level antagonisms that involved sectarian 
paramilitary groups, the emasculated Lebanese government, the regional powers of Syria and 
Israel, and the US-led Multi-National Force. Lebanon was a multi-dimensional chess game, and 
as much as these players wanted to move their pawns—the Lebanese political elite (or the 
zu’ama)—they too knew how to play their players. Figure 6 illustrates the major internal players 
during the war. This table is not comprehensive; it becomes all too apparent after studying the 
civil war that this is as simple as I can get to devising a neat configuration of the factions in the 
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 There are many historical and political studies that look into the causes of the Lebanese 
civil war. For this work, however, I will focus on the effect the war had on the ruling political 
class. Figure 6 provides a glimpse into the environment that the Taif Accords was negotiated in. 
During the conflict, sectarian paramilitary groups provided security and aid while they controlled 
territories throughout the country, because of the anemic Lebanese state. The primary factor that 
precipitated the conflict was, as Hiro describes, “the perception shared by the Maronite 
leadership that the presence of the Palestine commandos in Lebanon was a serious threat to 
Lebanese sovereignty.”118 Christian, Muslim, and Druze mobilized on ethnic-religious lines. 
Sectarian paramilitary groups flourished as they defended their territorial claims. Within each 
sect, personality-led divisions fragmented ethnic groups, resulting in a multiple-actor conflict 
within each sectarian grouping. Any attempt to negotiate between paramilitary groups and/or the 
government seemed futile, because “conflict regulation broke down when one of the Lebanese 
communities or actors operated their strategy in an attempt to get more than a relative 
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advantage” over the political situation.119 By viewing this civil war not as an inherently religious 
conflict but rather a more traditional one over resources, power, and legitimacy among a 
multiplicity of local actors (with the support of external interferences) we can analyze the Taif 
agreement through our theoretical lens from Chapter 2.  
3.4: The Taif Accords: A Projection of Possibilities or Political Compromise? 
 
 The Taif Accords—named after the Saudi Arabian city where it was brokered—was 
ratified on November 4, 1989 by the Lebanese parliament, giving greater political representation 
and power for Muslims in Lebanon after a grueling fifteen-year civil war. The concept of 
consociational democracy, once implicit in the 1943 National Pact, was now spelled out in this 
constitutional overhaul. Theodor Hanf observes this new reality: “In the Taif Agreement, 
coexistence between the religious communities is solemnly affirmed, declared the foundation of 
Lebanese legality and, more explicitly than ever before, recognized as both the state’s raison 
d’étre and its objective.”120 During the civil war, various factions supported breaking up Lebanon 
into separate nation-states corresponding to homogeneous ethnic homelands—in essence, a 
partition of the country. The Taif Accords dismissed those notions, choosing to maintain the 
viability of the Lebanese state through a foundational principle of coexistence. Certainly, a lofty 
goal for a society ravaged by internal strife. In Figure 7, I summarize my textual analysis of the 
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Coexistence Assimilation and Differentiation 
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Religious Coexistence Differentiation 
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Agreement has contradictory strategic 
goals, but envisions a national identity 
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In its “General Principles and Reforms,” the agreement reaffirmed Lebanon’s ‘Arab face’ 
according to sub-section B, in which “Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity.”121 Instead of 
being a bastion of Western civilization in the Near East, the Lebanese state would place itself 
among other Arab nations and share in the region’s identity. The agreement outlined a Lebanese 
identity that emphasized its Arab roots in a strategy of assimilating all ethnic groups in a 
‘common denominator’ identity. Sprinkled in this first section are references to economic and 
social justice, describing that while “the economic system is a free system that guarantees 
individual initiative and private ownership,” the state would make an effort “to achieve 
comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform.”122 These statements 
allude to the economic grievances of Lebanese Muslims in the 1970s, and particularly the 
poverty of the Shia population. Musa al-Sadr would successfully mobilize the poverty-stricken 
Shia with the “Movement of the Dispossessed” (Harakat al-Mahrumin) during the war.123 The 
last sub-section makes it clear that the Taif Accords will adhere to a cohesion strategy of 
differentiation: “No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be legitimate.”124 
The golden rule of coexistence is a forthright project, and the agreement even stipulates that it is 
the principle that legitimizes the Lebanese state. In short, the aspirational “General Principles” of 
Taif highlight the power-sharing agreement’s strategy of assimilation and differentiation through 
sites of coexistence—that is, in theory. 
 A whole host of political reforms reconfigure the Chamber of Deputies in the second 
section of Taif so that Christians and Muslims are equally represented. Most of the Maronite 
Catholic president’s prerogatives are transferred to an empowered Sunni Muslim prime minister. 
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In subsection five, the parliament is divvied up “equally between Christians and Muslims,” 
“proportionately between the denominations of each sect,” and “proportionately between the 
districts.”125 This contrasts with the National Pact’s six to five ratio of parliamentary 
representation because the power-sharing agreement rearranges the division of power so that 
Muslims have a greater say in the legislature. To achieve this, negotiators had to increase the 
number of seats in parliament, so during talks, it was proposed to raise it from 99 to 128. The 
political elites—who mainly sat out of the conflict or derived power as the traditional, notable 
zu’ama class—feared “this would enable too many militia leaders and warlords—and Syrian 
clients—to enter parliament.”126 So the delegates compromised with 108 seats, “the minimum 
number needed to create parity without depriving the Christians of existing seats.”127 Moreover, 
executive power was shifted from the president to a Cabinet headed by the prime minister, 
relegating the president to the status of a figurehead.128 These compromises, though orchestrated 
by the remaining parliamentarians of the 1972 Chamber of Deputies, were greatly facilitated by 
the ‘troika’ of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria. And all of this politicking happened under 
the shadow of the Syrian occupation. In line with theories of consociational democracy, the 
equality of Christian and Muslim representation was supposed to foster grand coalition building 
in the Cabinet. The political apparatus became a site of contestation for ethnic factions in a legal 
framework designed to moderate winning or losing in theory, in the hope of coalition politics. 
 Other provisions in the Taif document cover religious autonomy, education, and civil war 
displacement. Under Section III, sub-section B2 the “heads of the Lebanese sects” have 
constitutional prerogatives over one’s personal status, “the practice of religious rites” and the 
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“freedom of religious education.”129 Sub-section F deals with the state of education in the 
country: it guarantees free and obligatory education “for the elementary stage at least,” 
strengthens state control over private schools and textbooks, emphasizes vocational education 
and reforms at the Lebanese University, and mandated a revised national curricula “that 
strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness…on the subjects of 
history and national education.”130 The issue of displacement during the civil war is addressed as 
well. Taif establishes “the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from 
which he was evicted” and that “legislation to guarantee this right and to ensure the means of 
reconstruction shall be issued.”131 These three sections are attempts to codify social and cultural 
reforms for the new Lebanese government, and address issues of segmental autonomy for 
“internal affairs”—in this case, the autonomy of the religious sects—that Lijphart constitutes as a 
key aspect of consociationalism.132 Through these specific sections, efforts are made to cultivate 
sites of collaboration through education and the return of the displaced, and sites of coexistence 
for religious practices. Both cohesion strategies of differentiation, represented by the right to 
return to pre-1975 homes (many of which were mixed neighborhoods), and assimilation, via a 
national curriculum, are pursued. Thus, Taif produces social, cultural, and economic sites of 
coexistence and collaboration, with the cohesion strategies of differentiation and national 
assimilation in these areas of Lebanese society. 
  Lastly, Taif formalizes the Syrian army’s presence in the country, outlines a process for 
demilitarization, and calls on Israel’s withdrawal from the south. It is apparent that the last three 
sections of the treaty address the country’s foreign occupation by Syria and Israel—and reflects 
 
129 “Taif Accords," 6. 
130 Ibid., 6-7. 
131 Ibid., 7. 
132 Lijphart, Democracy, 25. 
 63 
the role of external powers in both stabilizing and destabilizing the Lebanese state. Provisions 
detail that all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias should disband, and their weapons “delivered 
to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months” after the charter’s ratification.133 The main 
enforcer would be Syrian president Hafez al-Assad and his army: “the Syrian forces shall 
thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the 
State of Lebanon with a set period of no more than 2 years.”134 This acknowledges the reality on 
the ground in Lebanon by the end of the civil war. The agreement then calls for the end of the 
Israeli occupation. Lebanon, according to Taif, will “[take] all the steps necessary to liberate all 
Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation” and “deploy the Lebanese army in the border 
area adjacent to Israel.”135 The last section effectively condones Syrian suzerainty over Lebanon, 
citing that “between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength 
from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests.”136 Al-Assad received 
international acknowledgment of his control over Lebanon, a remarkable feat considering that 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait just months after the Taif Accords received a 
multinational rebuke and a UN military response.  
Though unpalatable to many Lebanese, these provisions in the Taif were nonnegotiable. 
Prince Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia implored delegates to approve the treaty and painted a 
dark picture if they could not come to compromise: “He reminded them of the rejection of the 
United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine in 1947; the Palestinians were still searching 
for a bit of land. The Lebanese, too, were in danger of becoming a homeless people.”137 These 
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portions of the agreement further solidify the argument that external powers can stabilize ethnic 
civil wars through hegemonic control. 
 Reading between the lines, the Taif agreement was meant to be a framework to transition 
from a confessional government similar to the 1926 constitution but with Christian-Muslim 
parity, to an eventual non-sectarian government. Fawwaz Tarabulsi acknowledges this possibility 
in Taif, that “the Second Republic it gave birth to was to lead to a Third Republic in which 
political sectarianism would be abolished,” but he tempers this idealism in the document with 
this point: “In practical terms, the Ta’if regime reproduced the sectarian system, but with a 
sizeable modification in the balance of power among its constituents.”138 The political 
arrangements evened the playing field for Muslims in government, rectifying a major cause of 
the Lebanese civil war. The sites of contestation, in the form of government, seemed to balance 
political power, reflecting a moderation of Christian power and bolstering of Muslim power.  
As for the sections regarding religion, education, and displacement, a ‘top-down’ attempt 
was made to institute programs to cultivate sites of coexistence and collaboration. A product of 
compromise, the Taif agreement had seemingly contradictory strategies for power-sharing: in 
one line, the document pursues a differentiation strategy through “coexistence,” while in another, 
it pursues assimilation through de-sectarianizing the political constitution of the state as a 
“fundamental national objective.” An analysis of Lebanon’s history after Taif will help clarify 
what these abstract principles really meant in practice and if ethnic tensions did increase or 
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3.5: Lebanon After Taif: An Agreement Faces a Tough Reality 
 
 Lebanese politicians faced a formidable trade-off after the Taif accords. On the one hand, 
the state must consolidate its new power-sharing government and rebuild a war-weary society. 
On the other, the Lebanese had to face the prospect of Syrian political meddling. So long as the 
Syrian intelligence apparatus was monitoring Beirut and military installations were kept 
throughout the country, Hafez al-Assad would have the final say in political matters. Indeed, 
through subsequent treaties, “the Syrian hold on Lebanon was fully institutionalized,” as Rola el-
Husseini and Ryan Crocker contend.139 However, a military commander—with the backing of a 
populist Christian movement—would not have any of that. 
After the treaty’s ratification, the self-styled ‘Gaullist’ General Michel Aoun asserted his 
legitimacy as president by refusing to concede to Syrian occupation, holding out in the 
presidential palace at Baabda. Over time, however, the general’s opposition to the Taif 
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agreement and Syrian occupation was met with Syrian-backed politicians in the new ‘National 
Accord’ government: “the [Elias] Hrawi-[Selim] Hoss administration attempted to show that it 
was on top of its problems and that the Taif Accord was being implemented.”140 In October 
1990, Aoun’s movement was forcefully squashed by both the Central Bank’s refusal to pay his 
shadow government’s employees in addition to the Syrian army’s military operation forcing 
Aoun out of the Baabda palace. For his part, Aoun’s movement fizzled out as the general went 
into exile in France.  
This incident shows how the Syrians acted as a peacekeeping force with tacit Arab 
League support through Taif. With this stabilizing presence, president Hrawi intended to form a 
Cabinet that would incentivize paramilitary demilitarization, by “[providing] seats to militia 
leaders as a reward for disbanding their forces.”141 Although the Israeli occupation remained 
unsolved in the south, most militias laid down their arms in accordance with the power-sharing 
agreement. Their leaders, like Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt, were integrated into the 
government as high-ranking portfolio ministers. However, one militia based in southern 
Lebanon, and deriving its support from the Shia population and Iran, did not de-commission 
because it claimed to continue the ‘resistance’ against Israel—Hezbollah. This group, which 
perpetrated the US Marines barrack attack in 1983, ‘rebranded’ themselves as a “resistance 
force,” rather than a militia, and was never de-mobilized.142 This adds another layer of 
complexity to Lebanon’s political situation down the road. As Samantha May explains, the 
failure to demobilize Hezbollah “has created the conditions that have eroded the Lebanese state’s 
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monopoly of violence both within and without Lebanese territory” today.143 But on balance, 
peace in Lebanon seemed like a real possibility in the aftermath of the Taif agreement. 
After fifteen years of relative peace, the tumult of the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri, 
the ‘Cedar Revolution,’ and the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon marked a critical 
juncture for the country’s fragile power-sharing institutions. During the 1990s and early 2000s, 
prime minister Rafik Hariri oversaw Lebanon’s economic recovery, rebuilding Beirut and 
introducing neoliberal economic reforms. All of this was facilitated by Hariri’s connections to 
the Gulf states, because prior to his political career, he was a construction tycoon in Saudi 
Arabia. In addition, his “monopolization of Sunni institutions and marginalization of potential 
competitors” in Lebanon through his charitable foundation solidified his grip in politics, as 
Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar underscore.144 Hariri’s soaring popularity and cold relations 
with Bashar al-Assad made the prime minister a threat to Syrian hegemony in Lebanon by the 
early 2000s. On February 14, 2005, an explosion killed Hariri as his motorcade drove past the St. 
George Hotel in Beirut. Amidst international outcry and speculations that the Syrian regime 
orchestrated the assassination, demonstrators protested against the pro-Syrian government led by 
president Émile Lahoud and newly-appointed prime minister Omar Karami. What they did not 
anticipate was that Hariri’s death would electrify the Lebanese people—and cause the peaceful 
withdrawal of Syrian troops long overdue under Taif’s terms.  
The Cedar Revolution—as Western media labeled it—resulted in a political realignment 
in Lebanon between multi-religious blocs in favor and opposed to Syrian withdrawal—named 
after the day of each side’s demonstrations, March 14 and March 8 blocs, respectively. Andrew 
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Arsan portrays the spirit of the Lebanese protestors: “Loudly proclaiming its opposition to 
Syria’s presence in Lebanon, 14 March has presented itself as the guarantor not just of the 
country’s independence and sovereignty, but also of its stability” while “8 March has portrayed 
itself as part of a regional ‘axis’ ranged against the forces of Western neo-imperialism, Zionism, 
and Sunni jihadi obscurantism.”145 Eventually, sectarian affiliation came to the forefront, as the 
Sunni Future Movement party (al-Mustaqbal), led by Saad Hariri (son of Rafik Hariri), sided 
with the Maronite Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea in the anti-Syrian alliance, while Shia 
Amal and Hezbollah entered into an agreement with the Maronite Free Patriotic Movement in 
the pro-Syrian bloc—spearheaded, ironically, by Michel Aoun. In this scenario, Christians as an 
ethnic community held the balance of power amongst the division between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims. Coalesced behind pro- and anti-Syrian stances, ethnic tensions between Christian, 
Sunni, and Shia sects simmered as Lebanon faced a precarious position and a potential for 
renewed political violence.  
Animosities came to a boiling point on May 7, 2008, when the March 8 bloc mobilized 
Shia militiamen from Amal, Hezbollah, and the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) and 
paralyzed the streets of Beirut, when the government attempted to dismiss the pro-Hezbollah 
head of security at the international airport and dismantle a private, Hezbollah-built 
communications network.146 Sunni Future Movement and Druze PSP members of the March 14 
bloc responded by mobilizing their own partisans, and light skirmishes occurred throughout the 
capital. However, as Sami Hermez chronicles, “the Christian factions were not openly involved,” 
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most likely, because of their interethnic division in the political blocs.147 Lebanon came at the 
cliff’s edge of civil war. The Arab League, under the guidance of the Qatari emir, summoned 
parties for a “National Dialogue” in Doha, in which they agreed to a political settlement and the 
end of the armed crisis. A consensus candidate, General Michel Sleiman, would be elected as 
Lebanese president while a new “Government of national unity” would increase the pro-
Hezbollah opposition’s representation and give them a veto.148 In addition, both sides agreed on 
“an electoral law that divides the country into smaller-sized political districts that will influence 
the outcome of the next parliamentary elections in 2009.”149 Hezbollah and its allies effectively 
harnessed their ‘resistance’ militia to capture power through Lebanon’s political institutions, 
creating favorable conditions for them to gain a greater say in politics undemocratically. But the 
Taif Accords technically remained intact. These two blocs, in alliance to this day, remain 
committed to the confessional system. 
The first twenty years of Lebanon’s reconstituted government show that there was only a 
partial implementation of the Taif Accords. Both the historical record and political analysis 
confirm the power-sharing arrangement’s rocky start. Figure 8 below depicts the Taif Accord’s 
so-called “progress report” in regard to its implementation. I compile the University of Notre 
Dame’s Peace Accords Matrix data on Lebanon’s power-sharing agreement to chart its 
implementation by section of the text. I select ten aspects of the agreement that the dataset codes 
for in both the Taif and Good Friday Agreements and provide the overall implementation score. 
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An analysis of the GFA’s score will occur in Chapter 4. As for Lebanon, ten years since Taif was 
enacted, there was an only partial implementation of the overall agreement. Two spheres, 
mentioned previously in my text analysis of the Taif agreement, are worth highlighting in the 
Peace Accords Matrix. Education reform received a “no implementation” code and economic 
and social development received a “minimum implementation” code. To understand why this is 
the case, I analyze Lebanon’s education system and economic/displacement policies after peace 
was achieved in 1989 to determine how (or if) the SSIs and cohesion strategies in Taif were 
implemented and their impact on ethnic tensions within these spheres.  
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3.6: Lebanese Education: A Lost Opportunity 
 
 Implicit in Lebanon’s power-sharing agreement is the willingness of political elites to 
harness the Lebanese education system to cultivate a shared national identity. It envisions 
education as a site of collaboration between various sects to further a cohesion strategy of 
assimilation. In reality, subsequent steps by the government, religious leaders, and other political 
actors derailed the possibility of forging a truly shared national curriculum. Coupled with the 
deteriorating socio-political and economic situation in the country in the mid-2000s and 2010s, 
the Lebanese government has failed to foster collaboration and assimilation in education. It is no 
surprise, then, to see that education reform is coded as “no implementation” in the Peace 
Accords Matrix. Instead, education remains a site of contestation; inequal among sects, and rife 
with ethnic tension—especially in the subjects of civics and history. For a new, post-conflict 
generation of Lebanese students, the classroom can be a minefield that can trigger group 
animosities. 
 As mentioned earlier, Section III F of the Taif agreement deals with education, in 
addition to Section III B, 2.3, which explicitly accounts for a “freedom of religious education.”151 
In accordance with the treaty and the new government’s economic plan, the 1994 Education 
Recovery Plan charged the Education Center for Research and Development (ECRD) with 
developing a new curriculum and school assessment criteria. Nemer Frayha, a leading scholar in 
education, was tasked as the head of the ECRD from 1999 to 2002. His unique account of his 
time as a leading policymaker in post-Taif Lebanon—writing through the lens of both theorist 
and practitioner—help in understanding the political dynamics at play during his tenure. For 
instance, Frayha was keenly aware of “the larger configurations of power operating within 
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Lebanese society,” and was “[determined] to act as a specialized scholar rather than a public 
relations figure,” especially when he embarked to overhaul the state curriculum.152 However, his 
idealism was soon tempered by the political forces surrounding him: “In hindsight…as ECRD 
director, I really had little room to maneuver given the power wielded by pressure groups.”153 
Considering this, reformist and integrationist elements in Lebanese society failed to consolidate 
against traditional religious-political groups to produce a unifying national curriculum.  
 The Lebanese education system has been the mainstay of private institutions—most 
notably, religious groups—because the public school system had been weak and 
underdeveloped, even before the civil war. This had to do with the religious lobby and its vested 
interest in molding the minds of its believers. Frayha contends that religious leaders “tend to 
consider education as a particularly sensitive area worthy of their attention, especially since they 
run a large number of private schools and universities.”154 The outsized influence of religious 
sects in the schools is glaring. Over 40% of higher education institutions are either 
predominantly Christian or Muslim.155 The power of the sectarian political machine is immense 
in education policy, as “religious leaders have access to the grass roots, and the ability to 
mobilize the masses in favor or against a particular policy initiative.”156 For his part, Frayha was 
determined to use a “unified history” and the “writing of civics textbooks” to contribute to 
Lebanon’s post-conflict reconciliation.157 With this in mind, the 1994 Education Recovery Plan 
empowered the ECRD to overhaul the Lebanese education system and construct a new 
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curriculum, with the goal of cultivating national unity and assimilating pupils under a common 
Lebanese banner. Ideally, Frayha intended for a site of collaboration to take root, which would 
aid in socializing young citizens into a truly national identity. 
 At first, the Plan for Educational Reform showed promise in its stated objectives, opting 
to carry out the explicit and implicit sentiments of the Taif Accords by enacting a cohesion 
strategy of assimilation by way of a site of collaboration. The plan “locates the humanistic and 
religious dimensions of education as the basis of learning aims and activities,” synthesizing 
Lebanese secularists’ liberal, pluralistic vision and traditional Lebanese religious leaders’ 
concern for religion as a basis for educating.158 Key principles are enumerated in the document, 
such as: 
“Principle 5: 
The formation of a citizen who:  
(a) Feels honoured in his country–Lebanon–and is proud of his loyalty and 
belonging to it.  
(b) Is proud of his Arab identity and kinship, and of his commitment to them.  
(c) Recognizes the long national Lebanese history that, emancipated from 
extremist beliefs, will attain a unified, open and humanistic society.  
(d) Realizes the importance of co-existence among all citizens since ‘there is no 
legality for any authority that contradicts the Document of Co-existence’, which remains 
a unique guide in the region and to the whole world.  
(e) Respects personal and social freedom and preserves others’ rights and 
properties.”159 
 
These propositions indicate a concerted effort, by scholars and policymakers, to cultivate a 
unified Lebanese nationalism inclusive of all religious sects. In this context, assimilation is 
achieved under an umbrella ‘nationalism’ defined by Lebanon’s status as an Arab nation that 
nevertheless subscribes to liberal principles of tolerance.  
 




Since the 1994 Education Recovery Plan introduced a national history textbook in 1997 
two more attempts to revise the curriculum (2000 and 2012) failed due to the issue’s perceived 
divisiveness as ethnic tensions became more fraught in Lebanon. The 1997 textbook, as Maha 
Shuayb observes, “shows the big emphasis placed on nation building, unity and the Lebanese 
identity as means for building peace and social cohesion.”160 This revamp in the public education 
sector was meant to address the political reformation of a post-war generation in Lebanon. 
Forging a national Lebanese identity corresponded to creating a curriculum that included an 
over-arching Lebanese history that explains the civil war era. This contrasts to fragmented 
historical accounts, seen in many divided societies, that attribute blame or wrongdoing to a 
particular sect—thus informing one’s views of the other. It is, of course, a challenging feat—and 
sectarian groups could not agree to this history. This affected the educational reform as it “was 
highly inclusive of various religious, sectarian and economic sectors in Lebanon,” but not 
“students and parents.”161 Opting for a top-down approach to state curricula, subsequent reforms 
to the textbooks stalled as the political environment fractured in the mid-2000s. Thus, it was 
evident that the religious establishment would not relinquish their hold on to their privileges in 
the realm of education.  
As the Lebanese public education system deteriorated in the 2010s, the gap between 
public and private schools widened. This has led to a serious divergence in Lebanese history and 
civics education. Bassel Akar and Mara Albrecht conducted an empirical analysis on civics 
education in Lebanese private schools. They found that “classroom reflections suggested 
dominant didactic pedagogies for the purpose of students passing exams and degrees of 
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resistance towards classroom discussions so as to avoid conflicts with and among students.”162 
The collaborative site Frayha conceived gave way to a fraught atmosphere, where difficult 
conversations about religion and conflict are sidestepped. Pedantic approaches to the subject of 
civics are adopted as it creates the least controversy, in comparison to ‘active’ learning. 
Another issue is the proliferation of private schools after the civil war and well into the 
twenty-first century that are registered as foreign programs (e.g. the French baccalauréat 
system). Foreign-accredited schools have a high degree of autonomy and do not adhere to the 
national curriculum on civics.163 Akar and Albrecht estimate that “just over half” of Lebanese 
pupils registered in private schools do not learn through the state curriculum—a worrying sign, 
as the schools they studied “are recognized as among the most elite private institutions in 
Lebanon.”164 They also report how the supposed national education was in practice just rote 
memorization. As one teacher complains, “the other subjects I teach, like history and geography, 
[students] don’t like them because they’re dry. And civics is even drier…because there is no 
understanding, all memorisation.”165 A serious dilemma emerges because the unifying education 
first proposed in Taif and implemented by legislation is not even taught to a sizeable population 
of students. In their investigation, the researchers conclude: 
“Findings from empirical studies suggest that the implementation of these nationalist 
aims in Lebanon as a framework for policy (curricular design and textbooks) and 
practices (classroom learning) generates degrees of social exclusion and barriers to 
learning active citizenship and history as a discipline.”166  
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The evidence thus points out that the national Lebanese curriculum has mainly failed in 
cultivating the sites of collaboration it had once promised. Instead, an increasing number of 
students in the 2010s are not even exposed to the state textbooks—a form of social exclusion It 
seems that education is viewed as a site of coexistence, at best, or a site of contestation, at worst. 
 Public schools, which do teach the national curriculum, are usually representative of 
homogenized communities, meaning that these spaces lack the necessary conditions for 
collaboration between ethnic groups. Hoda Baytiyeh stresses how demography shapes the 
learning experience for students when administrators, teachers, and fellow classmates come from 
the same religious sect. “Despite the fact that these public schools commonly encourage national 
patriotism along with religious inspiration, such segregation in public education prevents social 
interaction between students required to overcome narrow views,” she concludes.167 There is still 
no agreed-upon history curriculum in Lebanon, so the subject “…is taught in schools on the basis 
of the 1971 pre-civil war curriculum that, evidently, lacks any reference to events that are key to 
understanding present-day Lebanon.”168 This national amnesia reflects how contested the civil 
war history is, and what is at stake in teaching history in the country. In general, politics in the 
classroom is strictly shunned. As Erik van Ommering puts it, “[teachers] resorted to neglecting 
the topic of war and violence altogether and complained about students being obsessed with 
sectarianism and politics.”169 These elements in schooling combine to reveal a bleak picture, as 
the vision of education in Taif as a tool for assimilation and a site for collaboration has yet to be 
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fully manifested in Lebanon. Rather, the schoolyard is a contested space for ethnic-religious 
groups. 
 An educational divide in Lebanon is persistent between Muslims and Christians. A recent 
study by Rania Tfaily, Hassan Diab, and Andrzej Kulcycki uses an innovative empirical model 
to examine educational disparities by religious sect. Their findings confirm that there are gaps 
not only between communities, but also in geographic distribution throughout Lebanon. School 
enrollment for Sunni and Shia Muslims outside of Beirut lagged behind Christians, and even 
Sunni Muslims in Tripoli and Saida “were significantly disadvantaged.”170 Geographical divides 
in communities are also present: Christian education was “considerably lower” among Christians 
in the south and Bekaa valley, and Shia Muslims in the south were more educated than those in 
the Bekaa.171 They conclude that “the regional/sectarian disparities that pre-dated the civil war 
were still to a large extent replicated in the current analysis, especially for men.”172 These 
empirical data analyses support the claim that Lebanon’s education system has ultimately failed 
to live up to its promise in Taif—to strengthen “national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural 
openness” as a site of collaboration.173 
  Equipped with the knowledge of the political landscape in Lebanon after the Cedar 
Revolution, it comes to no surprise that the Lebanese education system is failing in its purpose to 
assimilate the population under a broad national identity. Education, envisioned as a site of 
collaboration in Taif, is undermined by political intransigence and educational inequalities. This, 
in turn, exacerbates religious and class divides. The power-sharing attempt to bring about a site 
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of collaboration, in this instance, has failed—and the potential for education to decrease ethnic 
tensions has diminished. Education is practically a site of contestation for the country, in which 
political actors try to gain leverage over other ethnic groups, thereby making the topics of history 
and civics hotly-contested issues.  
3.7: The Demographic Spheres of Beirut: A Microcosm of Lebanese Displacement 
 
 It is hard to understand Lebanon without understanding its capital city, Beirut. A 
microcosm of the country’s ethnic diversity and outward-facing culture, the city has weathered 
through colonization, occupation, civil war, economic turmoil, and political unrest. This section 
will discuss the effects of post-war reconstruction on displacement and economic inequality. A 
disconnect between the treaty’s language and the post-war Lebanese government’s orientation 
towards development in Beirut resulted in reinforcing, rather than weakening, ethnic division in 
the capital—thereby transforming a proposed site of coexistence and collaboration into a site of 
contestation. An avenue for economic justice after the civil war, the displacement clause in Taif 
was tainted by corruption, so that family housing claims were bought out by a pseudo-public-
private corporation, Solidere. This exasperated sectarian animosities as it resulted in the literal 
destruction of the pre-war city center into a place wiped away (or sterilized, if put more bluntly) 
of Lebanon’s bloody past.  
If one views Beirut’s reconstruction through the lens of the Taif agreement’s Guiding 
Principles and Displacement clauses, then one sees the capital’s physical and demographic 
landscape attest to the promise of power-sharing and the ultimate pitfalls of the post-war peace in 
Lebanon. Three points in Taif’s “General Principles” outline the state’s commitment to; (1) a 
“free” economic system and “private ownership,” (2) a “culturally, socially, and economically-
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balanced development,” and (3) an effort to achieve “social justice” through reform.174 Further, 
Section D, pertaining to “spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon” addresses the 
war.175 It establishes the right for Lebanese citizens to return to their pre-war homes.176 These 
provisions envision a site of coexistence and collaboration, in which ethnic groups could 
possibly share more equitably in the economic ‘pie’ and return to some pre-war neighborhoods 
with mixed religious sects. This demonstrates an assimilation and differentiation strategy, in 
which a national effort to revitalize the economy would unify the Lebanese and tolerance would 
underpin sectarian intermixing in pre-war neighborhoods.  
Before the civil war, Beirut reflected a site of coexistence, in which ethnic groups co-
inhabited in the same city, but in different neighborhoods. Jon Calame and Esther Ruth 
Charlesworth recount the history of Beirut’s demographic landscape, noting that the city 
“traditionally functioned as a pluralistic but ethnically segregated city.”177 Like other urbanizing 
cities during the Industrial Revolution and global capitalism, “distinctions between clans, classes, 
and native or non-native Beirutis remained powerful distinctions within the larger ethnic 
categories.”178 A clear divide in the city emerged, however, as ethnic tensions rose in the 1950s 
and 60s. As Calame and Charlesworth write, “a demographic pattern had been established in 
which the political groups loyal to the Maronite nationalistic platform were concentrated in the 
eastern side of the city, and those in favor of the predominantly Sunni, pan-Arab platform in the 
west.”179 East and West Beirut, roughly divided between Christian and Muslim ethnic-religious 
groups respectively, reflected the power bases of each side during the Lebanese civil war. 
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The violence of the 1970s in Beirut forced population shifts that led to the city’s 
segregation by religious affiliation. Enclaves of ethnic minorities in Beirut sought security by 
moving out of the city or moving to areas in which their ethnicity was the majority group. In 
addition, “about a year after violence first erupted in the city, large-scale coordinated population 
transfers began in the capital…”180 This phenomenon is observed in ethnic conflict more 
generally.181 For many, this segregated atmosphere was embodied by the Green Line, which 
served as the de-facto demarcation of East and West Beirut during the civil war.182 Ethnically-
motivated violence that targeted civilians served to reinforce the power of the paramilitary 
groups as protectors of their religious sect. This caused “the disappearance of mixed residential 
areas, which were commonplace before the outbreak of hostilities, reduced the chances of 
reconciliation and accelerated the ethnic polarization of the city.”183 For its part, only a sliver of 
text in the Taif Accords addresses issues of segregation and displacement, an issue that became a 
site of contestation after the war.  
 Post-war reconstruction efforts honed in on a neoliberal vision of peace for Lebanon, 
focusing on revitalizing Beirut as a financial and leisure center to attract foreign investment and 
private development. John Nagle identifies the elite’s “reconstruction ideology,” that is, “…an 
intentional attempt to erase memories of the war; the process of forgetting conveniently 
reinforced the nexus between neoliberalism and ethnicity to facilitate the elites’ control of 
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economic and political institutions.”184 On the other hand, leaders faced a daunting challenge 
with the number of internally displaced persons in Lebanon after the civil war. The Ministry for 
the Displaced and the Central Fund for the Displaced were founded to facilitate property returns. 
This ministry was headed by Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and its 
militia—which alludes to Nagle’s point about the motivations behind the political elite’s 
reconstruction philosophy.185 What transpired was a botched program, rife with 
“mismanagement and embezzlement of funds.”186 According to Georges Assaf and Rana El-Fil, 
between 1991 to 1999, $800 million was spent on displacement, but only “20 per cent of the 
displaced were able to return” and only “nine per cent of those who returned were fully 
reimbursed for expenditure on house reconstruction.”187 Clearly, corruption tainted the economic 
recovery and the return of the displaced, quickly denying Beirut its potential to become a site of 
coexistence and collaboration.  
 Put simply, processing displacement claims in Beirut was a mess. An unwieldy 
bureaucracy and informal patronage networks organized along sectarian affiliation made it close 
to impossible for displaced persons to claim funds. Aseel Sawalha accounts for the post-war 
attitude in Beirut, in which segregated spaces became open to all once again, but “they continued 
to be foreign and unfamiliar to those who lived on ‘one side’ of the city and who paid cautious 
visits to the ‘other side’.”188 Her ethnographic fieldwork explored the reconstruction efforts in 
Beirut. She interviewed all those involved in the reconstruction process, from public 
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administrators to displaced person claimants and squatters. Sawalha corroborates Nagle’s 
hypothesis on the post-war reconstruction mindset, as officials believed “the city must be 
‘cleansed’ of all vestiges of the war, and therefore the displaced were mandated to leave the 
city.”189 But many Lebanese in Beirut, believing that they have a rightful claim for war damages 
to their homes, fought for their pay-outs. Sawalha interviewed ‘Ali’ (a pseudonym), a displaced 
person who filed a claim for his Beirut home. She summed up her encounter succinctly: “Ali’s 
case illustrates how intricately formal systems were interlaced with the informal systems of quid 
pro quo contracts that evolved directly from wartime practices.”190 What is revealed, in this 
instance, is a sectarian clientelist framework carried over from the civil war into the government 
apparatus of a weak state. It is safe to say that the sites of coexistence and collaboration 
transformed into a contested space in which Beirutis had to go through their sect’s patronage 
channels to get displacement relief. This competition for reparations turned into a zero-sum game 
between ethnic groups. 
 The corrupt displacement relief process went hand-in-hand with the rise of Solidere—a 
pseudo-public-private corporation founded by then prime minister Rafik Hariri in 1994—and its 
redevelopment of Beirut’s city center. Oliver Wainwright speaks of this hybrid oddity, 
“incorporated as a private business, listed on the stock exchange,” but also “[enjoying] special 
powers of compulsory purchase and regulatory authority” granted by Lebanese law.191 This gave 
Solidere extraordinary power to dictate terms favorable for themselves when they bought land in 
downtown Beirut. Only a handful of wealthy owners, such as Fady el-Khoury (who owns St. 
George Hotel), have resisted Solidere’s encroachment thus far. In building glamourous 
 
189 Ibid., 115. 
190 Ibid., 130-1.  
191 “Is Beirut’s Glitzy Downtown Redevelopment All That It Seems?,” The Guardian, January 22, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/jan/22/beirut-lebanon-glitzy-downtown-redevelopment-gucci-prada. 
 84 
skyscrapers, waterfront promenades, a yacht club, and luxury shops, the corporation aimed to 
unify the nation by “deterritorializing space.”192 Once an important “site of social centrality,” or 
a site of coexistence, it has “excluded most of the citizenry” and contributed to the “exacerbation 
of ethnic cleavages in the postwar era.”193 Areas like the Beirut Souks cater to the highest strata 
in Lebanese society, excluding the lower class from once shared spaces. Solidere is only one 
example of the cozy relationship between the political and business elites in Lebanon—the 
people who sought to rebuild the capital in their own image. When only the rich can intermingle 
in sites of coexistence, the rest of the Lebanese population are denied the opportunity to interact 
amongst ethnicities in a meaningful way. 
 Thirty years after the civil war, residential Beirut remains ethnically divided, although 
sectarian boundaries are not as rigid as before. Mona Fawaz et. al. notes that the boundaries of 
wartime East and West Beirut “have been weakened but they remain inscribed in the minds of 
many urbanites, especially when it comes to serious decisions such as choosing a place to 
dwell.”194 However, neighborhoods are increasingly being differentiated by political alliances, be 
it March 8 or March 14, where “panoplies of sectarian markers such as flags, emblems, graffiti, 
and posters are used to demarcate the territory of a group against so-called outsiders and re-
affirm the supposed allegiance of insiders.”195 In this case, sectarian allegiances are still salient, 
with elite-brokered political alliances defining the new in-group, out-group dynamic in Beiruti 
neighborhoods. This signaling—be it the light blue flags of Saad Hariri’s Future Movement or 
the bright yellow flags of Hezbollah—warns those who may upset the community. Unlike the 
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explicit barriers of the Green Line, these implicit signals harken to civil war control of territory 
by religious sect.  
Figure 10 illustrates the use of posters and political imagery to demarcate ethnic-religious 
neighborhoods. I took these images during my time in Beirut in 2019. In Photo C, a billboard 
depicting the Lebanese Forces (al-Quwwat al-Lubaniyah) party symbol and leader Samir Geagea 
hangs over a building that faces Elias Sarkis Avenue, the main thoroughfare in the East Beirut 
neighborhood of Achrafieh. This predominantly Maronite Catholic area was once a stronghold 
for right-wing Christian militias during the war. Up the road, Photo B shows another political 
billboard, this time of the late Bashir Gemayel. A Lebanese Forces flag can be seen in the 
foreground. The huge sign is situated in Sassine Square, a main artery in Achrafieh—and directly 
opposite of the site where Gemayel was assassinated in 1983. Photo A was taken in a Shia 
Muslim enclave of the Zuqaq el-Blat neighborhood. A young Hezbollah martyr poses with his 
assault rifle, with the party symbol depicted on the bottom right. These subtle reminders of 
ethnic belonging emanate in Lebanese society, precisely because of the sites of contestation that 
politicians have failed to transform. 
Figure 9. Ethnographic Map of Beirut 




Figure 10. This map shows the sectarian divisions of Beirut 
during the civil war. These divides, for the most part, 
remain today. I interlay photographs I took in Beirut, 
marking the signage’s location within the ethnic-religious 
neighborhoods.  
Photo A: A poster of a young Hezbollah fighter (or 
“martyr”) is shown in a small Shia enclave of the Zuqaq al-
Blat neighborhood. Hezbollah’s iconic green and yellow 
symbol is located on the bottom right of the poster.  
Photo B: Bashir Gemayel, former leader of the Phalangists 
and Lebanese president, is prominently displayed in Sassine 
Square, the heart of Achrafieh. Gemayel was assassinated in 
1983 near this spot. 
Photo C: A Lebanese Forces billboard depicting party 
leader Samir Geagea hangs in front of Elias Sarkis Avenue 
in Achrafieh. 
 
Sources: Map by Nasser Yassin, 
“Beirut,” Cities 29, no. 1 (February 1, 
2012): 69, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2011.0
2.001 (Reproduced and adapted with 
permission from Elsevier). 
Photographs by Czar Alexei Sepe 
(June-July 2019). 
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The intertwined relationship between Beirut’s displaced population and economic 
development after Taif reveals an unpleasant reality behind the hollow words of the power-
sharing agreement. By virtue of the sectarian political elites’ redevelopment policy, desiring to 
sanitize the civil war past through leveling parts of the city, a neoliberal outlook on the 
reconstruction was adopted. Solidere embodied the Lebanese government’s emphasis on 
capitalist growth over the echoes of social justice in the Taif agreement, at the expense of 
Beirutis who sought financial relief and displacement claims. When public space was 
monopolized by quasi-public-private corporations like Solidere for the rich, most Lebanese 
citizens were deprived of a meaningful site of coexistence—most notably, the old Beirut souks. 
Therefore, the development of Beirut’s economic reconstruction, alongside displacement issues, 
show that due to several factors—political corruption, clientelism, neoliberal governmental 
policies—the sites of coexistence and collaboration in Taif were not adequately cultivated. Only 
the rich coexisted and collaborated, in the new Le Yacht Club on the Beirut Marina. 
3.8: Gaging Ethnic Tensions and Sectarian Strife 
 
 Researchers try to gauge ethnic tensions in Lebanon through a systematic, data-driven 
approach; however, reliable public polling data is hard to come by for the country. To aid my 
investigation into the extent to which sectarian animosities have increased or decreased since the 
implementation of the power-sharing regime, I use selected opinion polling from the Arab 
Barometer and Kenneth Vaughan’s logistical regression study. Overall, the data demonstrate that 
from the end of the civil war to the mid-2010s, ethnic tensions have mostly risen.  
 The Arab Barometer provides public opinion polling for the MENA (Middle East North 
Africa) region, including Lebanon. In their “Wave V Country Report,” there has been a gradual 
uptick in the percentage of Lebanese respondents who say they “strongly dislike or dislike 
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having members of a different religion as neighbors”: from 2007 to 2010, those who did not wish 
to live next to other religious sects were 5% but increased to 14% in 2016 and 21% in 2018—a 
quadrupling in one decade alone.196 Surprisingly, this differs from the trends in general religious 
belief in the country. The same report found that “personal piety in Lebanon has declined 
dramatically in the past decade: only 24 percent [in 2018] describe themselves as religious 
compared with 44 percent in 2010.”197 Education level does not change the level of piety, as 
“those with a basic level of education in Lebanon are as likely to be religious as those with a 
higher degree.”198 These findings suggest that although religiosity is in decline, the essential 
ethnic identification of religion in Lebanon is still salient—and tension is on the rise. 
 Kenneth Vaughan investigates the perceptions of democracy between Lebanese ethnic-
religious groups to assess the consociational theory in general. His research method uses the 
Arab Barometer to conduct logistic regression models and assess the relationship between 
ethnic-religious identity (using the four main ethnic groups: Maronite, Sunni Muslim, Shia 
Muslim, and Druze) and trust in government institutions.199 Vaughan reveals that only Shias had 
consistently favorable views about Lebanon’s democracy and government institutions. 
Compared to Sunni, Maronite, and Druze respondents, “only Shia Muslims rated the Lebanese 
government as more democratic than undemocratic.”200 The difference between Shia and 
Maronite views on government institutions is stark: “when it comes to having a general trust in 
the government and trust in the police, Shia Muslims only have significantly higher odds of trust 
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when compared to Maronite Catholics.”201 For the most part, “evaluations of the freedom that are 
guaranteed in Lebanon were generally high” for all religious sects, “with the exception of the 
freedom to sue the government.”202 Vaughan summarizes his statistical analysis research of 
Lebanon:  
“In ten out of twelve models investigating equal outcomes for the state of democracy, 
Maronite respondents consistently feel that the state of Lebanon is less democratic, less 
trustworthy, and less free when compared to Shia Muslims. Similar disparities were 
observed between Shia and Sunni Muslims in nine out of the twelve models. Similar 
findings were also found between Shia Muslims and Druze respondents.”203 
 
According to International Information estimates, the Shia community is now the largest sect in 
Lebanon. This 2019 independent poll, using unofficial demographic estimates and electoral 
information from the 2018 parliamentary election, found that Shia represented 31.6% of the 
population, Sunni 31.1%, and Christians 30.6%.204 This is the first time since the official 1932 
Census that the Shia population has eclipsed all other sectarian groups. In this light, it is likely 
that the Shia community’s high confidence in Lebanese political institutions reflects broader 
demographic trends in favor of that ethnic group. Their preference and trust in democracy is a 
function of their claim as the country’s majority sect. 
 Vaughan’s investigation raises alarm bells for the state of ethnic relations in Lebanon. 
Because the faith of political institutions is highly correlated between religious sects, this 
increases the sectarian animosities in Lebanese society. The Taif Accords diminished the 
Maronite Catholic community’s political power relative to Sunni and Shia power. It appears that 
as Muslims—especially Shia—grew more powerful both institutionally and demographically, the 
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other religious sects’ faith in democracy in Lebanon fell. Coupled with the increased intolerance 
seen in the Arab Barometer, in the case of living next to those of a different religion, these 
surveys adequately prove that ethnic tensions have increased in Lebanon since the end of 
hostilities in the early 1990s. It is interesting to note, however, that the sharp decline in religious 
belief does not necessarily correlate with a decrease in ethnic tensions. The Arab Barometer 
report reaffirms the fact that sectarian affiliation in Lebanon is an ethnic identity—not 
necessarily underpinned by religious faith and conviction. 
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3.9: Findings and Conclusions 
 
 








































The Taif Accords forged peace for Lebanon, after an acrimonious civil war that 
devastated the state and its people. It is clear though that the power-sharing agreement was a 
compromise document, which spliced the divergent interests of the traditional Lebanese political 
elite, paramilitary leaders and the external power of Syria, into a text rife with contradictions. 
However, Taif did provide a consociational model that attempted to unify the nation out of the 
rubble. To sum up, the Taif agreement envisioned education as a space to pursue assimilation (an 
overarching national identity rooted in Arabness) by creating sites of collaboration, and the 
economic reconstruction of Beirut as a way to forge sites of coexistence and collaboration (by 
achieving economic and social justice). Both cases demonstrate that after peace in Lebanon, 
these provisions in the power-sharing agreements were barely implemented. Rather, the political 
elite and sectarian groups viewed education and the economy as sites of contestation (a zero-sum 
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game), thereby increasing ethnic tensions. Figure 11 summarizes this chapter’s case-study 
findings.  
 On balance, the combination of the state’s failure to cultivate sites of collaboration and 
coexistence, and the proliferation of sites of contestation is a causal factor in the increase of 
ethnic tensions in Lebanon. In this chapter, I establish a causal relationship between the 
proliferation of sites of contestations and the increase in sectarian animosities in the country after 
power-sharing was implemented. Due to various socio-political conditions, the proposed sites of 
collaboration, meant to decrease ethnic tensions, actually became sites of contestation, where 
ethnic group politics is openly played out and winners and losers are distributed by ethnic 
belonging. As for the cohesion strategies, due to the agreement’s ineffective implementation, the 
assimilation strategies were not carried through. By in large, an increase in ethnic tensions 
resulted in the persistent political mobilization on religious lines. Even when the loci of power 
politics remained sites of contestation, important areas in society that could have led to a 
furthering of cohesion strategies and sites of social interaction that decreased ethnic tensions and 
were formulated to do so in the Taif accords did not occur. The Taif agreement—if it was truly 
meant to decrease ethnic salience through a consociational form of democracy—has failed. Thus, 
I find that the Lebanese case study confirms my hypothesis on the relationship between SSIs, 





Northern Ireland: A Fight for Peace 
 
“I will never sit down with Gerry Adams…he’d sit with anyone. He’d sit down with the devil. In 
fact, Adams does sit down with the devil.” 
 
 – Rev. Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, 1997.205 
 
“Up until March 26 this year Ian Paisley and I never had a conversation about anything—not 
even about the weather.” 
 
 – Martin McGuinness, leader of Sinn Féin, 2007.206 
 
“I always walk with my heart constricting, / Half-expecting bottles, in sudden shards / Of West 
Belfast sunshine, / To dance about my head.”  
– Sinéad Morrissey, “Thoughts in a Black Taxi,” 1996.207 
4.1: Introduction 
 
In light of the 2016 Brexit referendum, one of the most contentious issues on the 
negotiating table was Northern Ireland’s status in a post-Brexit reality—and how proposed deals 
may violate the 1998 Belfast Agreement (Good Friday Agreement).208 Due to this, as well as the 
changing demographics in the region, there have been growing calls from nationalists to conduct 
a border poll referendum on Irish unification in the near future. Nationalists (who are 
predominantly Catholic and identify as Irish) believe demographic momentum is on their side: 
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the 2011 Census showed only a 3% difference between Protestants (48%) and Catholics (45%), 
while a more recent poll conducted by the Department of Education showed that from nursery to 
second-level education, “Catholics make up 50.6 per cent of the schools’ population (176,408 
pupils) while Protestants make up 32.3 per cent (112,637 pupils)” in the 2019-2020 school 
year.209 All sides are awaiting in suspense for the completion of the 2021 Census.210 But a border 
poll, triggered through the mechanisms outlined in the Northern Irish power-sharing agreement, 
risks stirring up sectarian animosities and re-surfacing the violence of the not-so-distant past.  
There is a precarious peace in Northern Ireland. Since the adoption of the 1998 Northern 
Ireland Act, establishing the devolved Northern Irish government, power-sharing has collapsed 
five times. This includes two long durations without a government in recent history (2002-2007 
and 2017-2020).211 A power-sharing deal was struck recently in January 2020, only after the two 
main political parties—the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin (SF)—performed 
poorly in the 2019 General Election, and the UK Government threatened another round of 
elections for the region.212 Ethnic tensions are persistent. From ‘peace walls’ that separate ethnic-
religious communities to the annual parade season, in which (mostly) Protestant groups march to 
commemorate loyalist historical milestones, sectarian animosity remains a tough hurdle in cross-
community reconciliation. Nevertheless, there have been inroads in the peace process, and ethnic 
violence in Northern Ireland has decreased drastically. Pat Nolan found that “158 ‘security-
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related’ deaths” have occurred in the twenty years since the GFA, which pales in comparison to 
the 480 deaths that occurred in 1972—in one year alone—at the peak of the Troubles.213 Part of 
the compromise settlement that brought back power-sharing in 2020 recognizes both Irish and 
Ulster Scots as official languages in the country.214 Certainly, progress has been made to 
ameliorate ethnic tensions in Northern Ireland, but to what extent did the Good Friday 
Agreement affect ethnic tensions in the region? 
This chapter will explore the role of the Good Friday Agreement in establishing power-
sharing institutions and sites of social interaction conducive to decrease ethnic tensions in 
Northern Ireland. Unlike Lebanon, Northern Ireland did not have historical roots in power-
sharing. Northern Ireland was formed to preserve a Protestant-majority polity on the island of 
Ireland. But Protestant dominance could not last. By 1968, violence erupted in the cities of 
(London-) Derry and Belfast, commencing the Troubles. Throughout this ethnic conflict, efforts 
were made—although unsuccessfully—to reach some form of political settlement via 
consociationalism. This led to the Belfast Agreement in 1998. Although it proved to be a 
challenge to implement, the power-sharing agreement fared well—as it was fully implemented in 
a decade.  
 I then embark on a textual analysis of the Good Friday Agreement. The power-sharing 
arrangement, which encompassed a plethora of issues, had overall SSIs of coexistence and 
collaboration, and a differentiation cohesion strategy. To better understand the GFA’s 
implementation and whether my predictions correspond to actual outcomes, I process trace two 
aspects of the agreement: anti-discrimination and employment and decommissioning of 
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paramilitary groups. Both cases demonstrate success in implementing the envisioned sites of 
social interaction, as well as the overall cohesion strategies. The case of decommissioning shows 
the fluid progression of SSIs throughout the implementation process, as I find that it was a site of 
contestation at first, but then transitioned to a site of coexistence. Through my analysis of public 
opinion polling, I conclude that there has been a slight decrease in ethnic tensions. Thus, my 
hypotheses are congruent with the Northern Irish case study, thereby amplifying its explanatory 
power. 
4.2: A History of Northern Ireland, Sans Power-Sharing 
 
 To explain the origins of the Northern Irish conflict, we must situate any historical 
analysis in the greater context of the English conquest of Ireland—most importantly, the Ulster 
Plantations in the seventeenth century. Under Queen Elizabeth I’s reign, the traditional Irish 
province of Ulster (comprised of nine counties: Antrim, Armagh, Cavan, Donegal, Down, 
Fermanagh, Londonderry/Derry, Monaghan, and Tyrone) were subdued by English forces after 
the defeat of the native Irish chieftains. The Crown confiscated land as the Irish nobility fled. In 
turn, subsequent British monarchs consolidated their hold on the island by distributing the land 
to colonists arriving from Britain.215 This colonial enterprise was accelerated by Oliver 
Cromwell during the English Civil War. His New Model Army ruthlessly conquered a resistant 
native population and raised Catholic towns, like Drogheda, in 1649.216 By the 1700s, the 
plantations were viewed as a success. As John Darby writes: “by 1703, less than 5 per cent of the 
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land of Ulster was still in the hands of the Catholic Irish.”217 Colonists came from the British 
isle, many of whom were Scottish, and established settlements while they pushed out native Irish 
onto undesirable land in the west. Sectarian dividing lines emerged rather quickly because most 
colonists were Protestant while most natives were Catholics. Furthermore, a system of Penal 
Codes in the 1700s prevented Irish Catholics from “bearing arms, educating their children and 
owning any horse above £5 in value,” while Protestants affiliated with the Church of Ireland—
both north and south—enjoyed landownership and self-rule during a period called the Protestant 
Ascendancy. Over time, these defining characteristics, including a sense of discrimination and 
deprivation, would form divergent ethnic identities that will come into confrontation in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is no surprise, as John Coakley holds, that “religious 
background has been the most fundamental determinant of national identity in Northern 
Ireland.”218 
Similar to the Lebanese state, the creation of Northern Ireland as a distinct political entity 
was a recent invention—dating to the Government of Ireland Act 1920 (and six years before 
Grand Liban). At the heart of this new ‘Northern’ Island lies competing political claims over 
self-determination: on one hand, Irish nationalists demanded that Northern Ireland be absorbed 
into the Irish state; on the other, unionists demanded that the territory remain a separate political 
entity under the ‘union’ of the United Kingdom.219 Therefore, the key to understanding the 
country’s history and ethnic conflict is the inherent interests of the two external powers involved 
in each side’s claims—the newly independent Irish Free State (Ireland) and Great Britain (UK). 
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Whether ‘nationalist’ or ‘unionist,’ a closer history that traces the reasons why Northern Ireland 
was partitioned by the UK will inform us about the country’s ethnic-religious group dynamic. 
In many respects, the Northern Irish government was meant to be a solution against 
competing Irish nationalist and Ulster unionist aspirations within Great Britain. This competition 
was exemplified in the Home Rule crises. As Irish cultural and political nationalism predicated 
on a Catholic, Gaelic identity came into full swing during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century (the Gaelic Revival), a parallel reaction against this conceptualization of the Irish nation 
took hold amongst the traditionally Protestant Ulster-Scots in the north. After two failed attempts 
to form a local governing body, known as Home Rule, the Third Home Rule Bill introduced in 
1912 was on the verge of passing in Westminster.220 Fearful of a Catholic-majority government, 
unionists coalesced under the Ulster Volunteer Force, a paramilitary group, and swore a solemn 
oath and covenant with over 500,000 like-minded Irish to “[use] all means which may be found 
necessary to defeat” Home Rule.221 This mass-mobilization alarmed Westminster, as British 
Liberals and Conservatives alike viewed “partition as a solution” to the Irish question.222 
Meanwhile, republican nationalists in the south steadily built up their own paramilitary 
groups and rebelled against Great Britain in the 1916 Easter Rising. This rebellion, though 
squashed in a week by British forces, marked the beginning of Ireland’s independence era. Many 
Irish resorted to arms in a nationalist struggle to declare Ireland a republic, free from the British 
monarchy. Fighting intensified in the south between 1919 and 1920, as the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), led by Michael Collins, employed guerilla tactics to subvert the heavy British 
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military presence. On the political front, the 1920 Government of Ireland Act implemented 
Home Rule, which was originally delayed because of the First World War. In accordance with 
the law, two parliaments—one for twenty-six southern counties and the other for six counties in 
Ulster (Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry/Derry, and Tyrone)—were created.223 
Nevertheless, republican guerillas continued to fight British forces until the 1921 Anglo-Irish 
Treaty, which created the Irish Free State, a political entity with a looser relationship between the 
Crown and southern Ireland. After a short, but bloody, civil war between those who accepted the 
treaty and those who opposed it, the fledgling Irish Free State entered the 1925 London 
Agreement, which “abandoned both the nationalists in the North and the hope for all-Ireland 
unity.”224 In short, Northern Ireland was created to maintain a Protestant-majority polity—
concentrated in six northern counties—loyal to Great Britain on the island, despite the 
independence-seeking Catholic majority in Ireland.  
Ulster unionists ceaselessly consolidated their power in the newly-formed Northern 
Ireland parliament, introducing legislation to essentially crystallize their rule in the country. The 
Ulster Special Constabulary was established by the end of 1920, in response to a “‘feeling of 
insecurity’ in Belfast.”225 However, as Thomas Hennessey notes, “the force that emerged was 
based mainly on a reorganized UVF and therefore almost exclusively Protestant,” thereby 
making justice and policing solely the domain of the ethnic majority.226 The creation of an 
independent state in southern Ireland, in 1937, polarized Ulster along sectarian lines, as bouts of 
ethnic violence erupted in urban centers such as Derry (Londonderry).227 Jonathan Bardon points 
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out the immense challenge a new Northern Irish government faced: “the fact that a third of the 
population was so hostile to the six-county state that it hoped for its downfall would have taxed 
the ingenuity of any government of the region.”228 For their part, northern unionists felt isolated 
as a minority in the whole of the island, so they entrenched themselves into the Northern Irish 
political apparatus. As violence spiraled out of control, the Northern Irish government took 
drastic measures, enacting the Civil Authority (Special Powers) Act in 1922, which “amounted 
to the civil equivalent of the statutory imposition of martial law.”229 These draconian measures 
foreshadow the extent to which the new country would go to protect its majority-Protestant 
status.  
Unlike the history of Lebanon, where the spirit of power-sharing comes from a legacy 
that dates back to Ottoman rulers and was encoded in the nation’s founding, Northern Ireland’s 
politicians sought to maintain one-party rule throughout the early to mid-twentieth century. 
Proportional representation was abolished in 1923, and soon after, “Unionist representation on 
elected public bodies increased at the expense of all other parties.”230 Sir James Craig sought a 
“clear-cut division between loyalism and nationalism.”231 It was effective: “there had been only 
eight uncontested seats in 1925 but by 1933 there were thirty-three—70 per cent.”232 This, 
alongside a 1924 electoral commission that gerrymandered the boundaries of local government, 
solidified Protestant, Unionist rule. Catholic, nationalist communities did not contest these 
changes out of protest, but this tactic damaged their cause in the long run, as Paul Bew argues.233 
In local Northern Irish councils, the property valuation system, whereby the local franchise was 
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granted to men who met property qualifications, disproportionately represented Unionists. 
Nationalists claimed this discriminated against them, but it was standard practice to use this 
system both in Britain and Ireland.234 These actions carried significant political weight in favor 
of Protestant Unionists, but also demonstrate a “vicious circle of distrust” as “the question of 
discrimination was coloured as much by the preconceived notions of Nationalists as by the 
actions of Unionists”—a cycle that will evolve and perpetuate as the seeds of ethnic political 
conflict were sown.235 
In the south, the newly-elected Taoiseach (prime minister) Éamon de Valera rewrote the 
constitution to distance Ireland’s relationship with Britain. The brainchild of de Valera, the 1937 
Bunreacht na hÉireann (Irish Constitution) institutionalized Irish republican ideology in relation 
to Northern Ireland, posing territorial claims in Articles 2 and 3. For instance, the original Article 
2 stated: “the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its island and the territorial 
seas [emphasis added].”236 Thus, the new state of Éire (Ireland) claimed legitimate sovereignty 
over Northern Ireland. For the Stormont government, this constitutional irredentist claim 
confirmed their distrust of the Catholic community. This beleaguered mentality, in which 
Protestants were a majority in Northern Ireland but a minority on the island of Ireland, carried an 
immense ideological sway for years to come. 
 The British government took a hands-off approach in Northern Ireland, which gave 
Unionists an opportunity to build a Protestant state through the civil service and economic 
reforms. Although many republican and Marxist interpretations of the Northern Irish conflict 
posit that Unionist dominance was actively created by Westminster, McGarry contends that 
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“control actually established by the Ulster Unionist Party between 1920 and 1972 was not 
planned, but rather was sanctioned by the neglect of successive British governments.”237 For 
example, the newly-established Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) was intended to be run 
efficiently, like other imperial bureaucracies in the British empire. Nevertheless, “instances of 
discrimination against well qualified Catholics occurred from the very beginning” and 
nationalists were excluded from civil service appointment boards.238 In the economic sphere, 
Northern Ireland suffered from stagnation because of the changing global market after the First 
World War. This made its traditional Northern Irish industries, like linen and shipbuilding, 
uncompetitive. To respond to this economic decline, the government apparatus adopted a “step-
by-step” policy, in which Northern Ireland’s welfare state would mirror British social services, 
including health insurance and unemployment benefits.239  
 It is apparent that Northern Ireland did not have a historical tradition of consociational 
power-sharing, unlike Lebanon. The partition of the northern counties produced a Protestant-
majority political entity that wished to remain in the United Kingdom. The country’s early years 
reveal that power-sharing was not on the table, at least for the unionist politicians. Most of the 
Catholic minority believed that the Northern Irish state was illegitimate, while most Protestants 
saw Catholic opposition towards the Stormont government as a confirmation of their worst fears: 
that a sizeable minority in the region would pose an existential threat to Northern Ireland. British 
negligence, coupled with Irish irredentism, allowed Ulster unionists to maintain ethnic-majority 
rule until conditions made it untenable in the 1960s. In hindsight, the historical development of 
Northern Ireland demonstrates why any conflict resolution—power-sharing or otherwise—must 
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also involve the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the negotiating 
parties came to this realization only after decades of sectarian turmoil.  
4.3: Outbreak of the Troubles and the Seeds of Power-Sharing  
 
The Irish historian Tim Pat Coogan paints a familiar picture in his account of the 
Troubles’ origins. He notes how the Catholic minority’s rise in education levels after the Second 
World War, their subsequent awareness of their relative economic deprivation, and the 
transnational civil rights movements of the 1960s coalesced to provide the ingredients for the 
‘powder keg’ of civil unrest.240 The issue of housing was the spark that lit up ethnic relations. 
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), “a broad-based civil rights movement,” 
demanded significant reforms from the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) government. Their 
manifesto expressed policy proposals to uplift the Catholic minority’s standing in society: “a call 
for ‘one man, one vote’,” an “end to discrimination and gerrymandering,” and “fair play in 
public housing allocation,” among others.241 They employed civil disobedience tactics that 
mirrored the US Civil Rights movement—even singing We Shall Overcome in demonstrations in 
(London-) Derry.242 However, the hope and optimism were squashed. The Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s police force, violently attacked NICRA protestors in 
October 1968. Riots and burnings consumed predominantly Catholic areas like Falls Road in 
Belfast in August 1969, as certain ‘B-Specials’ patrols protected Protestant, loyalist mobs.243 As 
prime minister Terence O’Neill failed to control the situation and did little to appease an 
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aggrieved Catholic population, riled-up by a perception of deep injustice in the country’s 
institutions, Northern Ireland descended into a period of political violence and terrorism.  
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Figure 12 provides a simple breakdown of the four key political groups that emerged 
amidst the outbreak of violence. Nationalists, who were mostly Catholic, believed in uniting 
Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland in the south through political means; Republicans, 
who were also nationalists, supported an armed struggle to achieve this end.244 Unionists, who 
were mostly Protestant, believed in the political union with the UK and opposed Irish 
unification; Loyalists, who were unionists, supported an armed defense of the union.245 It is 
important to stress that although each religious community is not purely monolithic in its 
political stance vis-à-vis nationalism and unionism, one’s sectarian ethnic group is a primary 
political identifier in Northern Ireland, especially during the Troubles. Similar to the Lebanese 
civil war dynamic, different factions vie for political control within ethnic communities in 
Northern Ireland. As the conflict intensified into the 1970s, religious-ethnic polarization and 
 




mistrust between communities pushed nationalist and unionist political demands further into the 
extremes of republicanism and loyalism.  
 As early as the 1970s, British and Irish leaders sought a political solution to the ethnic 
conflict that would placate nationalist and unionist interests. The 1973 Sunningdale Agreement 
marked a milestone in British-Irish relations, as it “was the first occasion since 1925 that the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister), and the Northern 
Ireland government…had attended the same talks on the future of Northern Ireland.”246 This 
marked a recognition that any power-sharing solution in Northern Ireland must include 
considerations from the UK and Ireland. Sunningdale was short-lived, however. The Ulster 
Workers Council (UWC) and loyalist paramilitary groups mobilized anti-agreement Unionists to 
hold a general strike and put Northern Ireland at a standstill. The Northern Ireland Executive 
collapsed, only five months after the settlement—and peace was deferred. 
 In 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) made strides in forging power-sharing 
frameworks that reflected the Catholic, nationalist desire for greater political representation in 
Northern Ireland. The main breakthrough of this agreement was that it clearly acknowledged the 
Irish dimension of the Troubles, thereby “placing the conflict in its proper British-Irish 
context.”247 In a sense, the conflict was internationalized. McGarry and O’Leary comment on the 
treaty’s important step “as an attempt to create the conditions for power-sharing to work, as a 
master-plan to coerce key factions of the unionist bloc to accept some version of the 1973-4 
settlement [Sunningdale] as the least of several evils.”248 P.J. McLoughlin highlights political 
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shifts in the Catholic community because the AIA “may have encouraged a rethink within 
republicanism” and the value of engaging with the British state politically.249 Though the AIA 
ultimately failed to secure peace, it did ameliorate British-Irish relations in regard to Northern 
Ireland and paved the way for the multi-dimensional aspect of the Belfast Agreement. 
 The 1993 Downing Street Declaration (DSD) was the last intermediary step for all 
parties, including paramilitary groups, to achieve the Good Friday Agreement five years later. 
Like the AIA, the Downing Street Declaration was an intergovernmental agreement that affirmed 
the principle of consent for issues pertaining to the future constitution of Northern Ireland. As 
Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA shifted their stance on the use of political violence in the mid-
1980s and early 1990s, both the British and Irish governments hoped to integrate republicanism 
into the mainstream, “to persuade republicans to abandon violence whilst not completely 
alienating mainstream unionism,” as Eamonn O’Kane contends.250 This was no easy feat. Plenty 
of moving parts, involving dialogues between the Catholic community (the Humes-Adams talks) 
and Dublin and Westminster culminated in this statement that sets the preconditions for the 
GFA. The United States put external pressure on all parties to find a political solution. Hence, 
the DSD was the penultimate episode in the resolution of the Troubles. In fact, the IRA would 
call a cease-fire eight months after the DSD on August 31, 1994, followed by the loyalist 
paramilitaries in October—setting the stage for peace. 
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4.4: The Good Friday Agreement and the ‘Parity of Esteem’  
 
The Belfast Agreement—signed on Good Friday, April 10, 1998—was a multi-faceted 
power-sharing agreement and peace settlement, involving the UK, the Republic of Ireland, and 
all parties in Northern Ireland, including paramilitary groups. It was lauded as a political solution 
to the ethnic conflict that consumed Northern Ireland for thirty years. The culmination of 
arduous negotiations, the power-sharing agreement encapsulated a whole plethora of issues, 
ranging from electoral formulas to human rights. This complex treaty encompassed the British 
isles, in three so-called ‘Strands’: the internal affairs of Northern Ireland, North-South Ireland 
relations, and British-Irish relations. With the GFA’s sheer breadth, I will provide a brief 
overview of the text by highlighting specific sections that are pertinent to my investigation of 
power-sharing and ethnic tensions.  
 Heading into the final negotiations, UK prime minister Tony Blair identified two 
principles for a deal; namely, “constitutional reassurances for Unionists” and “equality for 
Nationalists in Northern Ireland.”251 What underpins the multilateral agreement is the principle 
of ‘parity of esteem.’ Jyrki Ruohomaki describes parity of esteem as a normative concept 
“grounded in the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and hostile political cultures 
in Northern Ireland, and that those cultures must be accommodated.”252 Through this pragmatic, 
and perhaps pessimistic notion, parity of esteem is a basis for coexistence between both 
communities in Northern Ireland. Further, the GFA is not only an internal peace settlement but 
also an international treaty between Ireland and the UK. This means that in the sections 
addressing Irish and UK relations, there is no cohesion strategy for Northern Ireland because it 
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deals with international issues and not the cohesion of an internally fragmented society. Figure 
13 provides a breakdown of the Belfast Agreement, according to my frameworks. 
 




Site(s) of Social 
Interaction Cohesion Strategy Summary of textual analysis 
Strand One Contestation Assimilation and Differentiation 
Institutional mechanisms and 
electoral procedures temper 
winners and shelter losers. Major 
decisions made with cross-
community support. Group identity 
designations in parliament enshrine 
ethnic power-sharing. 
Strand Two Collaboration N/A 
Greater cooperation between N. and 
S. Ireland, including suggestions 
for spheres of cooperation and 
coordination between governments. 
Strand Three Collaboration N/A 
Institutional forums designed to 
exchange information and 
coordinate issues of shared interest: 
UK and Irish governments, and 








Human rights language and calls 
for anti-discrimination legislation. 
Enshrines the concept of ‘parity of 
esteem’ in cultural spheres like 
language and symbols. 
Justice and 
Policing Collaboration Differentiation 
Overhaul of the criminal justice 
system, community confidence in 






‘Parity of esteem’ as the 
overarching principle to promote 
tolerance in Northern Ireland, with 
efforts to promote cross-community 
and cross-country dialogue and 
interaction. 
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In Strand One, consociation and power-sharing theories guide the structure of devolved 
government in Northern Ireland. Section 4 states that “The Assembly – operating on a cross-
community basis – will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved 
responsibilities.”253 Under “Safeguards,” institutional mechanisms to ensure consociational 
decision-making are outlined, plus the proportional allocation of Committee memberships and 
Ministers, “parallel consent” of a majority of unionists and nationalists, a “weighted majority” of 
60% of members on important decisions like the budget, and an “Equality Commission” to 
monitor equal rights violations between communities in public bodies.254 Thus, all major 
political decisions must be made by a national supermajority, binding together unionist and 
nationalist decision-making via a strategy of assimilation. Members elected to the Assembly 
must declare an affiliation: unionist, nationalist, or other.255 This is in line with a strategy of 
differentiation. An Executive, discharged by a jointly-elected First and Deputy First Minister, 
would lead an Executive Committee with its seats allocated to political parties through the 
d’Hondt system.256 Although unwieldy and complicated, the institutional make-up of the 
Northern Irish government forces cross-community cooperation on major issues. The country’s 
consociational, power-sharing disposition is affirmed through its implementation of affiliation 
reporting in the Northern Ireland Assembly. In this vein, Strand One envisions a site of 
contestation that is dampened by collaborative measures, mitigating the winner-loser dynamic 
inherent in sites of contestation. It also proscribes a strategy of assimilation and differentiation. 
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 Strand Two underscores the unique relationship between northern and southern Ireland, 
creating the North/South Ministerial Council (NSMC) as a compromise between nationalist 
aspirations and unionist concerns. In essence, the cross-island Council aims to “bring together 
those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop 
consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland…on matters of mutual interest 
within the competence of the Administrations, North and South.”257 This compromise allows for 
the greater cooperation between north and south desired by nationalists while assuaging unionist 
fears that the NSMC would be a skeletal framework for a united Irish government, by explicitly 
deriving its authority through each country’s legislative assembly. The Annex of Strand Two 
suggests twelve areas of cooperation, such as agriculture, education, tourism, and transport.258 
This section provides for a site of collaboration, a forum for which mutual interest between north 
and south could be discussed and acted upon. Because the enactment of NSMC policies is 
contingent on both legislatures, Council decisions must be made with a broad consensus in north 
and south Ireland. Ultimately, Strand Two particularly caters to Northern Ireland’s Catholic, 
nationalist communities, who seek a closer relationship with the Republic of Ireland.  
 To wrap up the agreement, Strand Three addresses British-Irish relations, establishing the 
British-Irish Council (BIC) and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) to allay 
unionist discomfort over Northern Ireland’s closer relationship to the Republic in the previous 
section. The goal of the BIC is to “promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development 
of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands,” and thus creating an 
institutional forum for all nations in the British isles.259 Through consensus decision-making, the 
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BIC would deliberate on “common policies or common actions.”260 Another intergovernmental 
institution, the BIIC, would “bring together the British and Irish Governments to promote 
bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest” through a standing 
intergovernmental forum.261 This section addresses how the British and Irish governments would 
consult each other on “issues of mutual concern in relation to Northern Ireland,” 
institutionalizing the dual relationship of the region and solidifying the two government’s shared 
interest in maintaining peace and governance. The Third Strand interlocks two sites of 
collaboration, between the constituent nations of the British isles and between the sovereign 
governments of the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Nonetheless, these sites scantily arise 
because of the high bar of consensus needed to enact policy. Implicit in these institutions is the 
acknowledgment of Northern Ireland’s close ties to the Union, conceding institutional support 
for unionists via isle-wide political bodies.  
 Further areas addressed in the Agreement are human rights and equality, economic, 
social, and cultural issues. This distinguishes the Belfast Agreement from Taif, as its breadth of 
topics for consideration demonstrates how truly encompassing this treaty was. Of course, it is 
one thing to write all these provisions down on paper, and another to enact them. The GFA 
reaffirms human rights, and a “commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the 
religious liberties of everyone in the community.”262 This section calls for the creation of a 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and Equality Commission to safeguard human 
rights and equality throughout society.263 Moreover, the agreement “recognizes that victims have 
a right to remember as well as to contribute to a changed society,” as it states the “essential 
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aspect of the reconciliation process,” which is “the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every 
level of society…”264 With respect to economic and cultural spheres, this section acknowledges 
the need to address the “differential in unemployment rates between the two communities” and 
the importance of “linguistic diversity” in Northern Ireland.265 Many bold pronouncements on 
human rights and equality make this section quite progressive—but also ambiguous. These areas, 
once intense sites of contestation during the Troubles, are envisioned as sites of coexistence and 
collaboration. Assimilation and differentiation are both pursued, implying that all will benefit 
economically as one unit, while culture will be respected by both communities. ‘Mutual respect’ 
keeps appearing in the text and is indicative of this coexistence and collaborative lens.  
The last provisions of the GFA covering justice, policing, and the decommissioning of 
paramilitaries became the most contentious. A stated goal of the agreement is to “achieve the 
decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement…of the 
agreement,” a timeline that was too slow for unionists, and too fast for nationalists.266 For 
policing and justice, the document stresses that there must be “a new beginning to policing in 
Northern Ireland with police services capable of attracting and sustaining support from the 
community as a whole.”267 It adds certain aims in the creation of a new criminal justice system:  
“deliver a fair and impartial system of justice to the community; be responsive to the 
community’s concerns, and encouraging community involvement where appropriate; 
have the confidence of all parts of the community; and deliver justice efficiently and 
effectively.”268 
 
A Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland and a Review of the Criminal Justice System are 
sketched out in subsequent sections, presenting the parameters for which public bodies can 
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determine new legislation, regulations, and policy moving forward. These issues divided the 
Protestant and Catholic communities and would be a sticking point in the initial implementation 
of the Belfast Agreement. Like other hotly-contested spheres of social interaction during the 
Troubles, policing and decommissioning proved to be sites of contestation. In this case, the 
agreement attempts to transform these institutions to become sites of collaboration—a drastic 
move, considering the intense political violence and terrorism that both communities viewed as 
legitimizing the use of force, whether from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the British Army, the 
IRA, or loyalist paramilitaries.  
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Similar to the Taif Agreement, the GFA resorted to “constructive ambiguity” in the text 
so the multiple parties could agree to its ratification.269 This gave the various parties room for 
maneuvering, because they could interpret the open-ended parts of the agreement, and its 
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specificities, in a way that would garner support from their divergent communities. Nonetheless, 
the power-sharing agreement, as Arthur Aughey suggests, was meant to be transformative: “The 
reconstitution of Northern Ireland had become the deconstruction of Northern Ireland.”270 Yet in 
adopting this perspective on the GFA, we encounter a problem, for this meant that, as Colin 
Harvey argues, “the contest of Northern Ireland has not ended.”271 The rhetoric and proposed 
institutions in the power-sharing agreement enshrine an approach to conflict resolution that 
involves the conversion of sites of contestation to sites of coexistence and/or collaboration, in a 
normative effort to build a lasting peace between communities in the country. Even in a site of 
contestation like the Northern Ireland Assembly, complicated mechanisms—from the d’Hondt 
system to PR STV voting—are designed to temper the zero-sum game of politics. Thus, one can 
conclude that the overall cohesion strategy of the Belfast Agreement was differentiation, 
underpinned by the institutionalizing of sites of coexistence and collaboration.  
Elaborating on the causal hypotheses I pose in Figure 14, the Northern Irish case study 
analysis should find that ethnic tensions, on balance, have decreased. Accordingly, there should 
be limited success for the power-sharing regime in the long run. Because of the overall SSIs of 
coexistence and collaboration, the Good Friday Agreement, if implemented fully, would provide 
the conditions for a decrease in ethnic tensions. If the overall cohesion strategy of differentiation 
is implemented, case-specific factors will help determine whether or not there was an increase or 
decrease of intergroup animosities in Northern Ireland.  
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4.5: ‘Fighting For Peace’ after Power-Sharing 
 
Simultaneous referenda on the Good Friday Agreement were held in northern and 
southern Ireland on May 22, 1998. Unionist reactions were mixed. Though David Trimble, 
leader of the UUP, claimed he secured the end of the Republic’s territorial claims and 
recognition of “the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom,” others like the Rev. Ian Paisley 
and his Democratic Unionist Party were unconvinced.272 The DUP called the deal “treacherous” 
and was “nothing short of deception.”273 Paul Dixon notes how politicians like Tony Blair 
engaged in ‘honorable deception’ under the veil of the Agreement’s ambiguity, to convince 
certain Conservatives and unionists, who “had supported the ‘Yes’ campaign in the referendum 
under the impression that decommissioning would take place.”274  
The republican movement, for their part, trusted in the Sinn Féin leadership, who 
reasoned that the Agreement was “weakening the British link while defending the rights of Irish 
men and women…”275 Though splinter groups would contest the GFA, the Catholic 
community—both nationalist and republican—voted in a cohesive manner. For a moment, SF 
and the main Catholic nationalist party—the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)—
worked in concert. The campaign was successful in both countries. With a record turnout in 
Northern Ireland of 81 percent, 71.1 percent voted in favor of the Agreement, and in the 
Republic, it was an overwhelming 94.4 percent.276 However, as Aughey observes, “the 
overwhelming majority of nationalists voted yes but only a small majority of unionists did 
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likewise.”277 This could be viewed as a harbinger of the unionist community’s distrust of the 
GFA, but at the moment, the referendum was considered a tremendous success in legitimizing 
the treaty and paving the way for peace. 
 Stumbling blocks came, and many hurdles had to be jumped. Elections for the first 
Assembly yielded electoral success for the two main pro-Agreement parties; the UUP and the 
SDLP. In a close third was the anti-Agreement DUP, and the republican pro-Agreement Sinn 
Féin in fourth. As Hennessy observes, it was the first time in Northern Irish history that a 
nationalist party received the most first preference votes, while also revealing a split in 
unionism.278 The repeal of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 with the passing of the Northern 
Ireland Constitution Act 1998 enshrined the country’s place in the Union, dependent on the 
consent of the people.279 However, the new Stormont government could not sit, over 
disagreements between the UUP and Sinn Féin over the IRA’s decommissioning. This coincided 
with an upsurge in ethnic tensions, including the Omagh bombing in August 1998, which killed 
29 people.280 This incident was the deadliest attack in the conflict’s history. Multiple proposals, 
including the Hillsborough Declaration and Way Forward document, sought to outline a clear 
timeline on both paramilitary decommissioning and British troop withdrawals, but mutual 
distrust proved to be a stubborn barrier for mutual agreement.281 
 The St Andrews Agreement in 2006 ushered in a ‘fresh start’ to the peace process. In 
2003, Northern Irish elections resulted in the anti-agreement DUP and the republican Sinn Féin 
gaining the first and second most votes, respectively. This posed a considerable clash that 
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ultimately led to the collapse of power-sharing and direct rule from Westminster. The DUP 
refused to enter an agreement with SF because they viewed that the IRA was still too closely 
linked with the political party.282 Sinn Féin, on the other hand, did not acknowledge the reformed 
police service—and refused to share power with the DUP, who did not acknowledge all aspects 
of the Good Friday Agreement. Progress was made when the IRA completed its 
decommissioning process in 2005.283 By the next year, a compromise agreement was struck, so 
that Sinn Féin would accept the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the DUP would 
accept all power-sharing institutions.284 On May 8, 2007, a remarkable power-sharing 




282 “What Is the St Andrews Agreement?,” The Guardian, October 17, 2006, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/oct/17/northernireland.devolution1. 
283 Christopher Riches and Jan Palmowski, “St Andrews Agreement,” in A Dictionary of Contemporary World 




Figure 15. Implementation of GFA 10 Years After Adoption285 
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 The Peace Accords Matrix data for the Good Friday Agreement paints a much better 
picture for this power-sharing arrangement’s implementation 10 years after its adoption than the 
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Taif Accords. The coding shows that most parts of the agreement were implemented except 
“judiciary reform” and “paramilitary groups,” which received a “minimum” and “intermediate” 
coding, respectively. To recall, the categories listed above are a selection of a broader list that 
this dataset codes for. Further, the GFA scores high marks in its overall implementation score, a 
sign that it has almost been fully implemented. This data corroborates the historical analysis of 
post-agreement Northern Ireland. Although there were many stumbling blocks for peace, both 
communities remained committed to the peace process. Even when power-sharing collapsed, 
steps were taken in the interim—like the decommissioning of the IRA—to induce cooperation 
between unlikely bedfellows: Martin McGuinness and Ian Paisley. To delve into the GFA 
implementation process, I take a look into anti-discrimination and employment policies in 
Northern Ireland, which under “Economic and Social Development,” was coded as fully 
implemented. 
4.6: Anti-Discrimination and Economic Opportunities after Peace 
 
 The “Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity” section of the GFA addresses 
economic issues in Northern Ireland, envisioning an aggressive government push for economic 
equality and development. In this respect, post-GFA economic policies sought to create sites of 
coexistence and collaboration in the pursuit of a differentiation cohesion strategy. Section 1 sets 
conditions for economic reform. Although it places the onus on the UK Government, the 
implementation of economic policies was “pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern 
Ireland Assembly.”286 This underpins the emphasis on sustaining the political power-sharing 
settlement to usher in economic stability and progress. The GFA further outlined a 
comprehensive “regional development strategy,” with the goal of “tackling the problems of a 
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divided society and social cohesion in urban, rural and border areas” through transport, physical 
infrastructure, resource development, and urban renewal.287 This overall strategy would be 
intertwined with “short and medium term economic planning.”288 The economy was seen as a 
vehicle to promote a site of collaboration, in which the UK Government could claim they aimed 
to ‘lift all boats’ in Northern Ireland—Protestant and Catholic. This is an apparent assimilation 
strategy for the region’s workforce. 
As for economic equality, Section 2, subsection iii tackles “employment equality,” a 
serious issue for nationalists:  
“(iii) measures on employment equality included in the recent White Paper ("Partnership 
for Equality") and covering the extension and strengthening of anti-discrimination 
legislation, a review of the national security aspects of the present fair employment 
legislation at the earliest possible time, a new more focused Targeting Social Need 
initiative and a range of measures aimed at combating unemployment and progressively 
eliminating the differential in unemployment rates between the two communities by 
targeting objective need.”289 
 
This section admits the historical economic gap between Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland. As a prevailing factor in NICRA and the Northern Ireland civil rights movement’s rise in 
the late 1960s, unfair housing and employment practices added to Catholic grievances over 
political representation.290 For many, this economic disparity was the original issue of the 
Troubles, which was then obfuscated by an armed struggle and militant republicanism that 
sought Irish unification.  
 The Partnership for Equality White Paper, written in March 1998, projected the economic 
possibilities for Northern Ireland after peace. It takes the neoliberal, ‘new’ Labour view on work, 
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stating that “the Government believes that everyone should have an opportunity to play a 
productive role in the economy. Unemployment is a major contributor to poverty and the result 
of unemployment is usually welfare dependency.”291 The paper proposes the implementation of 
two initiatives: the Policy Appraisal and Fair Treatment (PAFT) guidance, which “aims to ensure 
that equality considerations are taken into account in the mainstream of Government policies” 
and “Targeting Social Need (TSN)…directed at socio-economic disadvantage.”292 In assessing 
PAFT’s successes and failures since its first iteration in 1994, the Government concluded that a 
“statutory obligation on public bodies” is needed to implement “equality of opportunity” 
guidelines.293 This body, a “unified Equality Commission,” would consolidate the Fair 
Employment Commission, Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland, Commission 
for Racial Equality for Northern Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Disability Council, and may 
deliberate on “the application of the concept of parity of esteem” in the law.294 In addition, the 
Government proposes a “New TSN” with “specific initiatives to promote the ‘social economy’ 
by developing economic activity and indigenous job creation at the community level.”295 These 
efforts, such as “job subsidies,” targeted investment in “identified disadvantaged areas,” and 
“targeting of education resources,” would be coordinated in conjunction with the Department of 
Economic Development and Northern Ireland Office.296  
 Another facet of the Northern Irish economy this White Paper examines are the problems 
of “social exclusion”—or marginalized communities, in today’s parlance. A new initiative for 
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Northern Ireland, Promoting Social Inclusion (PSI) is proposed, to prevent social exclusion.297 
This initiative, as laid out in the paper, seems amorphous, as it seeks a “holistic approach, 
transcending bureaucratic demarcation lines” and will improve “mechanisms for integrating 
policies and programmes…and drawing up key indicators of social exclusion against which to 
monitor progress.”298 Throughout this document, a running theme is revealed. It is evident that 
the Blair Government sought an active role in re-shaping the Northern Irish economy. Once a 
site of contestation between ethnic-religious communities, Blair wished to transform it into a site 
of collaboration where all disadvantaged, regardless of region, are uplifted. If poverty 
purportedly causes terror in the minds of many British politicians, then economic uplift will take 
the wind out of IRA recruitment.  
 On balance, the aggressive equality and anti-discrimination effort in the workforce has 
been somewhat successful. R.D. Osborne comments on the effects of these policies five years 
after the GFA: “the operationalization of fair participation, through affirmative action 
agreements, helped directly in the process of producing greater equality in the employment 
profiles of Protestants and Catholics.”299 The Northern Ireland Executive’s Labour Force Survey 
Religion Report conducted in 2017 marks considerable strides in employment percentage parity 
between Protestants and Catholics. Their data showed that the working-age economic activity 
rate for Protestants changed “from 76% in 1992 to 73% in 2017” while Catholics changed “from 
66% in 1992 to 70% in 2017.”300 The unemployment rate for ages 16+ also reflected the closing 
gap between communities: Protestants percentages changed “from 9% in 1992 to 4% in 2017” 
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and for Catholics “from 18% in 1992 to 4% in 2017.”301 These numbers show that a trend of 
parity is emerging in employment in Northern Ireland. For the Northern Irish Executive, these 
statistics and metrics prove that the country is steadily addressing the GFA’s concern for the 
employment disparities that were a factor in the Troubles. 
 Nevertheless, many commentators caution against using these figures to trumpet the 
complete success of the Northern Irish peace process. Commenting on these numbers, John 
Coakley warns that “it would be dangerous to jump to any political conclusions on the basis of 
these demographic developments,” in questions about the future of Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional status.302 Economist Esmond Birnie is more optimistic, saying that “the jobs gap 
between the communities had now ‘closed completely’.”303 But he too is cautious against a rosy 
view of Northern Ireland’s situation, adding that “the disappearance of the unemployment 
difference by itself does not definitively prove that religious discrimination existed in the past 
has now been eliminated.”304 Certainly, this data, at face value, does not unequivocally 
demonstrate that religious discrimination in the workforce is no longer an issue—although 
certain groups may claim that in order to discontinue these policies. They do point to promising 
trends that a level of parity in employment is being reached in the late 2010s. Catholics are 
gaining more job opportunities and closing the gap. In my framework, I categorize this case as a 
mostly successful instance of implementing an envisioned site of collaboration and assimilation 
strategy in the GFA.  
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4.7: Decommissioning: Having a Bone to Pick With Everyone 
 
 The decommissioning of paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland was a controversial 
issue for both communities, hindering aspects of the peace process. The GFA outlines protocols 
for decommissioning, which calls for the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD) to “[develop] schemes which can represent a workable basis for 
achieving the decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the possession of paramilitary 
groups.”305 An aggressive timeline is laid out, with the goal of “[achieving] the decommissioning 
of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South 
of the agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement” and the 
enactment of a decommissioning scheme by the end of June 1998.306 During the referendum 
campaign, decommissioning remained a sticking point for many unionists, who felt hesitant to 
vote for the power-sharing agreement if the IRA was still mobilized. As mentioned earlier, Blair 
used constructive ambiguity to placate unionist concerns—through half-lies. Though the GFA 
did pass, the issue of decommissioning derailed the beginnings of the new Stormont 
government.307 Hence, it is evident that this became a site of contestation, even before the power-
sharing arrangement’s ratification. 
 Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State promulgated the Decommissioning Scheme by the 
end of June, in accordance with the power-sharing agreement. The document specifies the 
process of decommissioning, to be overseen by the IICD.308 Spearheaded by General John de 
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Chastelain of Canada, this institutional arrangement involved members from Finland and the 
United States. This bolstered trust in the fair oversight of decommissioning for armed republican 
groups. The proposal further outlines policies of non-disclosure and confidentiality for the 
members of paramilitary groups partaking in arms dumps.309 The Commission would facilitate 
this process, recording the specifications of the arms, and destroying them.310 Progress for the 
enactment of these proposals, however, was not made after the ratification of the GFA. Unionists 
would have none of it and hindered the formation of a power-sharing government.  
As a result, unionist and nationalist elements drew lines in the sand. As David Mitchell 
writes, the “Unionists’ determination to pursue decommissioning stemmed from their perception 
of the immense ideological implications of weapons—silent or otherwise—remaining in the 
hands of their republican adversaries.”311 For the republican movement, “Sinn Féin adopted a 
two-pronged approach of, on the one hand, constructing a discourse of non-violent progress and 
momentum towards achieving republicanism’s traditional goals, and on the other, keeping in 
faith with its militant tradition by (among other things) stalling on decommissioning.”312 This 
fortified their non-violence claims as they engaged in Northern Irish politics, yet maintained their 
militarism to placate loyal republican supporters. The UUP made its move, as its ministers in the 
Stormont Executive resigned en masse on October 18, 2001—throwing Northern Ireland’s 
government in disarray.313 This moment was a critical juncture for the power-sharing 
agreement’s viability, as it threatened to derail it completely. Nevertheless, on October 23, 2001, 
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the IRA, framing itself as the savior of the GFA, announced: “We have implemented the scheme 
agreed with the IICD in August. Our motivation is clear. This unprecedented move is to save the 
peace process and to persuade others of our genuine intentions.”314 Up to this point, the IRA did 
not budge in its intransigence—but its leadership chose to begin decommissioning to further its 
‘two-pronged’ approach when the unionists were on the verge of ripping up Northern Ireland’s 
power-sharing institutions. 
The precarious nature of peace was on full display in this power-sharing crisis. However, 
the IRA did begin the decommissioning process and continued the destruction of arms in 2002 
and 2003. It is no coincidence that the IRA’s decommissioning continued relatively smoothly as 
the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections yielded favorable results for Sinn Féin, placing it 
as the leader of the Catholic bloc in Stormont for the first time in its electoral history.315 Two 
years later (2005), the IRA officially ended its armed struggle:  
“The leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann has formally ordered an end to the armed 
campaign. 
 
This will take effect from 4pm [1600 BST] this afternoon [Thursday 28 July 2005]. 
 
All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms. 
 
All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and  
democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means. 
 
Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.”316 
 
By September, the Commission notified the UK and Irish Governments that they verified the 
completion of the IRA’s decommissioning: “We have determined that the IRA has met its 
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commitment to put all arms beyond use in a manner called for by the legislation.”317 Seven years 
after the power-sharing arrangement, the contentious issue of the IRA’s demilitarization was laid 
to rest. Although smaller loyalist and fringe republican militias continued to decommission their 
arms between 2005 to 2010, the IICD officially ended its mandate in February 2010. 
 The Good Friday Agreement attempted to foster a site of collaboration, under the auspice 
of an international, independent body, to decommission paramilitary groups. It was soon clear 
that this area was a site of contestation for the main political actors in Northern Ireland. Mitchell 
describes this environment aptly: “In this context of threat, vulnerability and uncertainty, the 
decommissioning issue perpetuated the zero-sum thinking and communal mobilisation 
associated with earlier periods, with the political effect of polarisation.”318 This was the only way 
to properly assimilate violent actors into Northern Irish society. Eventually, progress was made 
as decommissioning proceeded with the IRA—trickling down to smaller loyalist groups, who 
felt pressure to disarm because their main enemy was no longer weaponized. Therefore, it is 
apparent that although a site of contestation arose when it was conceived as a site of 
collaboration, decommissioning was implemented in a limited fashion. What resulted was the 
‘state-in-your-lane’ atmosphere of an SSI of coexistence. This shows the potential for one type 
of SSI to transition to another during the power-sharing implementation process. Likewise, the 
assimilation strategy, though polarizing during the process, ultimately succeeded in its aim to 
end the armed struggle and bring all those involved into a peaceful mode of operation. 
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4.8: Ethnic Tensions?: What Polling Does (and Does Not) Suggest 
 
Public opinion polling in Northern Ireland is widespread and common because the 
country’s political stakeholders have incentives to gauge the people’s views on Irish unification. 
So numerous are the polls and their results that Gerry Moriarty, in his piece in the Irish Times 
quips, “you can almost pick your poll to support your point of view.”319 Some polls can seem 
like a tale of two cities. In February 2020 alone, a Lucid Talk poll found that “46.8% in Northern 
Ireland would vote to remain in the UK, while 45.4% would vote for a united Ireland,” while 
Liverpool University and Britain’s Economic and Social Research Council found that “just 29% 
of voters” would support Irish unity, and “52% against.”320 How could we, then, accurately 
gauge ethnic sentiments in Northern Ireland? Can we use polling data to show the extent to 
which there are ethnic tensions after the GFA? Yes, it is possible—but only with a healthy dose 
of skepticism and if interviews, incidents, and other reporting can supplement polling data. 
Since the Good Friday Agreement, people’s perceptions of identity have shifted as a 
unique ‘North Irishness’ has gained traction among both Protestant and Catholic communities. 
Jonathan Tonge and Raul Gomez conduct a statistical analysis on the Northern Ireland Life and 
Times annual survey to investigate sectarian identities, as it provides consistent polling data on 
questions of political affiliation, identity, and the constitution every year after the power-sharing 
agreement was struck, except 2011 (due to funding issues).321 Their 2015 findings reveal that an 
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emergent Northern Irish identity is developing in the country, despite the prevalence of the 
British-Irish ethnic and national dynamic in political rhetoric. Accordingly, they show that: 
“British identity has declined since 2000 even though 2012 represents an increase on the 
immediately preceding years. Conversely, both Irish and Northern Irish identity have 
increased since 2000…If we look at the evolution of Northern Irishness for the two main 
communities, it is evident that most Protestants started declaring themselves Northern 
Irish after the first half of the 2000s while the opposite trend is observed among 
Catholics.” 322 
  
One’s sense of identity and the strength of their feelings of belonging is a precursor to ethnic 
tensions. If the prevailing ethnic identities are steadily muted by some shared ‘Northern Irish’ 
identity, it is reasonable to think that ethnic antagonisms in Northern Ireland are, on balance, in 
decline since the GFA power-sharing agreement.  
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In general, these trends can be corroborated in more recent polling, since 2012. Created 
after the power-sharing agreement, the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey conducts annual 
face-to-face interviews of 1800 respondents that reflect Northern Irish society.324 Respondents 
were asked, “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a unionist, a nationalist, or 
neither?”325 As shown in Figure 16, from 2013 to 2019, the “neither” response saw an overall 
slight increase in percentage. Conversely, both “unionist” and “nationalist” responses ever so 
slightly decreased. 2019 bucks the trend, as there was a marked decrease in respondents 
answering “neither” and a slight increase in both “unionist” and “nationalist” responses. This 
was caused by Brexit’s centrality in the 2019 general election, which may have reawakened 
ethnic sentiments. However, as Kathy Hayward argues, the election results showed “there is a 
move to a centre ground” and “the overriding common feature of the centre ground is pro-
remain.”326 Nevertheless, if one corresponds Unionism with Britishness, Nationalism with 
Irishness, and “neither” as a sense of Northern Irishness, then subsequent NILT polling supports 
Tonge and Gomez’s arguments that some sense of national identity is taking root in the country. 
Ethnic tensions in Northern Ireland are gradually decreasing, as unionist and nationalist 
sentiments are giving way to the growing group who identify as neither. Even in light of Brexit, 
overall trends point to a growing population who do not particularly care for Unionism’s 
attachment to Britishness or Nationalism’s to Irishness. Tonge and Gomez pinpoint “that there 
are clear signs of younger non-religious individuals and young Protestants, particularly the well-
educated, being significantly more likely to adopt a Northern Irish identity.”327 This generational 
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effect could reflect favorably on the progress brought by the power-sharing arrangement. Further 
research demonstrates that this leveling of unionist and nationalist ethnic identities and the 
emergence of a third, Northern Irish identity, can be attributed in large part to the GFA.  
Viewed through the lens of our theoretical model, the multi-dimensional nature of the power-
sharing agreement shares a strategy of differentiation, where institutions recognize the legitimate 
aspirations of both communities through the concept of ‘parity of esteem’ and the Irish and 
British-Irish intergovernmental mechanisms that interlock.  
4.9: Findings and Conclusions 
 
 













































In the case of Northern Ireland, power-sharing was not embedded in the region’s political 
legacy. The Northern Irish state preserved Protestant dominance in government, which among 
several factors, collapsed at the end of the 1960s—the beginnings of the Troubles. Various 
settlements throughout the violent conflict, though unsuccessful, built a foundation of trust 
between all political actors involved in Northern Ireland. This led to the creation and ratification 
of the Belfast Agreement in 1998. The recent history, post-agreement, attests to the hard-won 
 132 
peace being cultivated in the country. Many false starts and rock blocks ensnarled the Northern 
Irish peace process. But through the efforts of strong-willed politicians who were committed to 
peace, power-sharing institutions remain intact—unlike the Lebanese state.  
 Through this study, I confirm the relationship between SSIs and cohesion strategies, 
ethnic tensions, and the success or failure of power-sharing. Figure 17 provides a succinct 
overview of my case study. Through a textual analysis of the Good Friday Agreement, I 
categorize its sections into my typologies of SSIs and cohesion strategies, finding an overall SSI 
of coexistence and cohesion strategy of differentiation. Then, I engage in a process-tracing 
analysis of two particular sections: anti-discrimination and employment and decommissioning. 
Northern Ireland’s anti-discrimination legislation and employment equality outcomes 
demonstrate success in implementing the envisioned sites of coexistence and collaboration, as 
well as the overall strategy of assimilation and differentiation. The case of decommissioning is of 
note since I conclude that although conceived as a site of collaboration, in reality, it became a 
site of contestation and then transitioned into a site of coexistence, after decommissioning ended. 
This demonstrates the fluid progression of SSIs as power-sharing regimes implement their 
policies. As for ethnic tensions, I found that there was a slight decrease in tensions since peace 
was achieved. Lastly, power-sharing has been implemented and the state, since its reconstitution, 
has been relatively stable—so I deem this a limited success. Overall, these findings confirm my 






Conclusion: Is Power-Sharing Worth It? 
 
“But you see, it's not me, it's not my family / In your head, in your head they are fighting / With 
their tanks, and their bombs, and their bombs, and their guns / In your head, in your head they 
are crying”  
 
– The Cranberries, Zombie, 1994328 
 
“They said to you / Enough preaching, come dance with me a bit / Why are you frowning, come 
dance with me a bit / They taught you the anthem; they said your struggle is useful for the nation 
/ They drugged you in the vein; they said your lethargy is useful for the nation.” 
 
 – Mashrou’ Leila, Lil Watan, 2013329 
 
5.1: Summary of Findings 
 
 
Figure 18. Summary of Case Study Findings 
Case Study Lebanon Northern Ireland 
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328 The Cranberries – Zombie, accessed March 9, 2021, https://genius.com/The-cranberries-zombie-lyrics. 
329 “Mashrou’ Leila: Lil Watan ( نَطَوْلِل ),” Lebanese Arabic Institute (blog), December 4, 2016, 
https://www.lebanesearabicinstitute.com/mashrou-leila-lil-watan/. 
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 This work endeavored to answer the question: To what extent do power-sharing 
arrangements affect ethnic tensions in post-conflict society? I conclude that power-sharing plays 
a definitive role in ethnic tensions and regime outcomes. To sum up, I reformulated Pierre 
Nora’s lieux de mémoire to extrapolate a sites of social interactions (SSIs) model as a unit of 
analysis for post-conflict societies. Alongside a model of cohesion strategies that accounts for 
power-sharing institutional designs, I describe a causal logic by piecing together my proposed 
theoretical frameworks. They predict the increase or decrease of ethnic group animosities after 
power-sharing arrangements are instituted. According to my typology of SSIs, sites of 
contestation (zero-sum game) corresponds to an increase in ethnic tensions. Conversely, sites of 
collaboration (shared space) correspond to a decrease in tensions. For sites of coexistence 
(tolerance/stay-in-your-own-lane), I hypothesize that ethnic antagonisms may increase or 
decrease, depending on case-specific conditions. As for cohesion strategies, I determine that 
assimilation—under a new national identity or a hegemonic ethnic identity—will increase 
tensions between ethnic rivals, while segregation—separation and bifurcation of nationality—
yields a decrease in tensions. Differentiation, which pursues tolerance and pluralism, will either 
increase or decrease animosities, depending on specific factors. Lastly, I posit that SSIs and 
cohesion strategies that produce an increase in ethnic tensions through power-sharing will lead to 
the regime’s long-term failure. On the other hand, SSIs and cohesion strategies that form a 
decrease will lead to a power-sharing regime’s long-term success. Mixed ethnic animosities 
could yield limited failure or success depending on certain case factors. 
  Lebanon’s history with power-sharing demonstrates that consociationalism had played a 
leading role in maintaining stability for that part of the world for centuries. Under the French 
mandate, these traditions of consociation were enshrined in the country’s constitution, but 
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presupposes a Maronite Catholic majority. During the 1960s and 70s, the government’s political 
make-up became unsustainable demographically, which precipitated the Lebanese civil war. 
After years of turbulence, involving multiple intra- and interethnic conflicts and interventions 
from abroad, parties met at Taif, Saudi Arabia to strike a power-sharing agreement for a new 
Lebanon. In the power-sharing agreement, one can see an overall SSI of coexistence and 
cohesion strategies of assimilation and differentiation.  
Next, I focused on two specific sections of Taif: namely, education and economic 
recovery/displacement. Many factors, after peace was achieved, led to weak implementation of 
the power-sharing agreement. Lebanese education, envisioned as a site of collaboration for an 
assimilation strategy, turned into a site of contestation, as religious leaders and partisan politics 
intervened in the building of curricula and textbooks. The effects are felt throughout the school 
system, showing disparities among sects and a lack of a truly national education program. As for 
the neoliberal economic reforms overseen by the new Lebanese government, corruption and 
clientelism tainted the coexistence and collaboration SSIs, creating a site of contestation. 
Displacement claims were filed through sectarian parties. War reconstruction, at least for 
Lebanese officials, meant raising the very sites of coexistence that Beirutis cherished before the 
war. My gauge of ethnic tensions found, in the same period after the reconstitution of Lebanon’s 
government, that animosities have increased dramatically. Overall, it is evident that the Taif 
Accords failed to cultivate sites conducive to a decrease in ethnic tensions, resulting in 
Lebanon’s power-sharing failure in the long run. My hypotheses are thus confirmed. 
Northern Ireland, created in the aftermath of Irish independence, did not have a power-
sharing tradition. Instead, it was configured to provide a majority ethnic-religious Protestant 
government. Conditions made the Protestant unionist hegemony over Stormont untenable in the 
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1960s, which led to the outbreak of the Troubles in 1972. As political violence and terrorism 
ebbed and flowed during this period, political actors from the UK, Ireland, and Northern Ireland 
proposed various power-sharing settlements—though all were unsuccessful. This changed in 
1998, however, when the Belfast Agreement was struck on Good Friday. Composing of 
constitutional reconfigurations, international treaties, and the use of supranational bodies like the 
European Union, the GFA had immense breadth and depth. 
In the power-sharing agreement, I found that it encoded overall SSIs of coexistence and 
contestation, as well as a cohesion strategy of differentiation. The concepts of ‘parity of esteem’ 
and ‘mutual respect’ guided policymakers’ vision for Northern Ireland, as these ideas became 
institutionalized and manifested through these types of SSIs and the cohesion strategy. I examine 
two realms of the agreement: anti-discrimination legislation and economic equality, and 
decommissioning. The mostly successful implementation of sites of coexistence and 
collaboration in anti-discrimination and economic reform for Northern Ireland promised to 
decrease antagonisms. As for the issue of decommissioning, the GFA was idealistic in its 
proscription of a site of collaboration. It became a sticking point at the beginning of the Stormont 
government, causing power-sharing breaks in the first years of peace. However, by the time the 
IRA decommissioned fully, this sphere became a site of coexistence, which pursued an 
assimilation strategy for paramilitaries. For my analysis of sentiments, ethnic tensions in the 
country, on balance, decreased slightly. My hypotheses line up with the Northern Irish case 
study, further corroborating my conclusions in the Lebanese case. 
My thesis proves a distinct causal chain between ethnic tensions and power-sharing 
success or failure, analyzed through the theoretical framework of sites of social interaction and 
cohesion strategies. Figure 18 neatly gathers my findings from each case study, comparing them 
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to my hypotheses addressed in Chapter 2. On one hand, power-sharing arrangements with SSIs 
and cohesion strategies that promote an increase in ethnic tensions or fail to implement SSIs and 
cohesion strategies that would promote a decrease in animosities will falter in the long run. On 
the other hand, power-sharing including SSIs and cohesion strategies conducive to a decrease in 
ethnic tensions and that are successfully implemented will endure. In between these two 
conclusions, there are degrees of the increase or decrease of ethnic animosity in post-conflict 
society and degrees of success or failure (limited success or failure, as I describe) in power-
sharing regimes. In the case of decommissioning, I conclude that there is a possibility for SSIs to 
transition during the implementation process of a power-sharing agreement, contingent upon 
certain factors. This variation of my hypothesis should be acknowledged but does not detract 
from its overall viability to explain this phenomenon. Hence, I demonstrate my three hypotheses’ 
explanatory power in my comprehensive comparative study. 
 Power-sharing arrangements impact a divided society’s ethnic relations through the 
mechanisms of sites of social interaction and cohesion strategies. The outcome of power-sharing, 
in a broad sense, is a function of the extent to which ethnic tensions are salient in a post-conflict 
society. The Lebanon and Northern Ireland cases illustrate similar paths, but drastic 
differences—due, in large part, to each country’s power-sharing arrangements. Each 
arrangement proscribes a different societal make-up (SSIs) and institutional design (cohesion 
strategies), to achieve stability after a civil war. While the Taif Accords was minimally 
implemented, the GFA was mostly implemented. The missing key in understanding power-
sharing and ethnic tensions lie in this theory of society, institutional design, and ethnic identity.  
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5.2: Scholarly and Practical Implications 
 
 I am careful not to make broad-stroke conclusions in the field of ethnic conflict. The SSI 
and cohesion strategies model should be treated as one of many lenses to analyze power-sharing 
and ethnic conflict after peace is achieved in divided societies. These frameworks can be a 
touchstone for new research or analyzing previous works. Michael Kerr, for instance, uses the 
same cases to investigate the role of external powers in each polity’s relative failure and success. 
He argues: “As far as consociation in Northern Ireland and Lebanon is concerned, exogenous 
pressures have been the determining factors when evaluating consociation’s chances of long-
term success,” a reasonable conclusion after my own study of both countries.330 On the surface, 
our conclusions may look incompatible. However, my framework may actually supplement 
Kerr’s work, as future scholarship can analyze the extent to which external powers influence the 
creation or dissolution of certain SSIs and cohesion strategies conducive to ethnic tensions 
increase or decrease. One may find that an external power’s influence may affect ethnic tensions 
and alter the trajectory of power-sharing arrangements. Simply put, this framework lends itself 
for use in a post-conflict setting, where it can assist scholars in their studies of divided societies. 
As more of these constitutional remedies are being instituted, there is a greater need to study the 
effects of these political institutions. Lebanon and Northern Ireland are cases that paralleled in 
ethnic-religious conflict, but drastically differ in outcomes.  
I believe SSIs and cohesion strategies can aid scholars as they study other causal factors 
that contribute to power-sharing’s success or failure. For example, an in-depth case analysis of 
Belgium’s power-sharing regime can use the SSI and cohesion strategies framework to assess 
 
330 Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing :Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon / (Dublin, 
2006), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015064694444, 40. 
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how the political institutions have shaped Belgian society.331 A scholar may look into a particular 
causal variable in a multi-ethnic society—like Singapore’s adoption of English as the state’s 
lingua franca—to determine how it aided in the country’s cohesion strategy.332 Though my 
theoretical framework was premised on the study of power-sharing and ethnic tensions, there is 
room for the typologies established in my thesis to be appropriated to ask broader questions 
about the relationship between institutions and society—ethnically divided or not.  
This examination adds to the rich body of work analyzing the effects of power-sharing 
arrangements. I prove that power-sharing institutions carry weight in future ethnic tensions and 
possibly, future sources of ethnic conflict. Although power-sharing may achieve peace in the 
short run, it may pose governing challenges in the future if ethnic tensions remain high and if 
sites of contestation are dominant in a divided society. This aligns with Roeder and Rothchild’s 
views on power-sharing: “The very same institutions that provide an attractive basis to end a 
conflict in an ethnically divided country are likely to hinder the consolidation of peace and 
democracy over the longer term.”333 In contrast, my theoretical frameworks conflict with other 
scholars’ theoretical findings on consociationalism, such as Lijphart and Horowitz.334 My focus 
is on societal impacts of institutions, rather than ideal institutional designs per se.  
 
331 See Marc Hooghe and Kris Deschouwer, “Veto Players and Electoral Reform in Belgium,” West European 
Politics 34, no. 3 (May 1, 2011): 626–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.555987. Their discussion about 
the electoral reform process could lend itself to an examination of why certain reforms have failed while others have 
succeeded through my conceptual schemas. 
332 See Chapter 1, “Language Policy in Singapore: English, Singlish, and the Mother Tongues” in Lionel Wee, The 
Singlish Controversy: Language, Culture and Identity in a Globalizing World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316855331. On face value, I can hypothesize that Singapore’s language 
policy pursues an assimilation cohesion strategy through a site of coexistence. Scholars can study specific aspects of 
an ethnically-diverse society, like language, through my theory. 
333 Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, “Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies,” in Roeder and 
Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, 6. 
334 See Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” in The Oxford Companion to Comparative Politics (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199738595.001.0001/acref-
9780199738595-e-95; Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985). 
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In particular, this study calls into question Lijphart’s original theories of consociational 
democracy, especially in its favorable view of elite coalition-building. His notion of a grand 
coalition is premised on elite compromise “because it minimizes the risk of being deceived by 
the other parties or by one’s own undue optimism concerning their willingness to be 
accommodating.”335 But if this space is viewed as a site of contestation, where a zero-sum game 
takes place, cooperation becomes only an ideal. How can a system premised on compromise be 
sustainable for a state’s long-term viability, when by the nature of the political institutions, they 
are sites of contestation? Even after both Taif and the GFA implemented political mechanisms 
that, in theory, tempered this winner-loser dynamic, power-sharing was still fraught with ethnic 
tension in the political sphere. Older theories of consociation can lend themselves to theoretical 
and empirical study in the SSIs and cohesion strategies framework—and may lead to 
institutional design improvements for divided societies. 
In practice, policymakers must be cognizant of the long-term impact that power-sharing 
agreements have on a polity. In a sense, the designers of consociational constitutions have a role 
to play in influencing the formation or re-formation of ethnic identities in post-conflict societies. 
Policymakers should view power-sharing through a macro-oriented lens. They should try to 
account for how political institutions influence practices and behaviors that trickle down to the 
societal level. For example, the Lebanese power-sharing agreement guaranteed the right for 
religious notables to provide education, but in a different section, it calls for universal education 
under a unifying, national curriculum. If policymakers were aware of the repercussions of this 
underlying contradiction on education policy when they wrote it, they should not be shocked to 
see those religious leaders stymie education reform in the country. Surely, I have the valuable 
 
335 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 31. 
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tool of hindsight, but if these texts are laid out with more intentionality—considering SSIs, 
cohesion strategies, and its effects of ethnic tensions—power-sharing can be a more viable tool 
for long-term stability in a divided society. 
Although the full implementation of power-sharing settlements seems rare, agreements 
that consider society-wide action (Northern Ireland) will fare better than strictly political designs. 
Policymakers should anticipate roadblocks in power-sharing implementation. There is always 
wriggle room in these negotiations, either for good or ill, but if implementation is to be 
successful, politicians must be held accountable. Both Lebanon and Northern Ireland suffered 
from this problem. The lack of accountability was in full display in the aftermath of the 2020 
Beirut port explosion, but many Lebanese people already knew that corruption and illegal 
enrichment go hand in hand in that country’s politics.336 After charges were brought against 
former prime minister Hassan Diab, his legal counsel “accused the judge of violating the 
Constitution by circumventing the Parliament with his latest actions and suggested that the judge 
did not have the authority to charge a prime minister.337 The Stormont government, to a lesser 
extent, has had issues with accountability in the Executive.338 The 2012 Renewable Heat 
Incentive, under First Minister Arlene Foster, came under fire for mismanagement and 
allegations of corruption. Although an independent inquiry absolved the First Minister of 
corruption, the report found incompetence and mismanagement in Stormont: “an accumulation 
of errors and omissions over time and a failure of attention, on the part of all those involved in 
 
336 See “Corruption Is Endemic in Lebanon’s Political System,” Transparency.org, accessed March 28, 2021, 
https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/corruption-is-endemic-in-lebanons-political-system-the-imf-can-help-change-
that. 
337 Ben Hubbard, “Lebanon Prime Minister Charged With Negligence in Beirut Blast,” The New York Times, 
December 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/world/middleeast/beirut-explosion-charges.html. 
338 See “Northern Ireland: Restoration of the Power-Sharing Executive,” The Institute for Government, January 13, 
2020, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/northern-ireland-restoration-power-sharing-executive. 
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their differing roles, to identify the existence, significance or implications of those errors and 
omissions.”339 
As seen in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, power-sharing is never fully manifested in its 
theoretical forms or as proscribed by political scientists. Rather, it is a product of arduous 
negotiations and compromises, which may hinder the development of a social fabric for post-
conflict societies in the long run. It is true especially if negotiations are elite-driven, top-down 
approaches, instead of a bottom-up, democratic consent-based agreement. This form of power-
sharing gives citizens the power to hold politicians accountable for their actions, especially short-
sighted political calculations that jeopardize peace. Stable power-sharing should lend itself to 
democratic norms. Though I may sound idealistic, I do not believe these two concepts are 
contradictory. In fact, I would argue that they are supplemental to post-conflict regime stability.  
I am no philosopher or politician—but as an academic, I can conclude that power-sharing 
institutions have a clear and defined normative impact on society and identity. This is not an 
innovation of thought, of course. Nonetheless, SSIs and cohesion strategies provide key insights 
into this powerful relationship. Political actors should be cognizant, especially when crafting 
legislation and political institutions, of the long-term ramifications of their decisions. In this case, 
it is one thing to write down statistical electoral formulas and high-minded ideals like ‘justice’ 
and ‘peace’ on a piece of paper—it is another to actually enact peace-building institutions and 
strategies in a war-torn society. Sure, it is a tall order to ask leaders to achieve these things in a 
lifetime—but it is still something that the people must demand. 
  
 




5.3: Remaining Questions 
 
 My research establishes a causal relationship between sites of social interaction and 
cohesion strategies in power-sharing arrangements and the increase or decrease in ethnic tensions 
in a divided society. There are plenty of questions to explore because of this investigation. 
Within both case studies, recent developments in Lebanon and Northern Ireland raise important 
questions about the future of power-sharing in those countries. How has the influx of Syrian 
refugees challenged the already fragile SSIs in Lebanon? What is the interplay between the 
shifting demographics in Lebanon and the cohesion strategies the government pursues? In 
Northern Ireland, how will Brexit affect the region’s cohesion strategy of ‘parity of esteem’? 
What is the role of Northern Irish civil society and grassroots organizations in cultivating sites of 
collaboration, integral to reducing ethnic tensions? Lebanon and Northern Ireland face dramatic 
critical junctures in 2021—and the decisions of political actors and the people may chart a new 
course for power-sharing in these countries.  
 There are also general, enduring questions in this field that my work raises. To what 
extent do international powers affect the outcomes of power-sharing agreements and their 
implementation? What role do modernization and secularism play in reinforcing ethnic-religious 
identities? How has the specter of colonialism haunted these violent conflicts and their power-
sharing agreements? How are institutions—meant to function or operate in one way—altered, 
manipulated, or co-opted to advance political goals in ways that were not anticipated? What role 
does the population have in influencing power-sharing and coalition building? How can sites of 
social interaction and cohesion strategies transform ethnic identities in general? Can institutions 
remold ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial identities? In this discussion, we cannot ignore the 
normative questions this study raises. Is power-sharing a preferred solution to ethnic conflict, if it 
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may lead to an increase of ethnic tensions in the long run? Can power-sharing institutions that 
achieve peace be scrapped for other political arrangements that may be more democratic in the 
future?  
5.4: Final Remarks 
 
Let’s return to where we left off, in our “tale of two taxi drivers”: Abu George and David. 
In the first chapter, we asked if we “can view power-sharing through the rearview window?” The 
short answer is yes—and no. This work has studied power-sharing arrangements in Northern 
Ireland and Lebanon knowing that there has been a sizeable gap between each peace agreement’s 
ratification and today’s power-sharing outcomes. Yet, I don’t think we can fully view power-
sharing agreements as a thing of the past, especially in these two countries. In fact, for our two 
taxi drivers, the legacy of power-sharing is ever-present. For them, it’s not about viewing their 
society behind the rearview mirror—it’s about what’s in front of them through the windshield. 
David sees Belfast’s UDA murals, adorned with the Union Jack and the colorful images of 
loyalist defenders dressed in their opaque sunglasses and bright berets—indeed, the great 
embodiment of ‘No Surrender’ in the face of the ‘greening’ of Northern Ireland. Abu George 
sees Beirut’s bombed-out Holiday Inn—once a testament to the ‘Paris of the Middle East,’ now 
dilapidated, riddled by the scars of sniper fire and shelling, towering high above a crippled city—
as the Security Forces guard this edifice of Lebanon’s circular possibilities: of what was and 
what is a condition of suffering. For all my theoretical squabbling, posing ‘ifs’ and forming 
hypotheses, the real ‘research’ question is quite simple, at least for our taxi drivers: was power-
sharing worth it? 
 Power-sharing is an institutional concept that projects itself onto post-conflict societies, 
emanating practices and behaviors that influence the rise and fall of ethnic divisions. Ethnicity is 
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not constant. Identity is malleable. Ethnic identity is thus contingent. Many scholars have 
explored these notions and proven, both theoretically and empirically, that these are the logics 
behind nation-ness. To some, this analysis of identity seems as though humans are wishy-washy, 
ever-changing, and inconstant. Yet, as it is made evident in this study, the contemporary world 
order is underpinned by the idea of nations and states. The bloodiest conflicts post-World War II 
and into this present century involve these fundamental questions of national identity. What is 
championed by the cases of Northern Ireland and Lebanon, at least traditionally, is how these 
two countries ended their internal conflict: through power-sharing institutions. 
 In a post-Cold War era of resurgent liberal internationalism, the concept of power-sharing 
was lauded by many theoreticians and practitioners of international affairs as a means of 
promoting peaceful, stable democracy in war-torn divided societies. Such areas, like Lebanon 
and Northern Ireland, cannot even agree on basic things like a flag or symbol, or a national 
language or ‘character,’ yet they have found a path towards coexistence. With the guiding hand 
of other countries, rival groups who seemed like they want to maim and kill the ‘other’ in a 
primordial, tribe-like matter found themselves sitting at the negotiation table, signing a new era 
of peace for their grateful nations. Or so they believed.  
 Consociational democracy that is intentionally implemented, in practice, has not had too 
many successes. Even in the cases that may seem relatively successful, power-sharing encounters 
serious challenges not only in implementation but in its own preservation. Mechanisms designed 
to do so and so or modify behavior in such a manner get co-opted and instrumentalized for 
political expediency. This may be a pessimistic view of power-sharing, albeit grounded in this 
study’s analysis of Lebanon and Northern Ireland.  
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 But, as much as I can diminish these power-sharing agreements for not living up to the 
promise that they may have held, power-sharing does accomplish two laudable objectives: peace 
and democracy. The effects of ‘negative’ peace, or the absence of war, truly changed the fabric 
of the two countries we have examined. In Lebanon, negative peace chartered a neoliberal path 
in its economic development and reconstruction, as the likes of Rafik Hariri tried to transform 
Beirut from a warzone into a center of luxury. But that allure is long forgotten. Northern Ireland, 
similarly, has experienced positive economic growth, as the city of Belfast has flourished in the 
tourist and service industries. But Brexit throws all of this up in the air, for the time being. 
We cannot underestimate the normative impact of power-sharing institutions on society. 
Perhaps, as political scientists, we take that for granted. When institutions are held up to a 
magnifying glass, not just in its political consequences, but in its effects on everyday life, we get 
a glimpse of how something as ‘essential’ or ‘inherent’ as ethnic, religious, political, or linguistic 
identity can be molded by socio-political structures and behaviors. After all, institutions 
ultimately institutionalize ideas—in some cases, what is, in others, what ought to be. As humans 
who hold identities, as citizens who participate in politics, and as members of a cohesive, 
common unit known as society, we must challenge, scrutinize, repudiate, and justify the 
institutions that we create. Not just for the sake of the people of Northern Ireland and Lebanon, 
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